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"SOME EFFECTUAL POWER": THE QUANTITY AND
QUALITY OF DECISIONMAKING REQUIRED OF
ARTICLE III COURTS
James S. Liebman* and William F. Ryan**
Did the Framers attempt to establish an effectual power in the national
judiciary to void state law that is contrary tofederal law, yet permit Congress
to decide whether or not to conferfederaljurisdictionover cases arisingunder
federal law? Does the Constitution, then, authorize its own destruction?
This Article answers "yes" to the first question, and "no" to the second.
Based on a new study of the meticulously negotiated compromises that produced the texts of Article HI and the Supremacy Clause, and a new synthesis
of severalclassicFederal Courts cases, the Article shows that, by self-conscious
constitutional design, and by dint of a consistent pattern of constitutional
interpretation by the Supreme Court, the principalmechanism for keeping
federal law supreme over contrary state law is not an assured "quantity" of
federal "arisingunder"jurisdiction but, instead, an assured "quality" of
federal judging in cases in which Congress confers jurisdiction. Encompassed within "[tihejudicialPower" are five qualitative means to the overridingstructuralobjective of national legal supremacy: An Article HI court
must decide (1) the whole federal question (2) independently and (3)finally,
based on (4) the whole supreme law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in the
process of binding the partiesto the court'sjudgment,effectuates supreme law
and neutralizes contrary law. Applying these principles, the Article explains
why the qualified immunity and Teague v. Lane doctrines, and one reading of amended section 2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, are constitutional, and why the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits' readingof section 2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM AND ITS
RESOLUTION THROUGH "THE JUDICIAL POWER" AND
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself
than it is odious to the people... of this country... [who] will
never be satisfied till some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes
and uncertainties which characterize the State administrations.
The FederalistNo. 37 (fames Madison)'
To correct vices [of the Articles of Confederation] is the business of this convention. One of its vices is the want of an
effectual controul in the whole over its parts. What danger is
there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy of each part,
and will not the general interest be continually sacrificed to local interests?
James Wilson 2
No man of sense will believe that such [constitutional] prohibitions [of actions by state legislatures] would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them.
3
The FederalistNo. 80 (AlexanderHamilton)
To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the
judiciary?
4
John Marshall
The state courts. In the scheme of the Constitution, they are the
primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases
they may be the ultimate ones. If they were to fail, and if
Congress had taken away the Supreme Court's appellate juris5
diction... then we really would be sunk.
[T]he difficulty involved in asserting any judicial control in the
face of a total denial of jurisdiction doesn't exist if Congress
gives jurisdiction but [tries to] put[ ] strings on it.... When the
way of exercising jurisdiction is in question, rather than its de6
nial, the constitutional tests are different.
1. The Federalist No. 37, at 243 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
2. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 167 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(June 8, 1787) [hereinafter Farrand].
3. The Federalist No. 80, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
4. 3Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 554 (1866) (statement of John Marshall at Virginia ratifying

convention) (June 20, 1788).
5. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953).
6. Id. at 1372.
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to

decide

Henry Hart
In 1953, Professor Henry Hart noted that "[t]he reports are full of
what may be thought to be injudiciously unqualified statements of the
power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts."'8 So,
arguably, is Article III of the United States Constitution. 9 Indeed, the
combination of Congress's seemingly "plenary"10 "Exceptions, and ...
Regulations" power regarding the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
and its "may [or may not] ... ordain and establish" power regarding the
lower federal courts," and its equally broad power to withhold consent to
lawsuits against the United States,1 2 creates (in Hart's phrase) "a double
reason ... why Congress has an absolute power over legal relations between the Government and private persons."' 3 Similarly, although not
discussed by Hart, the combination of Congress's power to limit federal
jurisdiction, and the Eleventh Amendment and common law immunity of
the states and their officers, 14 creates a "double reason" why federal

judicial review of state law and action is unprotected and unstable.
"How," Professor Hart asked, posing the central conundrum of federal
7. Id. at 1402.

8. Id. at 1362; see, e.g., Lockertyv. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Hart, supra

note

5, at 1363-66 (citing cases); Julian Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 671, 675-77 & nn.10,
12, 13 & 16, 681 n.42, 704 n.162, 712 n.195, 748 n.363 (1997).
9. See, e.g., infra notes 125-133, 203-208, 223-226, 267, 273-277, 287-289, 298 and
accompanying text (discussing Article III's apparent grant to Congress of the power to
decide (1) whether or not to "ordain and establish" inferior federal courts, (2) which cases
or controversies the entire federal judiciary's jurisdiction "shall extend to," and (3) what
"Exceptions, and . . . Regulations [it] shall make" in regard to the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction). For the majority view that "the plan of the Constitution . . . was
quite simply that the Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial
institution should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated
differently, how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state courts," Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965), see, e.g.,
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 901, 906 (1984);John Harrison, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III,
64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 207-08, 216-20, 243-47 (1997); DanielJ. Meltzer, The History and
Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1569, 1569 (1990); Martin H. Redish,
Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A
Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 143, 145-46 (1982). But see articles cited
infra notes 17-22.
10. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to ExParteMcCardle,15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229,
260 (1973).
11. U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
12. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).
13. Hart, supra note 5, at 1370.
14. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1122-32 (1996) (discussing
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 & n.12 (1984)
(extending a qualified immunity to state officials sued for damages in their personal
capacities for actions taken under color of state law).
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jurisdiction and of this Article, can Congress's powers and these official
immunities "be reconciled with the basic presuppositions of a regime of
15
law and of constitutional government?"
Insofar as the consistency of state law and behavior with federal law is
concerned, the answer Professor Hart gave was that "state courts... are
the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they
may be the ultimate ones." 16 That answer has not proved satisfactory to
many commentators. In Professor Amar's representative statement of the
problem, the Constitution's habitual reliance on "structural mechanisms
to harness the interplay of competing self-interest" makes it "grossly out
of character"-indeed, "naively blind" and "unthinkable"-"for the
framers to have committed 'ultimate' trusteeship of the Constitution to
state judges, whose appointment, tenure and removal were nowhere even
mentioned in, much less prescribed by, the [Constitution]."17 This view
has led some commentators to read Article III to mandate federal (or,
perhaps, only Supreme Court appellate) 18 jurisdiction over all cases 19
(or, at least, all legal as opposed to factual questions presented by all
cases) 20 falling within the nine heads ofjurisdiction listed in Section 2 of
that article, or at least over all cases insofar as they present federal (or,
22
21
perhaps, only constitutional) questions.
Letting state action escape federal review also troubles prominent
scholars who read the Constitution to allow Congress to make state courts
15. Hart, supra note 5, at 1363.
16. Id. at 1401; see id. at 1363-64 ("Congress seems to have plenary power to limit
federal jurisdiction when the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought, if
at all, in a state court.").
17. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article I: Separating the Two Tiers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 237-38 & n.112, 250 (1985); see, e.g.,
Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 Yale L.J. 498, 522 (1974); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 64, 68 (1981).
18. See Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 160-61 (1960).
19. See William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
United States 610-20 (1953); 1 Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 212, 239-47 (1971); 3Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution § 1696 (1833); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of
Federal CourtJurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 844-55 (1984).
20. See Raoul Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court 285-96 (1969) (later
repudiated in favor of broad congressional power over federal jurisdiction, see Raoul
Berger, Michael Perry's Functional Justification for Judicial Activism, 8 U. Dayton L. Rev.
465, 512-27 (1983)); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the
Exceptions Clause, 53 Or. L. Rev. 3, 27-28 (1973); HenryJ. Merry, Scope of the Supreme
Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 53, 54 & n.6 (1962).
21. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 522, 527; Sager, supra note 17, at 42-68.
22. See Amar, supra note 17, at 229-30, 238-59 (arguing that federal jurisdiction is
mandatory in federal question, admiralty, and ambassadorial cases).
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the ultimate arbiters of most questions of federal constitutional law. Particularly poignant are two statements by Professor Bator:
The "states' rights" argument at the Constitutional Convention
was that there was no need for lower federal courts precisely
because the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would
provide sufficient assurance of the supremacy and uniformity of
federal law in cases decided by the state courts. It was the premise of this argument that the Supreme Court would have the
power to review cases originating in the state courts concerning
issues of federal law. It was plainly not contemplated that the
system could work effectively with 23the state courts as courts of
last resort on issues of federal law.
If the Constitution means what it says, it means that
Congress can make the state courts . .. the ultimate authority
for the decision of any24category of case to which the federal
judicial power extends.
A similar unease underlies a third school of thought, that the Framers
deliberately obscured the answer to the question of how much jurisdiction the federal courts must have, to let Congress and the Court work out
25
a solution to a problem the Framers could not solve.
This Article argues that the Framers not only saw the problem but
solved it. They did so, to be sure, by compromising in favor of an "untried and untested" experiment in which Madison, for one, initially had
little faith. 26 But in the process of agreeing on that experiment, they
endeavored with exquisite care to draft constitutional language that precisely embodied the experiment's protocols and made them enforceable
against both Congress and the courts. Moreover, the solution the
Framers embedded in the much-negotiated texts of Article III and, crucially, Article VI's Supremacy Clause is nearly the opposite of the one that
subsequent commentary has thought to be necessary, even if (e.g., in
Bator's view) 2 7 textually impossible. The Framers did not assume that the
quality of state judicial review of state law for consistency with federal law
was so low that large quantities of mandatory federal question jurisdiction
were required. Rather, the Framers invited Congress to place the vast
quantity of federal question jurisdiction in the hands of "the Judges in
23. Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over theJurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
Vill. L. Rev. 1030, 1038-39 (1982).
24. Id. at 1039; accord Gunther, supra note 9, at 901, 906; Hart, supra note 5, at
1401-02; Velasco, supra note 8, at 713.
25. See Akhil Reed Arnar, Taking Article III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman,
85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 442, 452-53 (1991); William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier
Analysis of Congressional Control over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 Const. Commentary 89, 96
(1990); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 50-51 (1990).
26. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins ofJudicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 Stan.
L. Rev. 1031, 1048-50 (1997); see infra notes 354-355 and accompanying text.
27. See Bator, supra note 23, at 1038-39.
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every State"28-constituting what amounts to a distinct structural agency
of government lying between the state and federal spheres-while relying
upon the constitutionally fortified quality of federal judicial review (insofar as Congress was compelled for practical reasons to authorize it) to
assure that state judges performed their constitutionally crucial function.
The Framers thus relied on review by "the Judges in every State" as a
check on (or, better, a filter for) state law inconsistent with "the supreme
Law of the Land."29 The Framers then designed the qualitatively, not
quantitatively, defined 'Judicial Power" to decide "Cases . . . [and]
Controversies" 30 independently, comprehensively, lawfully, finally, and effectually as a check on state judges (or, better, as a way to "spot-check" state
judges' decisions to see if they fulfilled the judges' structurally crucial
duties).31 The Framers then designed Congress's "Exceptions, and...
Regulations" and "may . .. ordain and establish" powers to check the
federal judiciary. Finally, the Framers used the ambitions of a Congress
naturally disposed to aggrandize its sphere of influence at the expense of
the states to check its temptation, in league with the states, to aggrandize
their respective powers at the expense of the national judiciary's spotchecking function.
The Framers' solution to the problem of the fidelity of state law to
federal law is important not only because it is a central structural feature
of the Constitution but also because, as we show, it supplies the organizing principle for large swaths of American constitutional law. In addition, the solution has bite even today. A key provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996-amended section
2254(d) (1)-requires federal habeas courts adjudicating the legality of a
state conviction to limit themselves to considering "clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" at
32
the time the state high court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal.
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits read section 2254(d) (1) to go
even further. They would require a federal judge, upon independently
reviewing a state decision upholding a conviction on direct appeal, and
upon finding the decision inconsistent with clearly established federal
law, to effectuate the decision anyway and deny relief unless the decision's legal error is "grave" or "more than clear[ ],,.33 As we show, the
28. U.S. Const. art. V1, cl. 2.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
31. The ingredients of "[t]he judicial Power" are defined infra text accompanying
notes 350-351; see infra notes 330-349 and accompanying text.
32. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996) (codified as amended at

28 U.S.G.A. § 2254(d) (1) (West Supp. 1998)).
33. Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1997) (following Lindh v. Murphy,
96 F.3d 856, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2059
(1997)); see Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 923-25 (11th Cir. 1998); Drinkard v.Johnson,
97 F.3d 751, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Carter,
117 F.3d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Framers' conception of "[tihe judicial Power,"3 4 and of the supremacymaintaining function that underlies that "Power," is consistent with section 2254(d) (1)'s narrower reading (and with the Teague v. Lane35 and
qualified immunity doctrines that the reading partly mimics), but cannot
tolerate the kinds of deference that, on the broader Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuit reading, section 2254(d) (1) would oblige federal courts
to give to state decisions found to violate federal law.
Part I lays out our thesis in a play-by-play rebroadcast of the
Constitutional Convention and the carefully negotiated texts of Article III
and the Supremacy Clause. Part II then points out how little attention
the Supreme Court has given since the framing period to the quantity of
its and the lower federal courts' jurisdiction to review state law for consistency with federal law and how much attention it has given to preserving
the quality of its and the lower federal courts' review of state law when
Congress confers jurisdiction. The Court, we conclude, has sought to
preserve precisely the independence, "whole case," "whole supreme law,"
finality, and effectualness qualities that the Framers intended to
constitute "[tihe judicial Power." As did the Framers, moreover, the
Court has understood those qualities and that "Power" as principally
designed to maintain-and to ensure that "the Judges in every State"
maintain-" [the] Constitution, and the Laws of the United States, ...
and all Treaties... [as] the supreme Law of the Land[,] ...any Thing in
'36
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Only by reference to the Supremacy Clause, that is, can the nature of
"[the judicial Power" be understood. Making these points enables us to
provide a fresh perspective on a number of Federal Courts doctrines by
revealing a unifying, "qualitative" explanation for them that has not previously been identified.
Part III applies what we have learned to show why the Supreme
Court's qualified immunity and Teague doctrines, and the narrower of the
two readings of section 2254(d) (1), all of which deny relief to individuals
harmed by state action in violation of subsequently adopted readings of
the Constitution, are consistent with "[t] he judicial Power" as we define
it. It then explains why the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' broader
reading of section 2254(d) (1) to forbid habeas relief from state decisions
reached in violation of preexisting understandings of the Constitution is
not consistent with that "Power." In identifying a limit that Article III and
the Supremacy Clause place on the capacity of federal courts, on their
own or at Congress's behest, to withhold all relief in cases within their
jurisdiction, we identify an important "effectualness" qualification of the
37
standard view of Article III courts' remedial discretion.
34. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

35. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
36. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
37. Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 379, 849-54 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] (standard
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The extent of Congress's power to define the shape and authority of
the federal judiciary has remained a riddle for more than 200 years.
Scholars have looked for a solution in selected words and phrases in
Article III, which in relevant part reads as follows:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
[2] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
38
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
For some, the solution to Article III's riddle lies in the reference in
its first sentence to "[t] he judicial Power," although there is sharp disagreement over the phrase's meaning and its interchangeability, or not,
with the word 'jurisdiction."- 9 This debate has shaded into another over
view, following Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & DanielJ. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1736 (1991)), with infra note 399, and
infra notes 674, 774-799 and accompanying text.
38. U.S. Const. art. IIl.
39. Some commentators assume that Section l's phrase "[t]he judicial Power" is
defined exclusively by the cases and controversies to which Section 2, Clause 1 says that
power "shall extend," i.e., as if the terms "It]he judicial Power" and "jurisdiction" are
interchangeable (notwithstanding that the text seems to distinguish the two concepts,
treating the former in Section 1 and Section 2, Clause 1 and the latter in Section 2, Clause
2). See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 19, at 749-50, 791, 796; Gunther, supra note 9, at 899;
Ratner, supra note 18, at 172-73. Others contend that "It]he judicial Power" and
"jurisdiction" are related but not synonymous. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 17, at 233;
Harrison, supra note 9, at 214-18; Velasco, supra note 8, at 711. Still others distinguish
"[t]he judicial Power" from "jurisdiction," without defining the former term. See, e.g.,
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the meaning of Section 2, Clause 1, which provides that "[t] he judicial
Power shall extend to" three categories of "Cases" and six categories of
"Controversies," with "all" modifying only the first three "Cases" categories. Most importantly, does "extend to" mean "reach," in essence estab40
lishing a ceiling on the cases and controversies federal courts can hear,
or "be," establishing a floor as well as a ceiling?4' Are "Cases" (meaning,
for example, criminal and civil actions, thus perhaps explaining the use
of "all" with "Cases") 42 different from "Controversies" (meaning, for example, only civil suits)? 43 Or does the use of the word "all" before "Cases"
require that some federal court have authority to "decide finally" every
44
lawsuit coming within that category of disputes?
Also hotly contested is the meaning of the second clause of Article
III, Section 2, which lists categories of "Cases" in which the Supreme
Court "shall have original Jurisdiction" and provides that, "[i]n all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under
such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Does the Exceptions and
Regulations Clause grant Congress plenary power over the scope of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, 45 or limit that power only by the
proviso that the "Exceptions" not swallow the rule that the Court generally has jurisdiction in such cases? 46 Or is Congress's power to "except"
limited to questions of fact, 4 7 or simply an authorization to Congress to
reallocate "excepted" cases to the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-

Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review: Its Legal and Historical Basis and
Other Essays 16 (1914); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1176-77 (1992).
40. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1997) ("The grant of
federal judicial power is cast in terms of its reach . . . ." (emphasis added)); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 374 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("The
words are, 'shall extend to;' now that which extends to, does not necessarily include in, so
that the circle may enlarge, until it reaches the objects that limit it, and yet not take them
in."); Harrison, supra note 9, at 212-16; Velasco, supra note 8, at 702-04; infra notes 129,
132, 267, 298.
41. See Amar, supra note 17, at 229, 239-40; Clinton, supra note 19, at 749-50.
42. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 230-34.
43. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431-32 (1793) (Iredell,J., dissenting); Casto, supra note 25,
at 90; Meltzer, supra note 9, at 1575-76.
44. Amar, supra note 17, at 229; see Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 333-37 (dicta);
supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
45. See authorities cited supra notes 9, 24 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 5, at 1365; Sager, supra note 17, at 44; Laurence H.
Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the Federal Courts,
16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129, 135 (1981).
47. See authorities cited supra note 20.
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49
tion, 48 or to the lower federal courts' original or appellate jurisdiction,
while still requiring some federal judicial say in "all" such cases?
These "words and phrases" disputes pose a more fundamental question: To what source should we look for help in discerning the meaning
of the disputed terms? References in the ratification debates-the preferred source of the Constitution's original meaning-are sparse and
rarely interesting,50 while mainly normative arguments reveal little more
than how much is at stake in the debate. We accordingly turn to a different, surprisingly underutilized, source-the records of the Constitutional
Convention. In using these records, we do not ignore the preference for
original understanding over intent nor the risk posed by records meant
to be kept secret, 5 1 nor do we even claim that the proceedings always
provide a useful guide when no other is available. We do, however, conclude that the recorded deliberative process that produced the texts of
Article III and the Supremacy Clause is an unusually authoritative (i.e.,
accurate and legitimate) source of the meaning of those texts.
We reach this conclusion for several reasons that are documented
below: (1) Article III and the Supremacy Clause emerged from a painstaking series of drafts and redrafts, accepted and rejected amendments,
and renegotiations of agreed-to texts over a period of months. (2) This
meticulous process was necessary because (a) the judiciary played a central role in all of the contending forces' initial conceptions of the new
government's federal structure, (b) those conceptions-typified by
Madison's and Rutledge's-and the roles they assigned the judiciary were
sharply incongruent, and (c) no initial conception commanded a majority. (3) Madison (the author of many of the records) and at least some of
his allies and opponents evidently understood the intricate process of
forging a compromise as aimed at producing not only a majority but also
a conception of the new government's federal structure that, although
different from their own initial conceptions, was equally intelligible and
coherent as a matter of the accepted "checks and balances" political science of the day. (4) The contending forces' proposals so consistently
pulled (albeit in different ways and to different degrees) in the same contending directions that the participants almost certainly understood the
process and its product in the same way-i.e., as carefully calibrating (a)
the risk of abusive law and power that the state and national governments

48. See Corwin, supra note 39, at 5-6; Clinton, supra note 19, at 778. But see
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803).
49. See Amar, supra note 17, at 255-57 (applying this interpretation to "Cases" but
not to "Controversies" delineated in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1); Clinton, supra note
19, at 778.
50. See Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply,
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1651, 1664 (1990); cf. infra notes 208, 298, 305-311, 317-320, 322-323,
329-335, 342, 350, 353-355 (discussing pertinent aspects of the ratification debates).
51. See 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at xi. The Convention'sJournal was printed in 1819
pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress, and Madison's notes were published in 1840
after his death. See id. at xi-xii, xv.
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were expected to pose, (b) the degree to which judicial as opposed to
other mechanisms would be used to curb those abuses, (c) the respective
roles of federal and state judges insofar as courts were given that task, and
(d) the relative contribution of quantities and qualities ofjudging insofar
as federaljudges bore the task. (5) The drafting process that produced
Article III and the Supremacy Clause thus was sufficiently central to the
overall enterprise, committed to conceptual coherence, and transparent
that it not only provides evidence of, but actually seems by design to have
generated,a shared understanding of the meaning of the two crucial provisions among the participants in the process. Moreover, the most active of
those participants (e.g., Madison, Wilson, Randolph, Hamilton, Rutledge,
Sherman, and Martin) also were central players in the ratification process
in which they assumedly (and, via The Federalist,quite explicitly) 5 2 shared
their own understanding with the other ratifiers, with at least this much
success: The set of questions that had riven the Convention for months,
until the compromise texts of Article III and the Supremacy Clause resolved the dispute, did not loom nearly as large in the ratification
debates.
(6) Most importantly, the conveners labored long and hard not only
to develop a coherent and shared understanding of the functions of the
two relevant clauses but also to draft language that plainly and precisely
expressed that understanding-thus warranting even more confidence
than usual in the text as the best evidence of the original meaning. We
can confidently report, for example, that (a) when Article III says
'Judicial Power," its drafters meant just that and not, e.g., 'Jurisdiction";
(b) "shall extend to" meant that and not "shall be"; (c) "shall be vested in
one supreme Court and in such inferior courts.. ." meant that and not
"shall be vested in one supreme Court or in such inferior courts"; (d)
Congress was meant to "Regulat[e]" the Court's 'Jurisdiction" but not to
control the "manner" in which jurisdiction would be exercised; (e) the
parallel language of the "Arising Under" and Supremacy Clauses was intentional and structurally crucial; and (f) the latter clause meant "the
Judges in every state" and not, e.g., the Courts of each state. (7) Finally,
one crucial aspect of the forging of a shared understanding among the
drafters and the enshrinement of that understanding in the text is not
visible from the language, and can only be gleaned from the Convention
records, namely, a raft of important proposals that the Framers carefully
considered but rejected.
Just as it required a painstaking process at the Convention to produce the text and generate the conveners' shared understanding of it, it
requires a painstaking process here to recover that understanding. This
is especially so because shared meaning arises not from what little was said
and recorded about the various proposals and counterproposals, drafts
and redrafts, but from the consistent patterns that the contending texts
52. See infra notes 298, 305-311, 317-318, 320, 322, 327, 329, 332-335, 342, 350, 353.
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reveal-most notably, the subtle but steady shift from reliance on the
quantity to the quality of federal judging to maintain federal legal
supremacy. Sections A-H below detail the drafting process. Section I
summarizes our conclusions.
A. Preparingfor the Convention: Madison's Proposed Reforms
For James Madison, at least, the well-known failings and weaknesses
of the central government under the Articles of Confederation played
only a supporting role in the onset of the Federal Convention of 1787.
The principal part was played by the states-actually, as Madison and his
allies consistently particularized the problem, by the excesses and mischiefs of state legislators and the laws they enacted 52--their lack of support
for the federal government, their outright encroachments on federal authority, and their susceptibility to passing whims, hoped for private
"gain," and "populist, parochial passions. '5 4 As Madison wrote in a letter
to Jefferson summing up the Convention:
The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a
serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so
flagrant as to alarm the most stedfast friends of Republicanism.
I am persuaded I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from
these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our national character
and interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its
immediate objects. A reform therefore which does not make
53. See Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding
of the Federal Republic 76-107 (1995) (noting Madison's "alarm about abuses in the states
... [which he] traced to the debilities of the Confederation"); Jack N. Rakove, James
Madison and the Creation of the American Republic 44-52 (1990) (discussing the
ineffectualness of the Articles of Confederation in controlling the "vicious character of
state governments").
54. Rakove, supra note 26, at 1044-45; see, e.g.,James Madison, Vices of the Political
System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 The Papers ofJames Madison 9 Apr. 1786-24
May 1787, at 348, 353-58 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter 9 Madison
Papers]; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 Madison
Papers, supra, at 317, 318; Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16,
9 Madison Papers, supra, at 382, 383-84; 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 288 (Aug.
1787), int
14, 1787) (statement ofJohn Mercer) ("What led to the appointment of this Convention?
The corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States."); The Federalist No.
37, supra note 1, at 243 (James Madison) (quoted supra text accompanying note 1); The
Federalist No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); The Federalist No.
48, at 310 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also Corwin, supra note 39, at
62 ("[What] brought the Convention together was a general disgust at the recent antics of
the State legislatures [and a desire to] curtail legislative power as it existed in the State
constitutions in the interest... of an adequate national power and ... of private rights
.... ");Rakove, supra note 53, at 45 ("At the heart of Madison's thinking lay a deep
concern with the process by which laws were enacted, enforced, and obeyed, and an
overriding conviction that the legislatures created by the state constitutions of 1776 had
failed to discharge their duties fairly or responsibly."); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:
Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 46-56 (1996) (similar).
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provision for private
rights [as against the States] must be mate55
rially defective.
Madison's solution to the "injustice" and "mutability of the laws of
the States" lay in five specific reforms, all of which at his instance found
their way into Edmund Randolph's "Virginia Plan," introduced at the outset of the Convention. 56 The cornerstone of Madison's scheme was a "national negative," i.e., a national legislative power to veto any state law
found to contravene the national interest. Armed with the negative,
Congress could prevent state legislatures from encroaching on the central government's prerogatives, from "thwarting and molesting... other
[states], and even from oppressing the minority within themselves by...
'57
unrighteous measures which favor the interest of the majority.
Madison's goal, in short, was an effective mechanism for "securing the
general government's supremacy within a system where the overwhelming burden of political responsibilities would still be carried by the
58
states."
The second and third prongs of Madison's scheme for controlling
the abuses of state law relied on judges, both state and federal. Madison
thought that the supremacy of federal law would be at risk if state judges
beholden to state legislatures and having no allegiance to the national
government were left the task of interpreting and applying the law. Accordingly, he wanted state judges to take an oath of fidelity to federal law
and wanted a system of national tribunals available at the least to hear
appeals in cases involving the national interest.59
Fourth, and often overlooked, Madison initially favored authorizing
the federal government to use military force to bring recalcitrant states,
and particularly state legislatures, into line with national law. 60 Finally,
Madison advocated the creation of a council of revision, composed of
"the great ministerial officers" of the federal executive and a number of
federal judges. Subject to override by a legislative supermajority, this
body would have the authority, not only to veto "every [affirmative] act of
55. Letter fromJames Madison to ThomasJefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 The Papers

of James Madison 27 May 1787-3 Mar. 1788, at 206, 212 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1977) [hereinafter 10 Madison Papers].
56. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 20-22 (May 29, 1787); see Letter from James Madison
to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 Madison Papers, supra note 54, at 368, 369-70.
57. Letter fromJames Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 54, at 318; see Letter
from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra note 56, at 370; Letter from James
Madison to George Washington, supra note 54, at 383-84.
58. Banning, supra note 53, at 117-18 (emphasis omitted); see Rakove, supra note 53,
at 51.
59. See, e.g., Letter fromJames Madison to George Washington, supra note 54, at 384
(advocating oath and federal appeals because "[i]f those who are to expound & apply the
laws, are connected by their interests & their oaths with the particular States wholly, and
not with the Union, the participation of the Union in the making of the laws may be
possibly rendered unavailing"); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra
note 56, at 370.
60. See Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 54, at 385.
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the National Legislature before it shall operate," but also to overturn the
61
national legislature's exercise of its power to "negative" state legislation.
In this way, the national legislature's check on state laws would itself be
62
checked by the other two branches of the federal government.
For Madison, the course of the Convention was one of defeat, frustration, and finally compromise. Three of the five prongs of his scheme
to regulate state law did not survive July-force (which Madison himself
65
64
quickly abandoned),63 the national veto, and the council of revision.
66
Only the weakest prong-the oath requirement-was accepted in full.
Although judicial review remained, and became the focal point of efforts
to control state law, it did so only after the early defeat of the judiciary
provision Madison preferred. 67 What followed was, for Madison, a painful series of compromises and adjustments (of which the so-called
Madisonian Compromise was only the first and by no means the most
decisive) designed to keep judicial review powerful enough to satisfy the
nationalists' desire to constrain the states, yet modulated enough to satisfy the confederationists' desire to preserve state sovereignty. 68 Central
to these compromises, though largely overlooked in recent academic debates, were three issues: (1) the presumptions the national legislature
would be expected to apply in the exercise of a power to allocate jurisdiction between the state and federal courts; (2) the scope of the state
courts' responsibilities for keeping state legislation within the bounds of
national law; and (3) the quality of review federal courts would be required to exercise in cases over which they did have jurisdiction-particularly appeals of state court decisions-so as to maintain the supremacy of
federal law. We explore these neglected issues below by carefully examining their treatment throughout the Federal Convention.
61. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 21 (May 29, 1787) (Resolution 8 of the Virginia Plan);
see Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 54, at 384-85; Letter
from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, supra note 56, at 370.
62. See Rakove, supra note 26, at 1057 (discussing respects in which "Madison's
argument for the Council tracked his argument for the negative on state laws").
63. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 156-164 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 84-85, 104-108 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 119-122, 191-193, 284 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 86, 90-98 and accompanying text.
68. By "nationalists" we mean delegates who viewed abusive state law as the
fundamental problem to be solved by the Constitution. Madison, Randolph,James Wilson,
Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, and, to a lesser extent, Charles Pinckney were
leaders of this group. By "confederationists" we mean delegates who had more faith in the
states and envisioned a broader and less constrained role for them in the new government.
The latter category covers moderate proponents of state power such asJohn Rutledge and
Roger Sherman as well as ardent state sovereignty advocates such as Luther Martin. Cf.
Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and the First
Congress 7-8 (1993) (dividing the delegates into three groups: nationalists, state
federalists, and localist state-sovereignty advocates-the latter two groups constituting our
confederationist category).
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B. Commencing the Convention
The Convention began with the introduction of two plans for a reformed government, one drafted by Madison and other members of the
Virginia delegation and the other drafted by Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina.
1. The Virginia Plan. - In Philadelphia in advance of a quorum of
delegates from the other states, the Virginia delegation-Madison,
Randolph, John Blair, George Mason, James McClurg, George
Washington, and George Wythe-met daily to develop the fifteen resolutions that Randolph would introduce to the Convention on May 29, 1787
as the Virginia Plan. 69 All five prongs of Madison's conception
for rein70
ing in abusive state law were included in some form.
The crown jewel of Madison's scheme, the national negative, appeared along with a force provision in resolution 6.71 The legislature's
proposed power "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union"
was a watered-down version of the unrestricted negative that Madison had
advocated before the Convention and that he later advanced as an
72
amendment to the Virginia Plan.

Although Madison's national negative was diminished, his suggested
federal judiciary was augmented. Instead of providing for a mainly appellate national judiciary, the Plan's ninth resolution called for the establishment of trial as well as appellate federal courts:
Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one
or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during
good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed
compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at
the time of such increase or diminution, that the jurisdiction of
the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first
instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in
the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of
other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or
which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and
questions which may involve
73
the national peace and harmony.
69. See Banning, supra note 53, at 113-15; Rakove, supra note 53, at 54.
70. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
71. See I Farrand, supra note 2, at 21 (May 29, 1787). The force provision authorized
the national legislature "to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union
failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." Id.
72. Id.; see supra note 57 and accompanying text; infra notes 109-117 and

accompanying text.
73. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 21-22 (May 29, 1787).
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The Plan's judiciary resolution provides a baseline for consideration
of later revisions and alterations in four respects: (1) By mandating "a
National Judiciary" composed "of one or more supreme tribunals, and of
inferior tribunals," it left the legislature discretion as to only the number
of supreme and inferior tribunals and the number and selection of
judges to sit on each. (2) It included two provisions to assure the independence of federal judges-life tenure during good behavior and an
undiminishable (and unincreasable) salary. The premium that the
Framers placed on judicial independence is reflected by the fact that
these two provisions went virtually unchallenged throughout the
Convention, in confederationist as well as nationalist proposals, 74 and
prompted debate exclusively on the question of how best to insure independence-by denying Congress the potentially compromising power to
raise judicial salaries, or by preserving that power so that judges would
not become financially dependent in inflationary times. 75 (3) By (a) expressly allocating original jurisdiction to the inferior courts and appellate
("demier resort") jurisdiction to the supreme court(s), (b) dictating precisely what those courts' 'Jurisdiction .. .shall be," 76 and (c) using the
word "all" before the list of jurisdictional categories, the document evidently called for exclusive federal jurisdiction over all the listed classes of
cases. Certainly, the federal courts' jurisdiction included "all" admiralty
and maritime claims, diversity suits, national revenue cases, and impeachments, leaving the legislature at most with some role in identifying "cases
...which may involve the national peace and harmony." (4) The federal
courts' duty was to "hear & determine... cases," not to resolve abstract
legal issues (a distinction that will become clearer when we compare competing provisions).
Finally, the Virginia Plan incorporated Madison's council of revision-to be composed of "the Executive and a convenient number of the

74. See Rakove, supra note 26, at 1060-64 (discussing the dramatic late eighteenthcentury shift in the American conception of the judicial role towards one in which judicial

independence from the political branches was considered both a realistic possibility and a
worthy complement to, or substitute for, jury decisionmaking).
75. See, e.g., 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 45 (July 18, 1787) (statement of James
Madison) ("Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in agitation in the
legislature, an undue complaisance in the former may be felt towards the latter... which
ought not to [be] suffered .... ."). The opposition to federal judicial independence that
Mr. Scheidegger expresses in his response to this Article contrasts with the delegates'
unanimous support for that core qualitative attribute of the federal judiciary and reveals a
preference on Mr. Scheidegger's part for a constitutional arrangement substantially more
confederal than that advocated by even the most ardent confederationists at the
Convention. See Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative
Power, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 888, 895, 943-44, 948 (1998).
76. For a discussion of the distinction between "jurisdiction . . . shall be" and
"jurisdiction [or judicial Power] . . . shall extend to," see supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text; infra notes 129, 267, 298 and accompanying text.
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NationalJudiciary" 77-and an oath requirement binding all state officers
78
"to support the articles of Union."
2. The Pinckney Plan. - On the same day as Randolph introduced
the Virginia Plan, Pinckney brought forward his own, somewhat more
confederationist, proposal. 79 In particular, Pinckney's plan contained a
considerably more limited judiciary provision, which left to Congress the
"Power" to establish-or apparently not establish-a single "federal
judicial Court" with tenure protections and with jurisdiction over "all
Causes wherein Questions shall arise on the Construction of Treaties
made by U.S.-or on the law of Nations-or on the Regulations of U.S.
concerning Trade & Revenue-or wherein U.S. shall be a Party." 0 The
Randolph and Pinckney Plans thus agreed on the potential need for tenured federal judges to review state court decisions "constru[ing] "-if not
clearly, in the Pinckney version, applying-important federal law. The
plans disagreed over whether judicial constraints were sufficient and, if
81
so, how constraining they should be.
C. The Virginia Plan in the Committee of the Whole
During the first several weeks of the Convention, the Virginia Plan
was the focal point of debate in the Committee of the Whole (made up of
the entire membership of the Convention). Aside from the national negative, which was expanded slightly, Madison's proposals for curbing the
excesses of state legislation came under significant attack, prompting,
among other important consequences, the first so-called Madisonian
Compromise on the judiciary.
1. May 31: The Expansion of the NationalNegative and the Abandonment
of Force. - Deliberations began propitiously for Madison when, on the
second day of debates, without discussion or dissent, the national negative was agreed to after being expanded to permit vetoes of state laws
82
contravening "any treaties," as well as the articles, "of the Union."
Madison thereafter successfully moved to table the force provision, expressing the hope, fortified by the veto's initial success, that sufficient
77. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 21 (May 29, 1787) (quoted supra text accompanying

note 61).
78. Id. at 22.
79. See id. at 16, 23. Farrand includes three versions of the Pinckney Plan-one
outlined in James Wilson's contemporaneous notes and used in the Committee of Detail's
deliberations, see 2 id. at 134-37 & n.3, and two that apparently were reconstructed much
later, see 3 id. at 595-601, 604-09. We use the version the Committee of Detail used.
80. 2 id. at 136. Congress also had "the exclusive Right of instituting in each State" an
admiralty court and appointing its members. Id.
81. Pinckney's proposal failed to include a national veto or oath clause, more
narrowly limited the availability of force against the states, and excluded judges from the
council of revision. See id. at 135-36.
82. 1 id. at 47, 54 (May 31, 1787) (Benjamin Franklin moved to expand the negative).
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errant state legislation would be framed to
structural protections against
83
render force unnecessary.
2. June 4: The Demise of the Council of Revision. - Madison's scheme
for constraining state law began to unravel on June 4. It did so following
a pattern, presaged by Pinckney's alternative draft, that persisted
throughout the Convention-the dilution of Madison's nonjudicial constraints in favor of some form of review by federal judges whose independence from political influences and other 'judicial" qualities were strictly
protected. Madison's desire to include federal judges on the council of
revision was the first casualty. Elbridge Gerry argued thatjudicial participation was both unnecessary, because of the power already possessed by
Judges ... [to] set aside laws as being agst. the Constitution," and unwise, because "[i] t was quite foreign from the nature of [the judicial]
office to make" judges arbiters of "the policy of public measures."84 The
other conveners agreed, adopting Gerry's motions (1) to table the council of revision and (2) to substitute an executive-only veto of legislative
acts and, apparently, national vetoes of state legislation.85
The Committee next turned its attention directly to the Virginia
Plan's judiciary proposal. After accepting the Plan's first clause establishing a national judiciary, the Committee unanimously agreed to scale back
the original Madisonian conception by altering the succeeding clause to
read: "to consist of One supreme tribunal [as opposed to one or more
supreme tribunals], and of one or more inferior tribunals."8 6 With the
possibility of multiple supreme tribunals eliminated, commencing a trend
towards diminished federal judicial capacity, the confederationists set to
work the next day on eliminating the lower federal courts. The result was
the Madisonian Compromise, letting Congress decide whether to appoint
inferior tribunals.
3. June 5: The First Madisonian Compromise. - The confederationist
attack on lower federal courts began during the first of many inconclusive
debates over the method of appointing judges when John Rutledge of
South Carolina spoke "against establishing any national tribunal except a
single supreme one" because "State Tribunals <are most proper> to decide in all cases in the first instance. 8 7 After Wilson spoke in favor of
resolution's
"inferior tribunals,"88 the Committee turned to the judiciary
89
accepted.
quickly
it
which
provisions,
salary
tenure and
See id. at 54.
Id. at 97-98 (June 4, 1787).
Id. at 94, 98.
Id. at 95, 104-05 (June 4, 1787); see id. at 116, 119 (June 5, 1787) (amending
more inferior tribunals" to read, simply, "inferior tribunals").
87. Id. at 119. Angle brackets indicate changes Madison made in his notes when
preparing them for publication. See id. at xviii-xix.
88. Id. at 120.
89. See id. at 116, 121.
83.
84.
85.
86.
'one or
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Then came the coup de main, as Rutledge, seconded by Roger
Sherman of Connecticut, moved to delete the reference to inferior tribunals from the opening sentence of the judiciary resolution. 90 In
Rutledge's view, "the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all
cases to decide in the first instance," with "the right of appeal to the
supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights &
uniformity ofJudgmts" while avoiding "an unnecessary encroachment on
the jurisdiction <of the States[

]>."91

Rutledge's motion was consistent with both trends noted so farfavoring judicial over other constraints on state law, and favoring less over
more comprehensively fderaljudicial constraints. Notably, however, confederationists like Rutledge did not oppose federal judicial mechanisms
as a class. Instead, they opposed a federal originaljudicial mechanism,
preferring a state original mechanism backstopped by a federal appellate
mechanism when "the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts" were at
stake. 92 For confederationists like Rutledge, the state courts would provide the filter through which state law would flow so that supremacythreatening impurities could in theory be removed. But a federal appellate court also was understood to be necessary to check up on the filtration process and on state decisional law made in that process. Moreover,
by leaving intact the supreme court's (at this point entirely) appellate
jurisdiction, and by explicitly volunteering the "State Tribunals ...in all
[those] cases to decide in the first instance,"93 the confederationists evidently assumed that the federal government could command state courts
to hear all cases affecting the national interest 94 and that all of the resulting state court decisions would be subject to appeal to a single national
tribunal.
Wilson and Madison vigorously opposed Rutledge's motion. Doubting the supreme tribunal's capacity by itself to preserve national legal primacy, particularly if forced to hear all possible appeals, Madison for the
first time proposed abandoningmandatory supreme court appellate jurisdiction in exchange for more, and more locally available, lower courts-a
position that eventually would prevail. 95 Madison worried that, unless
"inferior tribunals . . . [had] final jurisdiction in many cases," the

supreme court (1) would be inundated with appeals "to a most oppressive
degree" and (2) would be unable to effectuate its judgements, thus in
90. See id. at 124.
91. Id.; see id. at 125 (statement of Roger Sherman).
92. See Bator, supra note 23, at 1038-39 (quoted supra text accompanying note 23).
93. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 124 (June 5, 1787) (statement of John Rutledge)
(emphasis added); see id. at 119.
94. See Amar, supra note 17, at 256 n.165.
95. See 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 124; 2 id. at 27 (July 17, 1787) (statement ofJames
Madison); id. at 46 (July 18, 1787) (statement of Edmund Randolph); infra notes 129-133,
162-163, 181, 226 and accompanying text.
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legal supremacy at the mercy of politically depractice leaving national
96
judges:
state
pendent
[A]n appeal [to the supreme tribunal] would not in many cases
be a remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts in
State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury?
To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose.
To order a new trial at the supreme bar would oblige the parties
to bring up9 7their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the seat of
the Court.
Despite these arguments and a proposal by John Dickinson of Delaware
to let the legislature decide whether to "institute" lower federal courts,
Rutledge's motion to delete inferior tribunals passed, five states to four,
with two states divided. 98
Rutledge's victory proved short-lived, of course. Toning down
Dickinson's unheeded suggestion of a legislative power to "institute"
lower federal courts, Wilson and Madison moved "[t]hat the national
legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals," 9 9 wording that,
at the time, carried a clear connotation of formally enlisting state courts
for national purposes.10 0 Rufus King of Massachusetts spoke in favor,
echoing Madison's fear of a supreme court deluged with appeals; Pierce
96. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 124 (June 5, 1787) (emphasis omitted).
97. Id.; see also Letter from James Madison to ThomasJefferson, supra note 55, at 211
(worrying that some "individuals ...may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to
the supreme Judiciary").
98. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 125. Where, as here, we report votes, the participation
of fewer than thirteen states is explained by the New Hampshire delegation's late arrival,
see 2 id. at 84, Rhode Island's failure to send a delegation, and other states' more
occasional absences.
99. 1 id. at 118, 125 (emphasis added). The Convention's Journal and the notes of
Robert Yates of New York use the word "appoint." Id. at 118, 127. Although Madison's
June 5 account uses the word "institute," id. at 125, his reprise of the Compromise a few
days later says "appoint," id. at 237 (June 13, 1787).
100. The Articles of Confederation had authorized Congress to, and it did, "appoint"
state courts as national tribunals "for the trial of piracies." Articles of Confederation art.
IX, para. 1 (1777); see I Goebel, supra note 19, at 212; Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases,
State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 120 ("The
practice of appointing state courts as federal courts, common at the time of the
Convention, may therefore have been understood by some delegates as the natural
reference of the Compromise's language . ..

."); Wythe Holt, "Federal Courts as the

Asylum to Federal Interests": Randolph's Report, The Benson Amendment, and the
"Original Understanding" of the Federal Judiciary, 36 Buff. L. Rev. 341, 357 (1987);
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 2019 (1993);
see also 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 45-46 (July 18, 1787) (statement of Nathaniel
Gorham) (arguing that the existence "inthe States already" of state courts appointed to
serve as federal courts "for trial of piracies"-as to which "no complaints have been made
by the States or the Courts of the States"-refuted the claim that inferior tribunals "will
create jealousies & oppositions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they
will interfere").
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Butler of South Carolina spoke against, predicting a popular "revolt at
such encroachments"; and the "Madisonian Compromise" carried. 1 1
At the end of the day, the Virginia Plan's judiciary resolution, as
amended, read:
9. Resd. That a National Judiciary be established to consist of
one supreme tribunal to be chosen by
, to hold their offices
during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times
fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in
office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals;
that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear &
determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to
hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies
on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions
may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and
questions 02which may involve the national peace and
harmony.'
June 5 thus witnessed the first compromise in the hotly contested
battle over how the new government would exert control over the mutable and unjust state legislation that for Madison and his allies was the
main "vice" prompting the Convention. 0 3 What was not at issue was
whether the national government should have authority to assure the
supremacy of national law over state law. The confederationists conceded that much, not only by willingly supporting mandatory supreme
court appellate jurisdiction and grudgingly accepting the possibility of
some federal original jurisdiction, but also, as of this moment, by accepting a powerful legislative veto that was the centerpiece of the nationalists' plan and no doubt crucial to their understanding and approval of
the initial Compromise. The Compromise, however, did not resolve the
deep disagreement that prompted it. A plan of which both the veto and
the Compromise were part could hardly assuage confederationist concerns about federal encroachments on state prerogatives. Nor, if the veto
were removed, could the plan possibly allay nationalist fears about the
insufficiency of a state judicial check-even one backstopped in all cases
by a lone and distant supreme national tribunal-on the mutability, injustice, and excessive populism of state law.
4. June 6: An Attempt to Revive the Council of Revision. - Commencing
yet a third trend in the Convention's deliberations, discussions the next
day shifted from the quantity to the quality of federaljudging. In support
of their motion to restore "a convenient number of the national
101. 1 Farrand, supra note 2,at 118, 125, 127 (June 5, 1787).
102. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (Judiciary resolution prior to
amendment); supra notes 86, 89, 99-101 and accompanying text (amendments).

103. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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Judiciary" to the council of revision,' 0 4 Wilson and Madison argued that
the judges' independence, "personal merit," and "permanent stake in the
public interest" were necessary to fortify the executive against the corrupting influences of factional politics and give its vetoes of state legislation the prestige needed to sustain them.' 0 5 In response, Dickinson,
Gerry, and King again decried an "improper mixture" of judicial and
political functions that would bias and corrupt the judges 10 6 and undermine the responsibility of the executive.' 0 7 The motion failed.' 08
5. June 8: The Rejection of an Absolute Negative. - With the abandonment of force, the dilution of the judicial check, and the defeat of the
council of revision, Madison joined Pinckney in an effort to expand the
national negative of state legislation to cover "all laws which to [the national legislature] shall appear improper." 0 9 Pinckney asserted that an
absolute negative was "indispensably necessary to render [the veto] effec10
tual," and was, in fact, "the comer stone of an efficient national Govt."'
Madison agreed that the national negative was "the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the States.""'
"[W]ithout it," Madison argued, the states would use their law to "infringe the rights & interests of each other[,] ... oppress the weaker party
within their respective jurisdictions," and "continually fly out of their
proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political system." 112 Wilson agreed:
To correct [the] vices [of the Articles of Confederation] is the
business of this convention. One of its vices is the want of an
effectual controul in the whole over its parts. What danger is
there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy of each part,
general interest be continually sacrificed to loand will not the
13
cal interests?1
Madison and Pinckney's motion unleashed a barrage of criticism
that, though aimed at the mechanism's expansion, could not help but
wound the concept itself. Gerry thought an unbounded negative would
104. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 131, 138 (June 6, 1787).
105. Id. at 138-39 (statements ofJames Madison); see id. at 140 (statement ofJames
Wilson).
106. Id. at 140 (statement ofJohn Dickinson); see supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
107. See 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 139 (June 6, 1787) (statements of Elbridge Gerry
and Rufus King).
108. See id. at 131, 140.
109. Id. at 162 (June 8, 1787); see id. at 164.
110. Id. at 164.
111. Id. at 165.
112. Id. at 164-65; see id. at 168.
113. Id. at 167; accord id. (statement of John Dickinson).
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permit the central government to "enslave the States." 1 4 Butler "was vehement agst. the Negative in the proposed extent, as cutting off all hope
of equal justice to the distant States. The people there would not he was
sure give it a hearing."1 1 5 Gunning Bedford of Delaware protested that
larger states would employ the negative to dominate smaller ones and
wondered how the veto could work in practice without destabilizing all
new state law pending the verdict of the national legislature." 6 The motion was defeated seven states to three, with Delaware, remarkably,
17
divided.'
6. June 11 & 12: The Acceptance of the Oath and a Refinement of Federal
Jurisdiction.- OnJune 11, the Committee took up the oath requirement.
Because the Madisonian Compromise had weakened the federal
judiciary's role as an external constraint on the states, creating the distinct possibility of state original cognizance of federal questions, the
oath's importance as an internal constraint on state judges-in
Randolph's phrase an additional "sinew[ ]" to "support[ I" a "supreme
national govemment"-became magnified." 8
When Hugh Williamson of North Carolina deemed the oath "unnecessary, as the union will become the law of the land,"" 9 Randolph countered that merely implied supremacy was insufficient "to prevent... competition between the National Constitution & laws & those of the
particular States," especially given state judges' disposition and oaths to
support their internal laws and their political dependence on the legislatures that adopted those laws. 120 Ironically, Williamson's anti-oath allies
undermined his, and made Randolph's, point by arguing that binding
state officials to oaths contrary to ones already made to the officials' own
states would improperly divide their loyalties and "intrud[e] into the
State jurisdictions.' 2 1 The oath was accepted, six states to five. 122
Returning to the judiciary resolution toward the end of the session
on June 12, the Committee of the Whole considered but did not act on a
motion to delete the Virginia Plan's delineation of what the 'Jurisdiction"
of the now-optional lower federal courts "shall be.' 23 By thus maintaining the "shall be" jurisdiction-conferring language for courts that might
114. Id. at 165; see id. (raising fear of hampering a state's right to call out its militia,
.a matter on which the existence of a State might depend"); id. (statement of Hugh
Williamson of North Carolina).
115. Id. at 168.
116. See id. at 167-68.
117. See id. at 162-63, 168. Only populous states-Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia-voted to expand the negative. See id. at 163.
118. Id. at 207.
119. Id. (June 11, 1787).
120. Id. at 203.
121. Id. (statement of Roger Sherman); see id. (statements of Luther Martin and
Elbridge Gerry).
122. See id. at 194, 204.
123. Id. at 211, 220 (June 12, 1787).
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never be created, the delegates may have understood the legislative decision whether to appoint lower federal courts as all or nothing. If the
legislature created lower federal courts, their 'jurisdiction... shall be" all
the enumerated jurisdiction. This understanding actually might have appealed to confederationists, because it reduced the likelihood that the
legislature, constrained by the all or nothing nature of its choice, would
create lower federal courts at all. Also possibly suggesting an antijudiciary impulse, the delegates ended the day by deleting the supreme
124
tribunal's appellate jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases.
7. June 13: The Randolph-Madison Substitute: From "ShallBe" to "Shall
Extend to." - Perhaps chastened by the events at the end of the previous
day, Randolph began proceedings on June 13 by proposing that the
Committee not continue working its way through the Virginia Plan's
heads of jurisdiction and, instead, given the difficulty of the task, lay
down some general principles on the basis of which a smaller group of
delegates could flesh out the details. 125 Seconded by Madison, he moved
to strike the existing jurisdictional provision and add: "That the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers,
and questions which involve the national peace and harmony."1 26 The
27
Committee unanimously agreed.
The "Randolph-Madison Substitute" had three important effects that
subsequent commentary has overlooked. First, installing "the national
Judiciary," rather than "the supreme tribunal," as the subject of the provision subtly emphasized the availability of lower federal courts to exercise
124. See id.
125. See id. at 238 (June 13, 1787).
126. Id. at 223-24; see id. at 232, 238.
127. See id. at 238. Encompassing Randolph and Madison's substitute language, the
judiciary resolutions in the Report of the Committee of the Whole, issued the same day
(June 13), read as follows:
11. Resolved. that a national Judiciary be established to consist of One supreme
Tribunal The Judges of which to be appointed by the second Branch of the
National Legislature. to hold their offices during good behaviour to receive,
punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services: in which
no encrease or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually
in office at the time of such encrease or diminution
12. Resolved. That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
Tribunals.
13. Resolved. that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases
which respect the collection of the national revenue: impeachments of any
national Officers: and questions which involve the national peace and
harmony.
Id. at 230-31. In some but not all versions (and not in the official version) of Resolution
13, the word "all" appears before "cases." Compare id. at 231 (Journal), and id. at 232
(Madison's notes) ("all" omitted), with id. at 237 (Madison's notes), and id. at 238 (Robert
Yates's notes) ("all" included).
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the full panoply of federal jurisdiction.1 28 More importantly, by eliminating the original Plan's limitation of "inferior tribunals" to "first instance"
jurisdiction and "the supreme tribunal to ... dernier [final appellate]
resort," the Substitute significantly altered the effects of the Madisonian
Compromise by creating two new possibilities: that the supreme court
would exercise original as well as appellate jurisdiction and that lower
federal courts would relieve the supreme court of some of its otherwise
potentially overwhelming appellate jurisdiction over state decisions.
Most consequentially, by shifting from "the jurisdiction of the
inferior tribunals [and the supreme tribunal] shall be" to "the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to," the Substitute removed the
constitutional floor on federal jurisdiction, leaving the floor-setting duty
to the legislature. 129 This change-which, among other things, is the
source of Congress's unquestioned, but (to some minds) textually unconfirmed, control of lower federal courtjurisdictiona 3 0 -had attractions for
128. Before the change, the jurisdictional clause had begun: "that the jurisdiction of
the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme
tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort." Id. at 22 (May 29, 1787).
129. Two years later, discussing Article III's "shall extend to" language on the floor of
the House of Representatives in support of what became the 1789 Judiciary Act,
Representative Stone encapsulated the phrase's significance:
It is not said ... that you shall exercise the judicial power over all those cases, but
that the judicial power shall extend to those cases. If the convention [had meant]
that its Judiciary should extend so as positively to have taken in all these cases,
they would have so declared it... [; they have given you a power to extend your
jurisdiction .... but have not compelled you to that extension.
1 Annals of Cong. 854-55 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); accord supra note 40; see Steven G.
Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1377, 1380-81 & n.14
(1994) (demonstrating that the accepted meaning of "extend" from the eighteenth
century to today has been to reach or to "'stretch out towards any part'" (quoting Samuel
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, W. Strahan 1755) [hereinafter
Johnson, Strahan]) (citing The American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed. 1991)));
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws,
104 Yale LJ. 541, 573 (1994) (noting that extend "derives from the Latin 'extendere,'
meaning 'to stretch [tendere] out [ex]" (quoting 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language 696 (Librairie du Liban ed. 1978) (4th ed. 1773))); Velasco, supra note
8, at 703-04 & n.159. Compare, e.g., Amar, supra note 17, at 212, 215, 239 & n.118
(noting the inflexibly directive nature of "shall [be]"), with, e.g., Bator, supra note 23, at
1031 (noting the elasticity connoted by Article III's "shall extend to" language). Given that
Randolph and Madison drafted the Virginia Plan, which originated the "jurisdiction ...
shall be" formulation, it is doubtful that their switch to "shall extend to" was accidental,
synonymic, or merely cosmetic. Cf. Amar, supra note 17, at 229-30, 238-59 (defining
"shall extend to" as "shall be" without discussing the Substitute or its apparently deliberate
change to one from the other); Clinton, supra note 19, at 749-54 (similar). Moreover, a
desire to vest all jurisdiction in the national judiciary as a whole, leaving the legislature to
allocate jurisdiction between the supreme court and any lower federal courts it chose to
create, cf. Amar, supra note 17, at 229-30, 238-59, might explain the switch to "national
judiciary" but not to "shall extend to."
130. Compare Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (concluding that
Congress's greater power to ordain and establish inferior courts impliedly includes the
lesser power to determine those courts' jurisdiction), with Bator, supra note 23, at 1031
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both nationalists and confederationists. On the nationalist side, the flexibility accorded the legislature to determine inferior court jurisdiction removed the disincentive to create courts imposed by the "all or nothing"
3
effect of the 'Jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be" language.' '
On the confederationist side, the Substitute applied the "shall extend to"
language to the entire "national judiciary," thereby replacing mandatory
supreme court review with a legislative power to authorize review when
appropriate. This latter concession evidently was palatable, or even attractive, to the nationalists because of their practical doubts about the
capacity of parties to get to the supreme tribunal and of that court to
handle all appeals indiscriminately, and given their consequent preference for lower federal courts that, inter alia, could share the appellate
32
load.'
Overall, therefore, the nationalist thinking apparently motivating the
Randolph-Madison Substitute was this: Given the assumed ineffectualness of the confederationists' preferred option of limiting the federal
judiciary to a single supreme court with mandatory appellate jurisdiction-even when bolstered by a legislative power to create lower federal
courts subject to an "all or nothing" disincentive-the reformulated
Compromise jettisoned mandatory supreme court appeals in favor of a
flexible legislative power to supplement the supreme tribunal with lower
federal courts and to assign either of them original or appellate jurisdiction "extending to" the enumerated categories. It thus makes sense to give
"extend to" its eighteenth-century (and current) meaning of flexibly
"reaching" as far as, but not mandatorily including, the entire constitu33
tionally permissible jurisdiction.
The Randolph-Madison Substitute left many questions unanswered.
Not only would the delegates have to hammer out specific jurisdictional
categories, but with the jurisdictional floor now removed and with
supreme court original and lower court appellate jurisdiction each being
possible, they would also have to establish presumptions for the distribution of jurisdiction. Numerous options were available. With respect to
both original and appellate jurisdiction (or particular categories of it),
and with regard to both the inferior and supreme courts, they could: (1)
establish federal courtjurisdiction as the rule and let the legislature make
exceptions in favor of state courts; (2) establish federal courtjurisdiction
as a possibility and in some way explicitly invite the legislature to invest
(resisting Lockerty's "greater includes the lesser" theory, and arguing that congressional
control of lower federal court jurisdiction is implicit in the original Madisonian
Compromise). Below we suggest that the Committee of Style's use of two verbs-"ordain
and establish"--to describe Congress's power over inferior courts may confirm the
legislature's jurisdictional as well as constitutive discretion. See infra note 289.
131. See supra text following note 123.
132. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text; infra notes 162-163, 181, 226
and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 40, 129 and accompanying text; infra notes 267, 298 and
accompanying text.
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the federal courts with it; (3) establish federal court jurisdiction as a possibility over which the legislature would have complete discretion; or (4)
establish state court jurisdiction as the rule and let the legislature make
exceptions in favor of federal courts. As we will see, the delegates spent
much of the remainder of the Convention deciding among these options.

At the end of the day onJune 13, the Committee of the Whole issued
a report reprinting the Virginia Plan as revised.134 Surveying the report,
Madison may have felt moderate satisfaction with its relatively expansive
national negative, the inclusion of the oath, and his and his allies' salvage
of a legislative power to "appoint" lower federal courts and invest them
with original or appellate jurisdiction. Or he might have felt moderate
disappointment with the Committee's disapproval of an absolute negative, a council of revision, and constitutionally mandated lower federal
courts. Whatever Madison's assessment on the 13th, it no doubt turned
more pessimistic the next day when William Paterson of New Jersey secured a postponement of debates so that New Jersey and several other
delegations might "digest . .. a purely federal" (in our terms "confed35
eral") plan to submit in opposition to the Virginia Plan.
D. The New Jersey Plan
The following day Paterson placed before the Convention nine resolutions that have come to be known as the NewJersey Plan.' 3 6 The conveners intensively debated the plan as a whole over the next several days
then rejected it.
1. June 15: Introduction of the Plan. - Paterson's plan vested the national government with more strictly defined powers than did the
Virginia Plan and displayed little interest in controlling state legislative
mischiefs. Of Madison's five measures for influencing state lawmakers, it
contained only one (that Madison had abandoned) and a half-force
137
and an extremely limited federal judiciary.
134.
135.
136.
137.
follows:
2...

See 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 228-32, 235-37.
Id. at 240 (June 14, 1787).
See id. at 241, 242 (June 15, 1787).
See id. at 243-44, 245. The New Jersey Plan's judiciary resolutions were as
[P~rovided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures & penalties to be
incurred for contravening such acts rules and regulations [of Congress] shall
be adjudged by the Common lawJudiciarys of the State in which any offence
contrary to the true intent & meaning of such Acts rules & regulations shall
have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the first
instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose in the superior Common
law Judiciary in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction of all
errors, both in law & fact in renderingjudgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary
of the U. States
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Although Rutledge apparently had no hand in drafting them (his
ally Roger Sherman of Connecticut may have), the New Jersey Plan's
judiciary resolutions bore his confederationist stamp:' 38 (1) a single
supreme tribunal with (a) full tenure and salary protections (beefed up
with a ban on employment or other entanglements with the political
branches) and (b) mandatory appellate jurisdiction over five categories
of matters (including, notably, the admiralty, maritime, and diversity jurisdiction that previously had been deleted), and (2) an explicit assignment to state courts of original jurisdiction over all matters in the same
categories. As with Rutledge's earlier proposal, the NewJersey Plan made
common cause with the nationalists on the need for a supreme national
tribunal with appellate power in an array of areas affecting the national
interest, while departing from the nationalists on the insufficiency of state
original and mandatory supreme court appellate jurisdiction and the necessity of lower federal courts with original and, potentially, some of the
supreme tribunal's appellate jurisdiction.
The New Jersey Plan's judiciary prong departed from the Virginia
Plan in another subtle, but important, way. With respect to federal questions (except in the enforcement context addressed in Resolution 2), the
New Jersey Plan appeared not to grant the supreme tribunal appellate
authority to hear and determine "cases" (much less "all cases"), but only
to grant it appellate authority "in the construction" of treaties and federal
acts. By apparently limiting the supreme court to the essentially advisory
task of providing a construction of federal acts, 139 the New Jersey Plan's
jurisdictional grant was significantly narrower than the Virginia Plan's
grant, which extended to any case "which may involve the national
peace,"'140 and narrower even than the Pinckney Plan's grant, which permitted a "federal judicial Court" to decide the whole "Cause [ ]," as long
5. Resd. that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme Tribunal
the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, & to hold their offices
during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed
compensation for their services in which no increase or diminution shall be
made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase
or diminution; that the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear &
determine in the first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, & by
way of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of
Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies &
felonies on the high seas, in all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in
the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the
Acts for regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue: that
none of the Judiciary shall during the time they remain in Office be capable
of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their time of

thereafter.
service, or for
Id. at 243-44.
138. See 1 Goebel, supra note 19, at 217-20 (drafting of the NewJersey Plan); supra
notes 87, 90-94 and accompanying text (Rutledge's views on the judiciary).
139. See infra notes 470-474 and accompanying text (the Marshall Court's rejection
of a similarly limited theory of federal question jurisdiction).

140. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 22.
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as some part of it required the "Construction" of national or interna141
tional law.
The New Jersey Plan did, however, contain a third mechanism for
controlling state law, one that combined in a unique way several of
Madison's suggested controls. It was part statejudge-targeted oath (recalling Williamson's view that an oath would be subsumed by a requirement
that "the union . . . be[ ] the law of the land"), 142 part statejudgeeffectuated national veto (because it prevented state laws from "[ ]withstanding" an official determination that they contravened federal law),
and part state-focused judiciary plan (insofar as it contemplated and regulated the exercise of federal question jurisdiction by "the Judiciary of
the several States"). In the first articulation of a supremacy clause, the
New Jersey Plan provided:
6. Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Gongs. made by virtue
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under
the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the
respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate
to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the
several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any
thing in the respective laws of the Individual States to the con-

trary notwithstanding ....143
The New Jersey Plan's prototype differs significantly from the
Supremacy Clause that ultimately emerged from the Convention. 14 4 It
did not subordinate state law to the national Constitution itself, nor did it
expressly subordinate state constitutions to federal statutes. Its reference
to "the Judiciary of the several States" was more institutional and less personal than the final version's 'Judges in every State." And it made federal
acts and treaties the "supreme law of the respective States,"'145 not "of the
Land." Although subtle, these last two distinctions are important: The
New Jersey version brought federal law into the corpus of state law,
thereby obliging state institutions to treat federal law as their own. By
contrast, the final version pulls the individual 'Judges in every State" out
of their local institutional roles and presses them into service applying a
law that, if not of another sovereign (say, "the law of the United States"),
is also not "the law of the respective State[ ]" but something in-betweenthe "supreme Law of the Land." In either event, this kind of provision
makes explicit what was implicit in the earlier Rutledge conception,
namely, that state courts had no choice but to make themselves available
141. 2 id. at 136; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
142. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 207 (June 11, 1787) (discussed supra note 119 and
accompanying text).
143. Id. at 245 (June 15, 1787).
144. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2.
145. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 245 (June 15, 1787).
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146
to enforce national law and to entertain federal causes of action.
Either way, that is, but particularly in the final Supremacy Clause, state
judges were given what amounts to a structural filtering function with
regard to state law inconsistent with federal law and, as such, were
uniquely "commandeered" (to use the current linguistic fashion) for national purposes. 147
2. June 16, 18, & 19: Rejection of the Plan. - In lengthy speeches,
Madison, Hamilton, and Randolph vigorously attacked the New Jersey
Plan and particularly its reliance on force, arguing that a "coertion of
arms" would inevitably lead to "a war between" the national government
and the states, whereas a "coertion of laws" would have a centripetal effect.' 48 The organizing principle of Madison's speech was the NewJersey
Plan's inability to control errant state law, i.e., to meet the central "object

of a proper plan .... to preserve the Union [and] provide a Government[ ] that will remedy the evils felt by the States. . . -149 Because the

Plan lacked (1) a national veto of injudicious state laws and (2) original
federal judicial cognizance of federal criminal cases (a point that could
not distinguish the revised Virginia Plan absent an assumption that the
federal legislature would choose to establish inferior federal courts),
Madison argued that the New Jersey proposal would not
prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties
which... must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars [;] ...
prevent encroachments on the federal authority[;] . . .prevent
trespasses of the States on each other[;] ...secure the internal
146. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. In reading the Supremacy Clause to
make this last point, the Supreme Court has vacillated (sometimes in the same passage)
between statements that sound in the New Jersey Plan's installation of federal into state
law, and other statements that sound in the final version's extrication of state judges from
their local institutional roles and impressment of them into a kind of national service. See,
e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) ("[T]he Constitution and laws ...are as
much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature. The Supremacy Clause
makes those laws 'the supreme Law of the Land,' and charges state courts with a
coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of
procedure."); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) ("[That] a State court derives
its existence... from the State laws is no reason why it should not afford relief [required
by federal law;... it is subject also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much
bound to recognize these [as] to recognize state laws.").
147. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S.CL 2365, 2371 (1997) (noting that the
Supremacy Clause "permit[s] imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal
prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions relate[ ] to matters appropriate for the judicial
power"); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992) ("Federal statutes
enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort
of federal 'direction' of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause.");
infra notes 499-501 and accompanying text.
148. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 284-85 (June 18, 1787) (statement of Alexander
Hamilton); see id. at 255-56 (June 16, 1787) (statement of Edmund Randolph). In his
speech, Hamilton proposed a new plan, like the Virginia Plan but more nationalist in every
respect. See id. at 291-93.
149. Id. at 315-16 (June 19, 1787).
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tranquility of the States themselves[; and] ... secure a good
15 0
internal legislation & administration to the particular States.
Seven states to three, with Maryland divided, the Committee of the
Whole voted against reporting the NewJersey Plan to the Convention. 5 1
The Convention instead took up the Virginia Plan as reported to it the
following day.
E. The Virginia Plan in the Convention
Although the New Jersey Plan was defeated, its small-state concerns
about representation in the national legislature generated nearly a
month of debate. Among the important fallout from the Convention's
resolution of this debate were the demise of the legislative veto and its
replacement by judiciary-focused supremacy and "arising under" clauses.
1. July 10: Randolph's Contemplated Compromise. - While the debate
between the large and small states was taking place, Randolph floated, at
least privately to Madison, a compromise plan. 15 2 Several provisions of
the "Randolph Compromise" are of particular interest here. They reveal
the nationalists' recognition that they would have to constrain even fur153
ther the "national negative" mechanism for controlling state law.
More importantly, they reveal the nationalists' disposition, borne out by
subsequent events, to compensate for such a loss by (1) emphasizing the
internal duty of state lawmakers to conform state "law" to national law,
and (2) ensuring observance of that duty through federal judicial review.
To begin with, the Randolph Compromise assured "the people of
each State" that they "retain the perfect right.., of making all laws not
contrary to the articles of Union," subject only "to the supremacy of the
General Government in those instances.., in which that supremacy shall
be expressly declared by the articles of the Union." Next, the proposal
authorized national legislative vetoes of state laws, but permitted states to
petition "the national Judiciary" to "void" vetoes that were "contrary to
the power granted by the articles of the Union," thus enabling federal
judges to fulfill something of a "council of revision" function with regard
to legislative vetoes without becoming politically entangled. Finally, as a
substitute for the weakened veto, the proposal developed a protoFourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clause and a
proto-section 1983-both aimed at unjust state "law," but not at other
improper state action-which allowed "any individual conceiving himself
injured or oppressed by the partiality or injustice of a law of any particu150. Id. at 316-19.
151. See id. at 313, 322. Delaware, NewJersey, and NewYork voted to report the Plan
to the Convention. See id.
152. See Edmund Randolph, Suggestion for Conciliating the Small States (July 10,
1787), reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra note 2, at 55-56.
153. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
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lar State [to] resort to the National Judiciary, who may adjudge such law
1 54
to be void, if found contrary to the principles of equity and justice."
2. July 17: The Fall of the Negative and the Rise of the Supremacy Clause.
The Convention settled the representation issue on July 16, voting five
states to four, with Massachusetts divided, to grant each state an equal
voice in the Senate.1 55 With large states now vulnerable to coalitions of
small states capable of vetoing their internal legislation (as well as vice
versa), the national negative immediately encountered new opposition.
Although Pennsylvania had been one of the three states to favor expanding the negative on June 8,156 one of its most prominent delegates
and a reliable nationalist, Gouverneur Morris, now attacked the veto as
offensive and superfluous. In keeping with his nationalist views, Morris
argued that a "negative[ ]" of offensive state "law" by the federal
'judiciary department," backed up by ordinary legislative powers, would
suffice in the veto's absence. 157 Confederationist Sherman agreed that
the negative was unnecessary but thought that "the Courts of the States"
should be relied on to void state laws that "contraven[ed] the Authority
5
of the Union."'1
Responding to these and various practical objections, 159 Madison
pronounced "the negative on the laws of the States ... essential to the
efficacy & security of the Genl. Govt."' 160 Only through it could "the propensity of the States to pursue their particular interests in opposition to
the general interest [be] .. .effectually controuled."' 61 Federal judicial
review would not suffice because it would come too late.' 6 2 Nor could
"[c] onfidence ... be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests" because they were vulnerable to local
politics:
In all the States these are more or less dependt. on the Legislatures. In Georgia they are appointed annually by the
Legislature. In R. Island the Judges who refused to execute an
unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by
the Legislature who would be willing
instruments of the wicked
6
& arbitrary plans of their masters.' 3
154. Randolph, supra note 152, at 56.
155. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 13-14, 15-16 (July 16, 1787).
156. See 1 id. at 163, 168 (June 8, 1787); supra note 117 and accompanying text.
157. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 28 (July 17, 1787); see Rakove, supra note 26, at 1047
("the negative was the first casualty... [of the] decision of July 16 giving the states an
equal vote in the Senate"); Sager, supra note 17, at 47.
158. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 27 (July 17, 1787) (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., id. (statement of Luther Martin).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 27-28 (footnote omitted).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:696

Madison's arguments notwithstanding, the negative fell, seven states
to three.' 6 4 Its defeat contributed to two of the trends discussed above:
(1) the rejection of other Madisonian mechanisms for "effectually controul[ing]" state legislators' self-interested and centrifugal "propensities"
on the ground that judicial review of state "law" would suffice; and (2) as
revealed by the discrepancies in the Morris and Sherman positions, an
ongoing tug-of-war between nationalists and confederationists over
whether the reviewing courts should be federal or state. With the demise
of Madison's cherished veto, competing nationalist and confederationist
efforts to recalibrate the balance struck by the Madisonian Compromise,
which the Randolph-Madison Substitute already had shifted subtly in a
nationalist direction, became an obsessive preoccupation during the re65
mainder of the Convention.
The process began with the Convention's very next act, namely,
unanimous acceptance of Luther Martin's motion to adopt a supremacy
clause, thereby delegating to judges (state and federal) what previously
had been the veto's function of voiding state law contrary to federal
law. 166 Martin was perhaps the Convention's most committed confederationist,167 so it is striking that his motion to revive an important feature of
the NewJersey Plan should secure the votes of all the nationalists. But as
the abortive Randolph Compromise already had telegraphed, 6 8 the nationalists recognized that however significant the role of state courts in
checking state legislatures, and however significant the role of federal
courts in checking up on the state courts, it would be crucial that (as
Martin proposed)
the legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in
pursuance of the articles of Union and all Treaties made and
ratified under the authority of the United States shall be the
supreme law of the respective States as far as those acts or
Treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and Inhabitants-and that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be
164. See id. at 21-22, 28.
165. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 87, 93-97,
157-158, 163 and accompanying text; infra notes 180-183 and accompanying text
(discussing the nationalist tugs and confederationist pulls). Ignoring the most important
dynamics of this tug-of-war, prior commentary has tended to argue that there was only one
pattern-away from the preferred Madisonian mechanisms and either toward mainly
federaljudicial review, see, e.g., Amar, supra note 17, at 248-49; Sager, supra note 17, at
46-48 & n.81, or toward mainly state judicial review, see, e.g., Harrison, supra note 9, at
252-53.
166. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 28-29 (July 17, 1787). Linking the negative's
defeat and the advent of the supremacy clause are, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement
Federal Law?, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1036-37 (1995); Rakove, supra note 26, at 1047;
Sager, supra note 17, at 46-48.
167. See 3 Farrand, supra note 2, at 172, 172-232 (reprinting Martin's postconvention writings opposing ratification).
168. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
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bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective
laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding. 169
Martin's position also represents a conversion of sorts. Although
previously of the view that "it would be improper" to make state judges
take an oath of loyalty to the articles of union insofar as it conflicted with
their oaths to uphold state law,170 he now sponsored a considerably more
demanding supremacy clause proposal. He did so, however, with the
"wish and hope" that it would encourage the national legislature to permit "all questions arising on treaties and on the laws of the general government... [to be] determined in the first instance in the [now appropriately fortified] courts of the respective states." 17 1 Martin's statement
also conceded, as had Rutledge and the NewJersey Plan, 17 2 that the state
courts would fulfill only a "first instance" filtration responsibility as to
state law contrary to federal law, leaving to an appellate federal court the
job of checking the filters and the decisional law the state courts made.
Martin's screen was only loosely meshed, however. Tracking the New
Jersey Plan's supremacy clause, he intentionally omitted any reference to
(1) the supremacy of the articles of union themselves (as opposed to federal acts and treaties) or (2) the subordinate position of state constitutions vis-a.-vis federal law-believing, as he did, that state constitutions
173
should trump contrary federal law.
3. July 18: The Advent of "Arising Under"Jurisdictionand a Battle over
Jurisdictional Presumptions. - The allocation of responsibility between
state and federal judges remained at the forefront the next day, July 18,
when the Convention took up, phrase by phrase, the three judiciary resolutions as reported by the Committee of the Whole.174 The Convention
unanimously agreed, as it had before, "[t] hat a national Judiciary be established" 175 to "consist of One supreme Tribunal"' 7 6 with tenure and
salary protections. 17 7 Deciding who would appoint "supreme" judges
78
again proved controversial and again was put off.'
169. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 22 (July 17, 1787); see id. at 28-29 (statement of
Luther Martin).
170. 1 id. at 203 (June 11, 1787); see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
171. Luther Martin, Luther Martin's Reply to the Landholder, Maryland Journal,
March 19, 1788, reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra note 2, at 286, 287.
172. See supra notes 87, 91, 137 and accompanying text.
173. See Martin, supra note 171, at 287. In Martin's version, the New Jersey Plan's
"Judiciary" of the several States became "Judiciaries," which then became "Judicatures"
when the Convention forwarded the resolution to its Committee of Detail a week later. 2
Fan-and, supra note 2, at 132 (emphasis added).
174. See supra note 127.
175. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 37, 41 (July 18, 1787).
176. Id.
177. See id. at 38, 45. Before adopting this clause, the Convention deleted the
prohibition on increases in salary during service. See id.; supra notes 74-75 and

accompanying text.
178. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 37-38, 41-44 (July 18, 1787).
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The provision empowering "the national Legislature ...to appoint

inferior Tribunals"17 9 prompted another debate, but now on how much,
not whether, federal and state review should occur. After Butler and
Martin reprised the extreme confederationist position against any authorization of lower federal courts, 180 the other delegates debated presumptions: Arguing in favor of the Compromise, Randolph, Gorham, and
Gouverneur Morris presumed that the legislature would exercise the
power to create lower federal courts because "the Courts of the States can
not be trusted with the administration of the National laws. The objects
ofjurisdiction are such as will often place the General & local policy at
variance." 18 1 Invoking the opposite presumption, Sherman announced
that he would accept the Compromise, "but wished [the legislature] to
make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be done ....,,182 In
George Mason's intermediate view, inferior federal courts might not be
immediately necessary, but "many circumstances might arise not now to
be foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary." 183
Although the provision passed unanimously, 184 the direction of its presumption remained contentious. What remained constant, however, was
the legislature's discretion over lower federal courts, which had been
broadened by (1)the Randolph-Madison Substitute's switch from "the
jurisdiction of the [supreme tribunal] shall be" to "the jurisdiction of the
nationalJudiciary shall extend to" 18 5 and (2) the Substitute's removal of
any limitation of the lower and supreme tribunals to, respectively, origi86
nal and appellate jurisdiction.'
The Convention next unanimously approved Madison's motion to
revise the preexisting jurisdiction clause to read: "That the jurisdiction of
the national Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by
the general Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the National peace and harmony."1 87 By replacing "cases which respect the collection of the Natl. revenue" with "cases arising under [all national] laws,"
this amendment accomplished another important adjustment of the
Compromise to compensate somewhat for the loss of the veto-in this
179. 1 id. at 231.
180. See 2 id. at 45-46 (July 18, 1787) (statement of Luther Martin) ("They will
create jealousies & oppositions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they
will interfere."); id. at 45 (statement of Pierce Butler).
181. Id. at 46 (statement of Edmund Randolph); see id. (statement of Nathaniel
Gorham) ("Inferior tribunals are essential to render the authority of the Nat. Legislature
effectual."); id. (statement of Gouverneur Morris).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 38-39, 46.
185. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text following note 128.
187. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 39 (July 18, 1787). Unlike the official version of this
resolution, see id., and the version submitted by the Convention to its Committee of Detail
for inclusion in a draft Constitution, see id. at 132 (undated), Madison's notes include the
word "all" before "cases." Id. at 46 (July 18, 1787); see supra note 127.
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case by allowing national judges, as the veto previously had allowed the
national legislature, to review state law for consistency with all federal statutory law. Of particular importance, moreover, Madison's amendment
reiterated the Randolph-Madison Substitute's invitation to the legislature
to use the entire "national Judiciary," inferior as well as supreme, to exercise jurisdiction over federal question cases both in original proceedings
and on appeal from state courts. 188 The amendment thus made the
lower courts available to shoulder not only some of the "original" work
that otherwise would have been confined to state courts, but also some of
the appeals from state courts that otherwise might have inundated the
supreme tribunal. 189
Over the course of the critical July 16-18 period, another true, if
provisional, compromise had been reached. In place of federal legislative
review of state laws for consistency with national law-the structural constraint on state lawmaking that Madison thought "absolutely necessary" 9 0-the Convention devised a different, judicial review device. Using a newly inserted supremacy clause that made federal statutes "the
supreme law of the respective States," the "Mid-July Compromise" coopted the nominally "state Judiciaries," performing a nominally "state
law" function, into performing what in fact was a national structural function, namely, filtering state legislation for any that conflicted with national statutes. Using a newly expanded federal question jurisdiction that
the national legislature could distribute among an undifferentiated "national Judiciary" with an undifferentiated capacity to exercise original or
appellate jurisdiction, the new Compromise also gave the national
legislature a broadly available device for supervising the state judicial filtering process and, if necessary, substituting federal first-instance filters.
The Mid-July Compromise, however, proved to be no more final than its
predecessors had been.
4. July 23 & 24: The Extension of the Oath Requirement. - The confederationists' conversion to the cause of constitutionally imposed legal
duties on state officials, at least in lieu of the national negative, became
clearer on July 23 when the oath requirement applicable to state officials
came before the Convention. Elbridge Gerry, who had earlier opposed
the requirement as offensive to state sovereignty, 19l now embraced it as a
useful supplement to the supremacy clause that would end state officers'
practice of treating their own governments "as distinct from, not as parts
of the[ ] General System, &... [from] giv[ing] a preference to the State
188. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text; infra note 226 and

accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 95, 128-133 and accompanying text; infra note 226 and
accompanying text.
190. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 54, at 383; see 2
Fan-and, supra note 2, at 27-28 (July 17, 1787).
191. See 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 203 (July 11, 1787); supra note 121 and

accompanying text.
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Govts. ' ' 192 After extending the oath requirement to federal officials, the
Convention unanimously accepted it.193 The Convention then and the
next morning appointed Ellsworth, Gorham, Randolph, Rutledge, and
Wilson to a Committee of Detail charged with reporting a Constitution
based on the proceedings thus far, with consideration, as well, of the
194
Pinckney and New Jersey Plans.
F. The Committee of Detail
No notes of Committee of Detail debates exist, and only two complete Committee drafts of proposed constitutions plus a final report survive. In these three documents, the Committee did five things. First, it
developed and refined the qualities that federal courts would be expected to exercise when they had jurisdiction, by (a) for the first time
investing all federal courts with a 'Judicial Power" that the legislature
could not withdraw; (b) giving all federal judges tenure and salary protections; and (c) making inferior courts (if any) independent federal tribunals, not appropriated state courts. Second, the Committee reinforced
the legislature's authority over the quantity of federal jurisdiction by retaining the Randolph-Madison Substitute's "shall extend to" language
and backstopping it with the first versions of an "Exceptions and
Regulations" clause and with an "assignments" clause letting the
legislature transfer jurisdiction from the supreme court to lower federal
courts. Third, the Committee created a presumption of state court original and supreme court appellate jurisdiction in most matters, subject to
legislative override in favor of lower federal court original jurisdiction, or
(in the later drafts) lower federal court appellatejurisdiction, or no federal appellate jurisdiction at all. Fourth, it expanded federal question
jurisdiction. Fifth, it continued expanding and personalizing state
judges' supremacy clause duties.
1. The Randolph-Rutledge Draft. - The earliest available thorough
draft of a Constitution is a Committee of Detail document crafted primarily by nationalist Randolph, with edits by confederationist Rutledge.1 95
a. FederalJudiciary.- The Randolph-Rutledge judiciary article was as
follows: 196

5. The Judiciary
1. shall consist of one supreme tribunal
2. the judges whereof shall be appointed by the senate
3. and of such inferior tribunals, as the legislature may
(appoint) <establish>
192. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 88 (July 23, 1787).
193. See id. at 84, 87, 88.
194. See id. at 85-86, 95-97, 106 (July 23-24, 1787).
195. See id. at 137-50 (July 24-26, 1787).
196. Words in parentheses were crossed out in the original; italics represent later
changes in Randolph's handwriting; angle brackets indicate emendations in Rutledge's
handwriting. See id. at 137 n.6.
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(4.

the judges of which shall be also appointed by the
senate-)
5 all the judges shall hold their offices during good
behaviour;
6. and shall receive punctually,
at stated times
a (fixed) compensation for their services,
to be settled by the legislature
in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect
the persons actually in office at the time of such
diminution.
and shall swear fidelity to the union.
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1
to all cases, arising under laws passed by the
general <Legislature>
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature
may assign, as involving the national
peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between citizens
of different states
<in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of another State>
in disputes between different
states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are concerned
<& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn>
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except
in <Cases of Impeachmt. & (in)> those instances, in which the legislature
shall make it original, and the legislature shall organize it
8. The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid
according to the discretion of the legislature
may be assigned to the inferior tribunals, as
197
original tribunals.
The Randolph-Rutledge draft was rife with small but consequential
innovations: (1) Using the word "may" with respect to the legislature's
power to create lower federal courts gently emphasized the optional character of those courts, and Rutledge's substitution of "establish" for "appoint" removed the previous connotation that the legislature could or
should designate existing state courts as federal courts to hear federal
disputes. 198 (2) Clinching the latter point, the draft extended tenure and
salary protections, which previously had been applicable only to the
supreme tribunal, to all federal judges, thus demanding of lower federal
judges the independence qualities that Madison and others had criticized
197. Id. at 146-47 (citation omitted).
198. See Collins, supra note 100, at 124-26; 1 Goebel, supra note 19, at 211-12. But
see Holt, supra note 100, at 357; Prakash, supra note 100, at 2019.
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state judges for lacking.' 9 9 (3) The draft then enumerated several categories of "cases" and "disputes" (as well as "impeachments") 20 0 to which
"[t]he jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend." It thus mandated that the court decide whole disputes, not abstract issues, while retaining the Randolph-Madison Substitute's innovation of imposing a constitutional ceiling, but not a floor, on the court's jurisdiction. 20 1 (4)
Enumerated, in addition to impeachments, were (a) the "arising under
[national] laws" category drawn almost verbatim from the Convention's
July 18 Resolution, with Madison's "all cases" language, 20 2 and (b) a revised formulation of the July 18 Resolution's second and final categoryreferring to "such other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as
involving the national peace and harmony"-now fleshed out to include
(and apparently capped at) collection of revenue and admiralty cases and
three categories of diversity disputes. (5) The last sentence of the jurisdictional categories deviated from the Randolph-Madison Substitute and
reverted to the Virginia Plan's express allocation of only appellatejurisdiction to the supreme court (except in the case of impeachments), subject,
however, to a legislative power to make thatjurisdiction original. (6) The
final clause let the legislature assign cases or disputes within any of the
supreme tribunal's jurisdictional categories (apparently including impeachments) "to the inferior tribunals" but only "as original tribunals."
Our fourth through sixth points, covering items 7 and 8 of the
Randolph-Rutledge draft, reveal a number of presumptions that the draft
established to influence the legislature's power over the judiciary. First,
by separately listing "arising under" jurisdiction and impeachments, this
draft appears to have emphasized the presumptive need for federal court
involvement in those areas and the drafters' expectation that the
legislature would confer jurisdiction. No similar expectation attached to
the other "peace and harmony" subcategories, thus letting the legislature
decide whether to confer jurisdiction, with no constitutional tilt one way
or the other.203 Second, the tribunal to which jurisdiction over the delin199. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 27-28 (July 17, 1787); supra notes 97, 163, 181
and accompanying text. When the possibility of appointing state courts as federal ones was
raised in Congress in 1789, Representative James Madison of Virginia opposed it as
unconstitutional on the ground that no practical mechanism would be available to assure
the tenure and salary protections that Article III requires. 1 Annals of Cong. 844 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789).
200. Cf. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 39, 46 (July 18, 1787) (prior unanimous vote by
Convention to delete impeachments as ajurisdictional category).
201. See supra notes 80, 129, 139-141 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203. By providing that "jurisdiction shall extend to" impeachments and "arising
under" cases and to "such other cases as the nationallegislaturemay assign, as involving the
national peace and harmony," the draft might seem to have given the legislature discretion
over the "peace and harmony," but not the impeachments and "arising under," categories.
That reading, however, ignores the word "other," which suggests (as does the genesis of
the "peace and harmony" category up through itsJuly 18 formulation, see supra notes 73,
124, 187 and accompanying text) that the impeachments, "arising under," and revenue
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eated categories of cases and disputes was "extend [ed]" was "the supreme
tribunal"-but only presumptively. If the legislature so desired, clause 8
permitted it to give original jurisdiction over those cases to any "inferior
tribunals" it created. Third, the draft's deviation from the RandolphMadison Substitute, and its reversion to the Virginia Plan's division between original (inferior) and appellate (supreme) jurisdiction, was also
by presumption only in one important respect. Thus, the "Exceptions"
clause in item 7 of the Randolph-Rutledge draft authorized the
legislature to transfer "arising under" and other "peace and harmony"
cases from the supreme tribunal's (thus only presumptively) appellate to
its original jurisdiction. 20 4 Only the legislature's assignment of appellate
(as opposed to original) duties to lower federal courts was entirely forbidden-as in the Virginia Plan, but not in the Randolph-Madison Substitute
or in any plan subsequent to the Committee of Detail's first draft.
We hasten to add that reading the Randolph-Rutledge "Exceptions"
clause to permit the legislature merely to shift cases from the supreme
court's appellate to its original jurisdiction, rather than to eliminate cases
from the court's jurisdiction altogether, is less consequential than it at
first might seem. This is because of the long-neglected but critically important remainder of the clause, which provided that "the legislature
shall organize [the supreme jurisdiction]." Recall Rutledge's central contribution to the judiciary conception as adopted (to this extent) by the
Madisonian Compromise, namely, the strong likelihood (indeed, in
Rutledge's, Sherman's, and Martin's view, the strong presumption) that
there would be appeals from thirteen previously independentjudicial systems to a newly established multi-sovereignty system of integrated
collection/diversity/admiralty subcategories all are types of "peace and harmony" matters

subject to the legislature's discretion whether to confer jurisdiction-with the draft
constitution having determined that all impeachments and "arising under" matters qualify

"as involving the national peace and harmony" (thus encouraging the conferral of

jurisdiction) while leaving it to the legislature to decide whether disputes in the other

categories affect "national peace and harmony" (thus implying no presumption of
jurisdiction). Recall that Randolph's own June 13 Substitute already had changed "the
jurisdiction [of the supreme tribunal] shall be" to "the jurisdiction of the nationalJudiciary
shall extend to." See supra note 129 and accompanying text. That switch, and not, as
Clinton and Goebel have argued, the merely confirmatory late-July insertion of the "as the
national legislature may assign" language, see Clinton, supra note 19, at 773; 1 Goebel,
supra note 19, at 234, initiated the principle of congressional control of federal

jurisdiction.
204. See Clinton, supra note 19, at 778 (basing this possible reading of Article 1T's
Exceptions Clause on the Clause's antecedent in the Randolph-Rufledge draft). The
Randolph-Rutledge "Exceptions" clause apparently served only the appellate-to-original
function, given that (1) the "extend to" language that began the jurisdictional section

already permitted the legislature to remove categories from the supreme court's
jurisdiction altogether, as, we conclude, did the "organize" (and later the "Regulations")
provision, see infra notes 206-208, 223 and accompanying text, and (2) the assignments
clause already allowed the legislature to shift categories from the supreme court's to the
inferior courts' jurisdiction.
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courts. 20 5 Conjoining one new and thirteen existing judiciaries into a
single integrated court system would require an intricate body of rules to
permit-and at times to compel-the movement of records, judgments,
and orders of enforcement between sovereigns.2 0 6 By giving the
legislature the power (or recognizing that only it would have the practical
capacity) to formulate those rules and thereby "organize" the new system
and prescribe when and how cases could cross the previously unbridged
state-federal divide, the Randolph-Rutledge draft expressly granted the
legislature (1) all the authority that the "extend to" revision already had
implied as to the supreme tribunal's appellate jurisdiction, 20 7 and (2) at
least as much authority as is entailed by the traditional reading of the
2 08
Exceptions Clause as ultimately adopted.
The effect of clauses 7 and 8 (together with the legislature's clause 3
power to forgo inferior tribunals) thus was to create two broad intersovereign presumptions. With respect to original jurisdiction, except in
cases of impeachment, state judicial responsibility would be the default
rule. With respect to appellate jurisdiction, the supreme tribunal presumptively would hear appeals in the "arising under" category and also in
205. See supra notes 87, 91-94, 137, 171-172 and accompanying text.
206. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 242-43 & n.115 (noting that "[i]t can take a while
to work out the implications of such an innovative, not to mention complicated, system [of
dual federalism]").
207. By creating a fully self-contained federal system of inferior (original) and
supreme (appellate) courts, the Virginia Plan would have avoided the organizational and
regulatory challenges posed by the Rutledge innovation as embodied in the Madisonian
Compromise. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had encountered and failed
to resolve these very challenges when it established a Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture,
which, although nationally staffed, was largely at the mercy of the states because of their
ability to bar (1) appeals from their courts to the Capture Court and (2) enforcement by
their courts of the Capture Court's judgments. See 1 Goebel, supra note 19, at 178-82,
194-95 (describing the Capture Court's frustration by "the intransigeance [sic] of the

states").
208. See supra notes 9, 23, 46 and accompanying text. In the Committee's next draft,
the legislature's power to "organize" became a power to "Regulat[e]" the supreme
tribunal's jurisdiction. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. During the ratification
debates, nationalists discussing Congress's power to limit federal appellate jurisdiction
usually focused on the "Regulations," not the "Exceptions," power. See, e.g., 2 Elliot, supra
note 4, at 494 (Dec. 7, 1787) (statement of James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying
convention) ("[W]ill not Congress better regulate [appeals], as they rise from time to time,
than could have been done by the Convention? Besides, if the regulations shall be
attended with inconvenience, the Congress can alter them as soon as discovered."); 3 id. at
519 (June 18, 1788) (statement of Edmund Pendleton at Virginia ratifying convention)
("Congress may make such regulations [of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction] as
they may think conducive to the public convenience."); id. at 534 (June 20, 1788)
(statement ofJames Madison at Virginia ratifying convention) ("by the word regulations, it
is in the power of Congress to prevent [appellate court supercession ofjury verdicts], or
[to] prescribe such a mode as will secure the privilege of jury trial" and Congress "may
make a regulation to prevent such appeals entirely" (emphasis added)); see also infra notes
366-367, 369, 372 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's emphasis during
the 1790s on "Regulations," not "Exceptions," as the source of Congress's power over the
Court's jurisdiction).
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the six "peace and harmony" subcategories insofar as the legislature decided to create any federal jurisdiction over those subcategories, but the
legislature retained the option of granting state courts the final say in any
or all cases, either by choosing not to extend federal jurisdiction to such
cases or by declining to "organize" any appellate method of transferring
records from, and judgments and orders to, state courts.
b. Supremacy Clause. - The Randolph-Rutledge draft had initially included language, subsequently crossed out by one of the authors, providing that "[a] I1 laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void,
and in the decision thereon, which shall be vested in the supreme
judiciary, all incidents without which the general principles cannot be
satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general principle. '209 By
mandating that the "supreme judiciary" have an effectual power to void
state law "repugnant" to the constitution, the crossed out provision departed significantly from the NewJersey/Martin supremacy clause, which
had presumptively divided the power to void state law between state (original) and federal (appellate) courts and had premised the power on statutory and treaty, not constitutional, repugnance. 2 10 As a matter of pure
speculation, one can imagine Randolph inserting, and Rutledge deleting,
the clause because it supplemented the presumption favoring federal, at
least appellate, jurisdiction over "all cases, arising under laws passed by
the general <Legislature>" with a requirement of at least federal appellate
21
jurisdiction over all cases arising under the articles of union. '
2. The Wilson-Rutledge Draft and the Final Committee Report. - The only
other complete Committee of Detail draft is in James Wilson's hand,
again with emendations by Rutledge. 212 This draft is virtually identical to
the final report that the Committee submitted to the Convention on
August 6,213 so we discuss both together.
a. FederalJudiciary.- The Wilson-Rutledgejudiciary article obviously
was influenced by the Randolph-Rutledge draft, but is somewhat truer to
2 14
the Convention's Resolutions:
14.
The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme (National) Court, and in such (other) <inferior>
209. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 144.
210. See supra notes 143-145, 169, 184 and accompanying text.
211. Cf. Sager, supra note 17, at 49 (clause reveals "crucial link between national
supremacy and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court").
212. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 163-75.
213. See id. at 183, 186, 188 (Aug. 6, 1787) (supremacyjudiciary, and oath provisions
in Committee of Detail's final report). Minor stylistic discrepancies between the draft and
the final report are ignored.
214. Words in parentheses were crossed out in the original; italics represent Wilson's
edits; angle brackets indicate Rutledge's edits. See id. at 163 n.17.
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Courts as shall, from Time to Time, be constituted by the
Legislature of the United States.
The Judges of the Supreme (National) Court shall (be chosen by the Senate by Ballott).

(They shall) hold their Offices

during good Behaviour. They shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished

during their Continuance in Office.
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court shall extend to all Cases arising under Laws passed by the Legislature of
the United States; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors (and
other) <other> public Ministers <& Consuls>, to the Trial of Impeachments of Officers of the United States; to all Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies between
<States,-except those wh. regardJurisdn or Territory,-betwn>
a State and a Citizen or Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States and between <a State or the> Citizens (of
any of the States) <thereof> and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In Cases of Impeachment, (those) <Cases> affecting Ambassadors (and) other public Ministers <& Consuls>, and those
in which a State shall be (one of the) <a> Part(ies)<y>, thisJurisdiction shall be original. In all the other Cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such Exceptions and under
such Regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature
may (distribute) <assign any part of> the(is)e Jurisdiction
<above mentd.,-except the Trial of the Executive->, in the
Manner and under the Limitations which it shall think proper
(among) <to> such (other) <inferior> Courts as it shall
215
constitute from Time to Time.
The Wilson-Rutledge draft for the first time (1) identified something
called "[t]heJudicial Power of the United States," that differs from both
the particular "Courts" that the constitution and legislature create and
their 'Jurisdiction," and (2) vested all of that power "in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior Courts" 216 as are "constituted" (i.e., not "ap215. Id. at 172-73.
216. Here we support Amar's point that Article III as finally written creates "structural
equality" among all federal judges. Amar, supra note 17, at 235-39 & n.1 15, 262. We
cannot, however, accept his argument for reading the "and in" phrase as if it said only
'and"-or even "or." By reading the "in" out of "and in," Amar departs from the plain
meaning approach that he usually adopts, in order to argue that Article III's phrase
"judicial Power" means to say, or at least "subsume" the term, "jurisdiction," certain
categories of which (in his view) have to be vested in some federal court but may be vested
in either the inferior courts or the Supreme Court without being vested in both. Id. at
221-22, 230-32 & n.88, 233. That reading falters not only because (a) all federal
"jurisdiction" concededly is not vested in the lower federal courts, although all of the
"judicial Power" is vested "in" them, but also because (b) Article III, Section 1 irrevocably
"vest[s]" the judicial power in all federal courts while Section 2 only says that "[t]hejudicial
Power shall extend [meaning reach] to" certain heads of jurisdiction, rather than "shall
be" composed of thatjurisdiction (the Virginia Plan's pre-Compromise formulation), and
because (c) Amar's interpretation cannot easily be brought into reflective equilibrium
with later congressional and Supreme Court practice, see Meltzer, supra note 9,
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point[ed]") by the legislature. In so doing, the draft established two qualitative traits by which federal courts henceforth were distinguished from
state courts. First, the Wilson-Rutledge draft made yet clearer than the
Randolph-Rutledge draft (which had made clearer than the Convention
drafts) that the national judiciary was nationally "constitute [d] "-and
thus physically and personally separate from state courts. Second, the
draft defined a characteristic that all, and only, federal judges had: the
duty and responsibility to exercise the 'Judicial Power of the United
States." These innovations, in turn, left the quantity, or categories, of federal jurisdiction-some of which, at the least, could or would be shared
by state original tribunals, and as to which the federal courts' "Power"
merely could, but did not have to, "extend"-with relatively little significance as a means of distinguishing federal courts from state courts.
The intent to establish a set of qualitative, integrative, and distinctive
traits of federal judges was even more clearly evidenced by the Committee
of Detail's final report to the Convention, which extended tenure and
salary guarantees to all judges rather than only (as in the Convention
Resolution and the Wilson-Rutledge draft) to supreme judges. 217 Doing
so amplified the structural equivalence of all federal courts and established a third qualitative respect (independence) in which those courts
were distinct from and "structurally superior" to state courts.2 18 Building
on the innovation previously made in the Randolph-Madison Substitute
for the original Madisonian Compromise, the Wilson-Rutledge draft in
these three ways deftly invested the lower federal courts with the entirety
of the judiciary's "Power," while still maintaining the spirit of the
Compromise by refraining from mandating the lower courts' creation.
The Wilson-Rutledge jurisdictional categories were similar to those
of the Randolph-Rutledge version, except that the Wilson-Rutledge draft
(1) replaced the "peace and harmony" heading and its various subcategories with a listing of the subcategories alone; (2) substituted "Controversies" for "disputes"; (3) added a new Ambassadors/Ministers/Consuls category; and (4) applied an "all cases" description to the "arising under
Laws," "Ambassadors," and "Admiralty" categories, in contrast to the
at 1585-602. Nor can Amar avoid the first problem by arguing that the "permissive 'may
[from time to time ordain and establish]'" language might have reflected back on the
Supreme Court but for the insertion of the second "in." Id. at 232 n.88. The biggest
difficulty with this argument is that the "permissive 'may'" is nowhere to be found in the
Wfilson-Rutledge draft where the second "in" first appears. Moreover, even if one were to
delete the second "in," there is no straight-faced way to read Article III's "such inferiorCourts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" language to feed back to the
Supreme Court. The "such inferior Courts as" formulation does all the work Amar would
assign to the "in" and in a much clearer manner than "in" could do. There is simply no
purpose for the second "in" other than to make clear that the entire "judicial Power" vests
"in...inferior [federal] Courts."
217. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 186.
218. See Arnar, supra note 17, at 235-38 (describing the "structural superiority" of
federal judges).
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"Trial of Impeachments" and the various diversity-of-citizenship-based
"Controvers [y]" categories. Given Wilson and Rutledge's retention of the
Randolph-Madison Substitute's "shall extend to" innovation, the WilsonRutledge draft's selective use of the word "all" apparently was meant to
extend the legislature's power to confer jurisdiction to all subcategories
within the specified categories of cases, rather than to limit the
legislature's power to withholdjurisdiction over cases within those categories. 21 9 The selective use of "all" thus may have reflected: (a) an intent to
include criminal as well as civil disputes within "Cases," but only civil disputes within "Controversies"; 2 20 (b) a desire to include single-party
"cases" in categories in which there need not be a "controversy" between
two or more people; 221 and/or (c) an effort to include every dispute
within the subject-matter-defined categories and notjust those presenting
pristine questions of law, and the whole such dispute rather than just the
part of it involving the "federal" (or equivalent) question-thus ruling
out the Pinckney Plan's limitation of jurisdiction to a subset of cases in
which some treaty or other provision of national or international law
needed to be "constru[ed]," and the NewJersey Plan's option of addressing only the federal (or equivalent) construction question itself, and not
222
the entire case or controversy.
The last three sentences of the Wilson-Rutledge draft closely paralleled the format of the analogous provisions in the Randolph-Rutledge
version, with an "Exceptions" clause aimed at least in part at giving the
legislature power to shift the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction to its
original jurisdiction, a "Regulations" clause (synonymous with the prior
draft's "organize it" clause) 22 3 giving the legislature a more muscular
power to deny supreme court appeals, and an "assign [ments]" clause letting the legislature shift cases within the supreme tribunal's jurisdiction
to inferior federal courts. 224 Notably, however, the later version's
"Exceptions" clause was more general than the prior version's, potentially
allowing it to do some of the same work as the "Regulations" and "assign[ments]" clauses. A more important difference between the two
219. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text. But see Amar, supra note 17,
at 229-30, 238-59.
220. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
221. See RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 449-50, 472-511 (1994).
222. See supra notes 80, 137, 139 and accompanying text; infra notes 470-474 and
accompanying text. Under this interpretation, it would be natural to omit "all" before the
"Controversy"-denominated heads of jurisdiction, because, in those disputes where
jurisdiction is dependent on the nature of the parties, not the type of legal issue, no
ambiguity exists over whether a dispute qualifies and whether the federal court gets the
whole case.
223. See Clinton, supra note 19, at 778, 781 (noting the relationship between the
Randolph-Rutledge "organize it" clause and the Wilson-Rutledge "Regulations" clause);
Ratner, supra note 18, at 170 (as used in the eighteenth century, "[a] 'regulation'. ..was a
rule imposed to establish good order").
224. See supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
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drafts was the later version's removal of any requirement that jurisdiction
225
shifted from the supreme to the lower courts be "original jurisdiction."
This change enabled the Wilson-Rutledge draft once again to take full
advantage of the Randolph-Madison Substitute's sacrifice of mandatory
supreme court appellate jurisdiction in favor of letting the legislature assign nearly the whole of the federal jurisdiction (original or appellate) to
226
any lower federal courts that it might need or want to create.
The presumptions the Wilson-Rutledge draft created were similar to
those the Randolph-Rutledge draft had established: (1) State court oriinaljurisdiction was still the default rule, except as to impeachments and
ambassadorial and state-party cases, as to which supreme court original
jurisdiction was the rule. But the legislature was invited to shift matters
within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction to its original jurisdiction or to assign cases (except some impeachments) that were presumptively within, or had been legislatively shifted to, the supreme court's original jurisdiction to the original jurisdiction of any lower federal courts
that the legislature created. (2) With respect to appellate jurisdiction,
the presumption was that the supreme court would hear appeals in all
constitutionally specified categories in which it did not have original jurisdiction. But the legislature (a) was invited to shift any of the supreme
court's appellate jurisdiction to the lower federal courts and (b) retained
the option-though it was not expressly invited-to give state courts the
final say in any cases over which they exercised original jurisdiction by
declining to promulgate regulations for the transfer of records, judgments, and orders between state and federal courts or otherwise withholding federal appellate jurisdiction.
b. Supremacy Clause. - The Wilson-Rutledge draft contained a
supremacy clause similar to the Martin provision the Convention had
adopted on July 17:
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in Pursuance of this Constitution, and all Treaties made under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the
several States, and of their Citizens and Inhabitants; and the
Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their Decisions, any Thing in the Constitutions 22or7 Laws of the several
States to the Contrary notwithstanding.

225. Arguably, the power the Wilson-Rutledge draft conferred on the legislature to
make assignments to the inferior courts "in the Manner and under the Limitations which it

shall think proper," for the first time raised the possibility that the legislature could impose
qualitative, not just quantitative, limits on the federal judiciary's decisionmaking powers.
See infra notes 268-271, 283 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text. The Wilson-Rutledge draft
thus rejected-permanently, it turned out-any bar to lower federal court consideration of
cases begun in the state courts.
227. 2 Fan-and, supra note 2, at 169.
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To Martin's dismay, 228 but apparently not Rutledge's, this clause for the
first time forbade state constitutions, as well as state laws, to withstand federal laws and treaties with which the former were in conflict. Additionally, by directing the clause to "the Judges in the several States," the
Wilson-Rutledge draft largely completed the pluralizing, personalizing,
and deinstitutionalizing transformation that previously had progressed
from "the Judiciary" to "the Judiciaries" to "the Judicatures of the several
States." 22 9 As such, it more clearly conscripted state judges as individuals
(albeit ones still purportedly applying federal law grafted onto the law of
the states) into national service as the first line of defense against state
laws (and now constitutions) that were contrary to federal statutory and
23 0
treaty provisions.
G. The Committee of Detail Report in the Convention
1. August 20 & 22: Two Rejected Advisory Opinion Amendments.
Before reaching the judiciary-related aspects of the Committee of Detail
report, the Convention referred several new proposals to the Committee.
Among them were Pinckney's suggestion that "[e]ach Branch of the
Legislature, as well as the supreme Executive [be given] authority to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions," 2 31 and Gouverneur Morris's
idea for a "Council of State" composed of the heads of several executive
departments and the chiefjustice of the supreme court. In this role, the
chief justice would have been responsible not only for advising the
President, but also for proposing "alterations of, and additions to, the
Laws of the United-States." 23 2 Hewing to the Convention's consistently
strong commitment to judicial independence and effectual judicial decision of the whole case, 233 the Committee of Detail rejected the advisory
opinion proposal and reported a watered down "Privy-Council" provision
(with a reduced role for the chiefjustice) that the Convention then pro23 4
ceeded to ignore.
2. August 23: A Last Debate on the Negative and the Assurance of "this
Constitution['s]"Supremacy. - On August 23, the Convention for the
fourth time replayed the debate over mechanisms to keep state law within
the bounds of federal law. An array of nationalists again moved and
spoke in favor of a national negative, this one requiring a two-thirds vote
of both houses and reaching any state law "interfering... with the gen-

228. See supra note 173.
229. See supra notes 143, 169, 173 and accompanying text.
230. See 1 Goebel, supra note 19, at 236 (noting that the change from "Judiciaries" to
"judges" "had the effect of making personal the injunction").
231. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 334, 341 (Aug. 20, 1787).
232. Id. at 335-36, 342-43.
233. See supra notes 74-75, 139, 222 and accompanying text.
234. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 367 (Aug. 22, 1787).
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eral interests and harmony of the Union. '235 The negative, Wilson said,
was "the key-stone" of any effective means of controlling state law, because "the firmness ofJudges is not of itself sufficient[.]" 23 6 An array of
confederationists, and Pennsylvania nationalist Morris, again opposed the
negative, arguing, inter alia, that it was "unnecessary; the laws of the General Government being Supreme & paramount to the State laws according to the plan, as it now stands." 237 Anticipating the last point, Rutledge
had earlier in the day moved, and the Convention had unanimously
agreed, to extend the reach of the supremacy clause to assure for the first
time that "[t]his Constitution" itself, and not merely federal acts and
2 38
treaties, would be treated as "the supreme law of the several States."
Two days later, the Convention also unanimously expanded the
supremacy clause to make clear its inclusion of preexisting as well as
newly made laws and treaties. 239 The motion to seek additional
240
committee consideration of the negative failed, six states to five.
As on each prior occasion, the answer to the question of how to keep
state law within federal law came back to "the Judges"-begging the follow-up questions that also had been mooted on every prior occasion and
never satisfactorily resolved: Which judges, subject to what duties and
what review? 241 Possible answers to these questions were embodied in (1)
Randolph and Madison's Virginia Plan-proposing an exclusively federal
judicial approach to the review of state law; (2) Rutledge's June 5
Amendment-jettisoning federal in favor of state original jurisdiction but
retaining federal appellate review; and (3) the various intermixtures of,
and presumptions as to, state and federal original and appellate review
reflected in the Madisonian Compromise itself, the Randolph-Madison
Substitute, the New Jersey Plan, the Convention's Resolutions to the
Committee of Detail (now including a supremacy clause), and that
Committee's Randolph-Rutledge, Wilson-Rutledge, and final drafts. The
evanescence of all of these solutions revealed, however, that the underlying question had not yet received an acceptable answer. With the national negative and the various revisionary and privy councils now permanently laid to rest, and with "force" rejected as a cure worse than the
disease, the judiciary question-now refined to a question of presumptive
quantities and assured "Power[s]," or qualities, of review-had to be
resolved.
235. Id. at 382, 390 (Aug. 23, 1787) (motion of Charles Pinckney); see id. at 390
(statement ofJames Madison); id. at 391 (statement ofJohn Langdon of New Hampshire).
236. Id. at 391.
237. Id. at 390 (statement of Roger Sherman); see id. (statement of George Mason);
id. at 391 (statement of John Rutledge); id. (statement of Hugh Williamson); id.
(statement of Gouverneur Morris).
238. Id. at 381-82, 389.
239. See id. at 409, 417 (Aug. 25, 1787) (quoted infra note 248).
240. See id. at 382, 391 (Aug. 23, 1787).
241. See supra notes 84, 87-88, 90-101, 157-173, 180-185 and accompanying text.
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3. August 27: The FinalMadisonian Compromise. - Matters came to a
head on August 27, a date equal in importance toJune 5 (the Madisonian
Compromise), June 13 (the Randolph-Madison Substitute), and July 17
(the negative's defeat and replacement by the supremacy clause) in the
development of the Convention's novel and complex judicial solution to
the state law "vices" that provided the Convention's raison d'itre for
Madison and his allies. 242 As much by voting down certain proposals as

by adopting others, the Framers finally constituted their federal experiment. In doing so, to be sure, they confirmed (1) the original
Compromise's mandate of a supreme national tribunal and (mere) authorization of inferior ones; (2) the Substitute's "shall extend to," instead
of "shall be," trade-off of mandatory supreme court appellate jurisdiction
for increased legislative leeway to create more numerous and more geographically proximate lower federal courts on which could be conferred
original or appellate jurisdiction; and (3) the Committee of Detail's investiture of the entire national judiciary with the full 'Judicial Power," its
broadened "arising under" category, and its legislative "Exceptions" and
"Regulations" powers over appellate jurisdiction. In addition, however,
the delegates (4) conformed the supremacy and "arising under" clauses,
carefully linking the state courts' filtering and the federal courts' spotchecking duties; (5) calibrated the presumptions that would govern the
legislature's allocation of (a) jurisdiction between state and federal courts
and (b) federal original and appellate jurisdiction between inferior and
supreme courts; and, most importantly, (6) clarified the qualitative nature of "[t] he judicial Power" and insulated it from legislative interference-building on earlier decisions to ensure judicial independence and
freedom from advisory duties and other political entanglements and to
oblige federal courts to apply supreme law effectually to decide the whole
case.
a. The Quality ofDecisionmakingPreserved and the "ArisingUnder"Jurisdiction Expanded. - Excluding minutia, the day began with the adoption,
six states to two, of a motion to insert the words "both in law and equity"
after the opening phrase of the judiciary article-"The Judicial Power of
the United States." 243 That addition was supplemented later in the day
by a successful motion to expand the "arising under" jurisdictional category to include all cases "in law and equity."244 In a subsequent touch-up
of the judiciary article, the Convention withdrew the "law and equity"
modifier of "[t] he judicial Power," thus leaving the phrase to expand the
242. See supra notes 53-55, 110-113 and accompanying text.
243. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 422, 428 (Aug. 27, 1787) (motion of William

Johnson).
244. 2 id. at 425. The "law and equity" addition to the jurisdictional enumeration was
surplusage if "all" already was meant to mandate federal jurisdiction in all "arising under"
matters, see Amar, supra note 17, at 229-30, 246-52, but not, e.g., if "all" was designed to
exclude the Pinckney and New Jersey possibility that only abstract legal issues could
generate federally cognizable "arising under" cases. See supra notes 43, 80, 137, 139,
220-222 and accompanying text.
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number of "arising under" cases to which "[t] he judicial Power shall extend" without corrupting the qualitative content of that "Power" with a
quantitative descriptor.2 4 5 Turning then to judicial independence, and
continuing to exhibit more agreement on its importance than on all
other aspects of the judiciary article, the Convention, seven states to one,
executive removal of federal judges on
rejected Dickinson's proposal2 4 for
6
the application of Congress.
Next, in a crucial series of additional modifications to the "arising
under" clause, the Convention, spurred on by, of all people, confederationist John Rutledge, unanimously agreed to expand federaljurisdiction
to include not only "all Cases arising under the laws passed by the
Legislature of the United States" (the preexisting language) but also all
cases arising under "this constitution."247 In addition, the delegates carefully modified the language of the "arising under" clause (deleting
"passed by the Legislature" with respect to "laws" and adding "and treaties
made or which shall be made under their [the constitution's and laws']
authority") so as, in Rutledge's words, to revise the "arising under" jurisdiction "conformably to a preceding amendment in another place," to wit, the
now linguistically identical supremacy clause as expanded on Rutledge's
motion four days earlier. 248 The Framers thus self-consciously and irrevocably forged the constitutional structural link between the front-line decisionmaking of "the Judges in every State" under the supremacy clause
and the supervisory decisionmaking of the federal judiciary when called
upon to exercise the "arising under" jurisdiction permitted by the
judiciary article.
As Madison explained to Jefferson in an 1823 letter rejecting the
Virginia Court of Appeals' claim that the Supreme Court was not authorized to review state court decisions:
Believing as I do that the General Convention regarded a provision within the Constitution for deciding in a peaceable &
245. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 621 (Sept. 15, 1787).
246. See id. at 423, 428-29 (Aug. 27, 1787). As before, see supra notes 75, 177 and
accompanying text, the Convention deemed inflationary dilution of judicial salaries a

greater threat to independence than a legislative power to increase them, and accordingly
defeated Madison's proposal to forbid increases or, at least, to delay their effective date.
See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 423, 429-30 (Aug. 27, 1787).
247. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 423, 430 (Aug. 27, 1787) (emphasis added); see supra
notes 145, 173 and accompanying text.
248. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 422-24, 428, 431 (Aug. 27, 1787) (emphasis added).

After the amendments of August 23 and 25, the supremacy clause read:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States, which shall be made in
pursuance thereof and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the
United-States shall be the supreme law of the several States ....

Id. at 409 (emphasis added) (discussed supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text). As
reconstructed, the "arising under" clause read:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases both in law and
equity arising under this constitution the laws of the United States and treaties made or
which shall be made under their authority.
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regular mode all cases arising in the course of its operation, as
essential to an adequate System of Govt. that it intended the Authority vested in the Judicial Department as a final resort in relation to the States, for cases resulting to it in the exercise of its
functions, (the concurrence of the Senate chosen by the State
Legislatures, in appointing the Judges, and the oaths & official
tenures of these, with the surveillance of public Opinion, being
relied on as guarantying their impartiality); and that this intention is expressed by the articles declaring that the federal
Constitution & laws shall be the supreme law of the land, and
that the Judicial Power of the U.S. shall extend to all cases arising under them ... thus believing I have never yielded my original opinion indicated in the "Federalist" No. 39 ....249

The only (and, as it turned out, fleeting) objection to the addition of
"this constitution" to the body of federal law under which federal cases
might arise was advanced by, of all people, James Madison. Revealing the
strength of the view that the constitutionally assured quality of federal
judicial decisionmaking was more important than even the constitutionencompassing quantity of it, Madison initially opposed adding "this
constitution" because it might invite the judiciary to offer advice to the
political branches on the constitution's meaning, and because outside
"cases of a Judiciary Nature . . . [t]he right of expounding the
Constitution ...ought not to be given to [the judiciary] Department. ' 250
Others clearly agreed, but assured Madison that "the jurisdiction given
was constructively limited to cases of ajudiciary nature." 25 1 It thus being
"generally supposed" that "cases" meant "Judiciary" cases, the motion
passed without dissent. 252 Together with the same day's "law and equity"
amendment, and the Convention's prior rejection of the Pinckney and
New Jersey proposals for abstract federal judicial disquisitions on the
constitution's "construction," the August 27 colloquy over "this
constitution" confirmed the Framers' view that the federal courts were
authorized to decide the whole "arising under" "Case"-and nothing but
such "Cases" and "Controversies."
b. QuantitativePresumptionsRevisited. -

Having found as much com-

mon ground as they could, the delegates repaired to their respective
camps and let fly a barrage of motions aimed at the question that yet
remained: As between state judges conscripted to national service by the
supremacy clause and federal judges to whom the legislature might "extend" jurisdiction, which judges would presumptively bear responsibility
for what cases?
First came a remarkably even-handed proposal (offered, perhaps, by
its anonymous author as an eve-of-battle olive branch) to distribute the
249. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), in 4 Farrand,
supra note 2, at 83, 83-84.
250. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 430 (Aug. 27, 1787).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 430 (emphasis added); see id. at 423.
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nonoriginal aspects of what at this point 25 3 was still styled "[t] he Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" as follows:
In all the other cases beforementioned [i.e., in all enumerated
cases save the few designated for original supreme courtjurisdiction] original jurisdiction shall be in the Courts of the several
States but with appeal both as to Law and fact to the courts of
the United States, with such exceptions25 4 and under such
regulations, as the Legislatures shall make.

The motion eventually was withdrawn. This may have occurred because the nationalists were unwilling to create so strong a presumption in
favor of state court original jurisdiction. Or the confederationists may
have been unwilling to extend so strong an invitation to the legislature to
give the lower federal courts appellate (and maybe only appellate) jurisdiction vis-a-vis state courts or to let federal courts review state court fact
findings ("Law and fact" being new to the debates). Or finally, both sides
may have worried about the exceptions and regulations the legislature
was invited to make (e.g., withholding federal appeals entirely; permitting
appeals of "Law" but not "fact"; or establishing supreme court or lower
federal court, in lieu of state court, originaljurisdiction). What is remarkable about the proposal (and may account for the academic disregard of
it)255 is how close it came to the set of presumptions the delegates ultimately would adopt. But until more partisan motions were either rejected or watered down, neither side apparently was able to appreciate
how well the proposal discerned the political center of gravity.
The proposal's "Law and fact" phrase did, however, capture the attention of nationalist and federal judiciary expansionist Gouverneur
Morris, perhaps on the "whole case" theory that, if state courts were going
to exercise significant original federal question jurisdiction, federal
courts should thereafter have the potential ability to exercise supervisory
authority over every aspect of the case that could impinge on the
supremacy of federal law. As a follow-on to Morris's query whether the
supreme court's appellate jurisdiction would extend to "matters of fact as
, 2 56
well as law-and to cases of Common law as well as Civil law" -

Dickinson moved and the Convention agreed without dissent to insert
the phrase "both as to7 law [and] fact" after the words "[this jurisdiction]
'25
shall be appellate.
c. Three Cucial Motions. - The last three significant judiciary motions were especially critical in determining the quantity and quality of
253. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (text of judiciary article prior to

August 27).
254. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 424 (Aug. 27, 1787).
255. But cf. 1 Goebel, supra note 19, at 239-41 (reading the motion's withdrawal as a
nationalist victory).
256. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 431 (Aug. 27, 1787).
257. Id. at 424, 431; see also id. at 431 (Wilson's view that the appellate jurisdiction
conferred by his existing Committee of Detail draft already was intended to reach the
whole case).
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federal judging the constitution contemplated. As of this point, section 3
of the judiciary article, to which the final three motions were directed,
read:
Sect. 3. [1] The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend
to all cases arising under this constitution the laws of the United
States and treaties made or which shall be made under their
authority; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party, controversies between two or more States... [and various
diversity] controversies ....[2] In cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, this jurisdiction shall be original. [3] In all the
other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate both as to
law and fact with such exceptions and under such regulations as
the Legislature shall make. [4] The Legislature may assign any
part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the
President of the United States) in the manner, and under the
limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts,
as it shall constitute from time to time.
Unanimously adopting a motion by Madison and Morris, the
Convention first substituted "The Judicial Power" for "The jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court" in sentence [1].258 By a vote of six states to two, the
Convention then rejected a motion to replace sentence [3] with "In all
the other cases before mentioned the judicial power shall be exercised in
such manner as the Legislature shall direct." 259 Finally, the Convention

unanimously removed sentence [4], the so-called "assignments" clause.2 60
Thus, at the end of the day, section 3 read:
Sect. 3. [1] The JudicialPower shall extend to all cases both in
law and equity arising under this constitution the laws of the
United States and treaties made or which shall be made under
their authority; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be
a Party, controversies between two or more States... [and various diversity] controversies .... [2] In cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a
State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have originaljurisdiction. [3] In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate both as to law and fact with such exceptions and under
such regulations as the Legislature shall make. [ ]
The three motions completed the gradual but crucial shift in the
judiciary article from a mainly quantitative to a mainly qualitative federal
258. Id. at 425, 432. This change required the delegates to substitute "The supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction" for "this jurisdiction shall be original" in the second
half of sentence [2]. Id. at 425.
259. Id. at 425, 431.
260. Id.
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judicial check on state law-a check that, in the absence of a legislative
veto, had become the principal mechanism for achieving Madison's central constitutional goal of controlling the excesses and injustices of state
law. Via the Madisonian Compromise, the nationalists had relinquished
the Virginia Plan's division of mandatory federal jurisdiction between
inferior (original) and supreme (appellate) tribunals to reclaim a possibility (denied by Rutledge's temporary pre-Compromise victory) of legislatively appointed lower tribunals with exclusive original jurisdiction and a
supreme court with mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Via the RandolphMadison Substitute, the nationalists then gave up mandatory federal jurisdiction of any sort in return for a broad legislative discretion to appoint
lower courts and an express invitation to the legislature to invest those
courts with whateverjurisdiction (original or appellate) it might choose.
The Committee of Detail drafts and the early proceedings on August 27
preserved the outlines of this latter compromise, but proposed various
presumptions in regard to the allocation of jurisdiction among state
courts, lower federal courts, and the supreme court-eventually settling
on a strong presumption (expressed in preamendment sentences
[1]-[3]) in favor of (mainly appellate) supreme courtjurisdiction, and a
relatively weak invitation to the legislature (expressed in the "assignments
clause" in preamendment sentence [4]) to spread or shift some of the
supreme court's jurisdiction to the lower federal courts. Through the
series of motions late on the 27th, the nationalists made another trade
that entirely refocused the judicial check. In return for a constitutional
guarantee of the quality of judging that all federal courts would exercise
wheneverjurisdiction was conferred, the nationalists (1) gave up even the
formality of a constitutional conferral of large amounts of federal jurisdiction, (2) modestly weakened the presumption that the legislature would
confer broad supreme court jurisdiction, and (3) dropped any express
invitation to the legislature to confer lower federal court jurisdiction.
(i) Sentence [1]. - To see how this new compromise took shape, recall that section 1 of the judiciary provision that emerged from the
Committee of Detail had vested "[t] he Judicial Power" in its entirety "be'
each and every inferior court that the national legislature chose 26to1
constitute as well as "in" the constitutionally created supreme court.
The first late-27th motion then "extend [ed]" the 'Judicial Power" to a list
of cases and controversies over which at least some of those courts probably would never exercise jurisdiction. For instance, any lower federal
courts the legislature created very likely would never exercise jurisdiction
in cases over which the supreme court presumptively had original (and,
in that event, final) jurisdiction. Even more to the point, the legislature
could simply deprive any lower courts it created ofjurisdiction in many or
most of the listed disputes. 262 As such, the 'Judicial Power shall extend
261. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
262. Whatever their positions on other issues, nearly all observers acknowledge
Congress's power not to confer all of the jurisdiction enumerated in Article III on the
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to" language could not mean 'Jurisdiction shall be," because in some
cases jurisdiction would not be. The first change thus confirms, contrary
to the views of neonationalists Amar and Clinton, 263 that, after the
Randolph-Madison Substitute, the delegates did not mean to dictate the
federal courts' jurisdiction (hence the Substitute's deletion of "shall be")
but merely intended to say how far that jurisdiction could potentially
reach (hence tie Substitute's inclusion of "shall extend").
But sentence [1]'s modification went further than the RandolphMadison Substitute. Removing the word 'jurisdiction" meant that sentence [1] no longer would play any role in conferring or allocating jurisdiction over the listed categories of cases and controversies, much less
establish a mandatory floor on that jurisdiction. Although the sentence
did give inferior federal courts the same relationship to the listed categories as the supreme court, it defined that relationship not by the quantity
of cases over which all federal courts would exercise jurisdiction, but
rather by the quality of decisionmaking-the "Power"-that all would apply to cases over which they were given jurisdiction by some other means.
Neoconfederationist scholars thus are correct-from a quantitative
perspective-that inserting "[t] he Judicial Power" in sentence [ 1] merely
gave federal judges as a class a "capacity," if and when the legislature
chose to trigger it, to exercise jurisdiction over the specified matters. 264
But this neoconfederationist conclusion is incomplete because it ignores
the important qualitative effect of, and therefore, the nationalists' reason
for accepting, the change. Thus, in return for removing 'Jurisdiction"
from sentence [1]-and in return for all their other quantitative concessions stretching back to the Madisonian Compromise-the nationalists
secured an all-important qualitative assurance via the extension of "[t] he
Judicial Power" to the specified categories of cases and controversies:
Whenever called upon to decide those matters, federal judges would be
required to deploy the qualities-the decisionmaking powers and responsibilities-inherent in "[t] he Judicial Power" and thus inherent in every
court constituted by or under the judiciary article.
It is not surprising, therefore, that four of those qualities, powers,
and responsibilities had dominated the delegates' attention in the days
leading up to, and in their deliberations earlier on, the 27th. 2 65 Building
on the Committee of Detail's efforts to increase both the professionalism
of all federal courts and their independence vis-a-vis state courts and

lower federal courts. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 17, at 229; Ratner, supra note 18, at 158;
Sager, supra note 17, at 23; infra note 371 and accompanying text (discussing Joseph

Story's views).
263. See Amar, supra note 17, at 239; Clinton, supra note 19, at 782-86.
264. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 9, at 214-18.
265. See supra notes 231-252 and accompanying text.
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political entanglements, 266 the delegates had (1) rejected Pinckney's and
Morris's advisory opinion proposals and (2) insisted on empowering federal courts to decide matters finally, but only if they constituted "cases of
a Judiciary [i.e., nonadvisory] Nature." (These powers and constraints
were confirmed by sentence [1] 's limitation of "[t] he Judicial Power" to
"Gases" or "Controversies.") (3) The "Law and fact" amendment of the
27th reinforced the "whole case" assurance implied by the delegates' earlier rejection of the Pinckney and New Jersey proposals to limit "arising
under" jurisdiction to abstract legal questions or cases presenting such
questions. And (4) expanding the "arising under" category to track the
state-law-controlling function of "the Judges in every State" under the previously expanded supremacy clause solidified the federal courts' obligation to decide matters (and, especially, to supervise state courts) in such a
way as to uphold the supremacy of federal law.
Insertion of the phrase "it]he Judicial Power shall extend to" in sentence [1] thus brought to a climax the nationalist effort from the
Randolph-Madison Substitute forward to ensure the quality of federal
judging. The qualitative significance of the amendment disproves the
claim that sentence [11's mandatory "shall" lacks effect unless "shall extend" means "shall include" or "shall be."267 To help see why, consider a

police chief's statement to line officers: "From now on, your [exercise of
the qualities of] courtesy, professionalism, and respect shall extend to all
off-duty athletic events, parties, professional conferences, and other social
affairs." Notwithstanding this statement's use of the mandatory "shall"
(and the quantitative "all"), its qualitative subject matter makes clear that
it does not require officers to attend all, or any, athletic events, parties, or
professional conferences, but only to behave themselves when they do.
Likewise, to say that "federal courts' power to reach independent, comprehensive, final, and effectual decisions shall extend to all cases arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the nation" is not to require
those courts to decide all such cases but only to require that they deploy
the included judicial qualities when they do decide them.
The directive nature of the "shall extend to" language remains critical, however. If the legislature were to tell federal courts to exercise
something less than "[t] he Judicial Power" in cases within their jurisdiction, the courts would be required to ignore that directive because the
Constitution itself, through sentence [1], dictates that "[t]he Judicial
Power shall extend to" those cases. And if the legislature were to assign
anything other than the listed "Cases" and "Controversies" to the
"Supreme" and "inferior" courts, those courts would have to decline the
assignment so as not to address a matter beyond that to which "shall ex266. See supra notes 198-199, 216-217 and accompanying text (discussing the
Committee of Detail's extension of tenure and salary protections to lower federal courts
that the legislature would have the power to "constitute[ ]" and not merely "appoint[ ]").
267. Cf. supra notes 41, 129 (citing authorities favoring a "shall be" interpretation).
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tend" (1) the only "Power" Article III, Section 1 gives them and (2) the
power by which they are defined.
Barely had the ink dried on Madison and Morris's qualitatively directed revision of sentence [1] when it, too, came under attack, from a
proposal that "[i]n all the other cases before mentioned [i.e., in all matters outside the supreme court's original jurisdiction] the judicial power
shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct. ' 268 Had
the Convention agreed to this motion, the qualitative federal judicial pro269
tections against multiple, mutable, unjust, and impotent state laws
would have been added to the long list of Madisonian casualties-force,
the council of revision, mandatory federal jurisdiction, and the national
negative-and, consequently, Madison's most basic hope for the
Convention would have been dashed. For a legislative capacity to control
the "manner" in which federal courts exercised "[t] he Judicial Power"
would have entirely neutralized the independence, "whole case," "whole
supreme law," finality, and effectualness qualities of federal judicial decisionmaking. 270 But the motion was defeated, six states to two; the lastand the most comprehensively qualitative-version of the Madisonian
27
Compromise held. '
(ii) Sentence [2]. - The nationalists' victory came at a cost. The
judiciary provision that emerged mandatorily conferred no (or very little)
federal jurisdiction and, instead, contained only (or mainly) presumptions and invitations to the legislature with respect to both the conferral
and the distribution (original versus appellate) of jurisdiction. What is
more, by the end of the day, those presumptions ran less powerfully in
the direction of federal jurisdiction than they had at the beginning of the
day.
268. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 425 (Aug. 27, 1787).
269. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
270. See Velasco, supra note 8, at 733 (defeated "proposal was dangerously
susceptible to abuse, for it gave Congress plenary authority not only over jurisdiction, but
over the judicial power" and "might have empowered Congress to dictate... how [federal
courts] should decide ... cases"). At the time of the Framing, "manner" connoted the
substantive "method" or "way of performing or executing" the specified task, or a
"[c]ertain" "[s]ort," "kind," or "degree or measure of" the specified behavior. Johnson,
Strahan ed., supra note 129, under "manner"; 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of
the English Language, under "manner" (Johnson Reprint Corp. ed. 1970) (1828).
271. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 425 (Aug. 27, 1787). Given the proposal's grant
of authority over the way in which "the judicialpower shall be exercised," the claim that the
proposal's defeat forbade any "legislative meddling with [sentence []'s supposed] grant
of [federal] jurisdiction," 1 Goebel, supra note 19, at 240 (emphasis added); see Clinton,
supra note 19, at 791; Ratner, supra note 18, at 173, is misguided. This is particularly so
because, at this point on August 27, sentence [1], which the proposed sentence would have
modified, no longer granted any jurisdiction nor even used the word. The defeated
proposal's apparent aim, therefore, was not to limit the already legislatively controlled
quantity of federal jurisdiction, see supra notes 129-130, 204-208, 223-226 and
accompanying text, but instead to subject the otherwise constitutionally sacrosanct quality
of federal judging to legislative diminution.
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For example, before the revisions, the 'Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court shall extend to" language of sentence [1] invited (without requiring) the legislature to confer federal court jurisdiction in the listed categories of cases. Withdrawing 'jurisdiction" from sentence [1] withdrew
that invitation. Now, 'jurisdiction" appeared for the first time in a slightly
modified sentence [2]: "In cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have originaljurisdiction." This sentence can plausibly be read in two ways. It might mandate original supreme court jurisdiction over the two specified categories of disputes. Alternatively, it
might leave the legislature with the power to decide whether to confer
supreme courtjurisdiction over those disputes, while embodying a strong
presumption in favor of doing so and a requirement that any such jurisdiction be original. Supporting the latter interpretation is Congress's actual treatment of the substantively similar provision in the final Article III
(Congress, from 1789 forward, never having required the Supreme Court
to hear all "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls").272 The placement of "the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction" at the end of the sentence (where it arguably tells the legislature
what to do with jurisdiction already conferred-"make it original") rather
than at the beginning (where the language might more clearly do the
conferring itself) also lends some support to the latter reading.
(iii) Sentence [3]. - Proceedings late on the 27th left sentence [3]
intact (as modified earlier in the day by the "law and fact" insertion): "In
all the other cases before mentioned, it [supreme courtjurisdiction] shall
be appellate both as to law and fact with such exceptions and under such
regulations as the Legislature shall make." Even more so than that of
sentence [2], sentence [3]'s syntax suggests that it was not designed to
confer supreme courtjurisdiction in the specified categories of cases. Instead, its apparent intent was to create a strong presumption that the
legislaturewould (1) vest thatjurisdiction (2) in the supreme court (3) in
an appellate form. Together with the steps taken earlier in the day to
conform the scope of "arising under" jurisdiction to the scope of state
judges' supremacy clause duties, sentence [3] strongly encouraged the
legislature to give the supreme court appellate jurisdiction over decisions
resolving disputes within the categories enumerated in sentence [1] and,
2 73
most particularly, over state decisions "arising under" federal law.
272. See Amar, supra note 17, at 261 n.183.

273. The strongest basis for reading the corresponding sentence in Article III to
conferjurisdiction is language added by amendment the next day, modifying sentence [3]

to read, "In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction"instead of "In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate." 2
Farrand, supra note 2, at 434 (Aug. 28, 1787) (emphasis added). But Madison's notes

explain the next day's change as designed solely to make clear that the referent of "it"was
the supreme court's jurisdiction (however conferred). See id. at 437-38. Even if sentence
[3] actually conferred appellate jurisdiction on the supreme court, the conferral still was
only presumptive, because it could be overcome by the legislature's invited decision to
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The legislature could, however, overcome the presumptions in selected cases, in four or five ways. Using its "Exceptions" power, the
legislature (a) might have been permitted to make the supreme court's
presumptively appellate jurisdiction in the specified cases original; 274 (b)
clearly was permitted (as contemplated, e.g., by the Randolph-Madison
Substitute and Committee of Detail Report and by the switch on the 27th
from "[t]he Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" to "[t]he Judicial
Power") 2 75 to shift some of the supreme court's appellate responsibilities
on an overflow basis to lower courts; 276 and (c) apparently was permitted
simultaneously to make specified aspects of the supreme court's appellate
jurisdiction original and to assign that jurisdiction to lower federal
courts.2 77 As we develop above, moreover, the legislature could use its

"Regulations" power (d) to withhold jurisdiction by declining to authorize the transfer of records and issuance of judgments needed to permit
appeals in certain enumerated categories, including appeals of state decisions; or (e) to limit appeals to matters of law as opposed to "law and
278

fact."

(iv) Sentence [4] No More.-By removing any implication that sentence
[1] conferred, or required the legislature to confer, the specified 'jurisdiction" on the supreme court, and by largely delegating that decision to
the legislature in sentences [2] and [3]-albeit with a strong presumption that the legislature would confer the jurisdiction and make it original
or appellate as indicated in those sentences-the Convention quantitatively weakened the federaljudiciary. This effect was enhanced by the last
of the late-27th motions, which removed former sentence [4]'s express
invitation to spread or shift the supreme court's original or appellate jurisdiction to inferior federal courts.
The standard view is that sentence [4] 's deletion accomplished nothing not already accomplished by sentence [1] 's shift from "[t] heJurisdiction of the Supreme Court" to the more catholic phrase, "[t]he Judicial
Power."279 But that is not accurate. Although the modification of senwithhold jurisdiction by "regulation[ ]" or to shift the jurisdiction to a lower court
(including in an "original" form) by "exception[ I."
274. See authorities cited supra note 48. Compare supra note 204 and accompanying
text; supra text following note 222 (as initially drafted by the Committee of Detail, the
"Exceptions" clause clearly let the legislature make parts of the supreme court's
presumptively appellate jurisdiction original), with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 173-75 (1803) (holding that, as ultimately adopted, the Exceptions Clause did not
give Congress that power).
275. See supra notes 128-133, 223-226 and accompanying text.
276. See authorities cited infra notes 380, 890 and accompanying text.
277. Cf.authorities cited infra note 279 (interpreting Article III's Exceptions Clause
to have only this effect).
278. See supra notes 205-208, 223-224 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 12 n.46 (3d ed. 1988); Clinton, supra note 19, at 792-93; Sager, supra note
17, at 50 n.95. Some commentators read the "Exceptions" clause in sentence [3] of the
August 27 draft (or the analogous clause in Article III itself) to permit-and only to
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tence [1] gave qualitative protection to inferior federal courts, and confirmed that the legislature was permitted to give those courts jurisdiction
over the listed matters, the withdrawal of sentence [4] removed any express invitation to the legislature to create and confer either original or
appellate jurisdiction on such courts and thereby diminish the amount of
state court original jurisdiction or increase state court susceptibility to
federal, and especially lower federal, court review. Indeed, the August 27
draft's silence on lower federal court jurisdiction, together with section
l's baseline of no lower federal courts, meant that the draft embodied
fairly strong presumptions favoring state court originaljurisdiction and
supreme court appellatejurisdiction. The former presumption was rebuttable only if two constitutional preferences-that federal jurisdiction be appellate and be exercised by the supreme court-were overcome. 280 The
latter presumption was rebuttable in favor of either lower federal court appellate jurisdiction, if the preference for supreme court exercise of appellate jurisdiction was overcome, 281 or no federal appellate jurisdiction, if
the preference for federal appellate review was overcome.
As we noted above, this outcome nearly replicated the proposal withdrawn earlier in the day to confer presumptive original jurisdiction in
28 2
most cases on state courts and appellate jurisdiction on federal courts.
As such, the late-27th draft preserved the quantitative aspects of the original Madisonian Compromise in what from the nationalist perspective was
permit-Congress to assign cases, or at least certain categories of cases, otherwise falling
within the supreme court's jurisdiction to lower federal courts. See, e.g., Amar, supra note
17, at 221, 257; Clinton, supra note 19, at 778, 793. If that reading is correct, the
"Exceptions" and assignments clauses were redundant, explaining the latter's deletion on
August 27. See Clinton, supra note 19, at 793. The difficulty with the redundancy theory is
that both clauses entered the judiciary article at the same time, in the Randolph-Rutledge
Committee of Detail draft (in rough form) and in the Wfilson-Rutledge and final
Committee of Detail drafts (in a more complete form). See supra notes 197, 215 and
accompanying text. If the two clauses were intended to accomplish precisely the same
thing, there is no reason for their simultaneous development nor their running in tandem
for so long. A less radical reading is that the "Exceptions" clause permitted a variety of
things, including the assignment of cases within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction
to lower courts. Still, that understanding cannot explain the simultaneous insertion of the
assignments and "Exceptions" clause-unless (as we have argued) the assignments clause
was designed to affect the "presumptions" by explicitly inviting the legislature to grant
lower federal court jurisdiction.
280. Congress adhered to this presumption for 86 years after the Constitution became
law. See infra note 374.
281. Today, of course, inferior federal courts routinely hear appeals in cases in which
lower federal courts and administrative agencies have original jurisdiction. In addition,
lower federal courts' removal and state-prisoner habeas jurisdiction, and other recognized
exceptions to the resjudicata effect of state court decisions and the bar to federal court
injunctions against state court proceedings, often require lower federal courts to review
state court decisions-a fact the Supreme Court has acknowledged in expressly upholding
lower federal courts' "appellate jurisdiction" over cases commenced in state courts. See
supra note 226; infra notes 327, 376-389, 886-895 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 253-255 and accompanying text.
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the only moderately strengthened form of the Randolph-Madison
Substitute.
Sentence [4]'s withdrawal had another, qualitative, effect. Recall its
language, that "[t]he Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction
above mentioned . . .in the manner, and under the limitations which it
shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time
to time." The "manner/limitations" language raised the possibility that
the assignments clause, while serving the nationalists' quantitative desires
by inviting Congress to confer lower federal courtjurisdiction, served the
confederationists' qualitative desires by letting the legislature control the
lower federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction that was conferred on
them. 283 All in all, therefore, sentence [4]'s deletion may simply have
confirmed the terms of the compromise that the previous three motions
had constructed-with the nationalists receding on their quantitative
judicial ambitions in return for assurances of comprehensive qualitative
protection.
August 27 thus was a day of quantitative compromise, as ardent nationalists and confederationists finally acknowledged that their ideal approaches to the relative amounts of state and federal jurisdiction would
not command a majority, and that the best they could do was to let the
legislature make many of the hard decisions under the influence of a set
of presumptions on which the delegates could agree. Just as significantly,
though, August 27 was a day on which the delegates refused to
compromise on, or to trust the legislature with, issues of quality-or, at
the least, agreed to make the qualities inherent in "[t] he Judicial Power"
constitutionally sacrosanct in return for the nationalists' relinquishment
284
of their quantitative ambitions.
H. The Committee of Style
On September 8, the Convention appointed Hamilton, William
Johnson, King, Madison, and Gouverneur Morris to a committee charged
with stylizing and arranging the articles the delegates had approved. 285
Four days later, the Committee issued its report, employing the familiar
28 6
seven-article structure of the Constitution as adopted.
1. Article I1. - The Committee made two notable changes in the
judiciary article (now Article III). First, it revised the opening sentence to
vest the judicial power of the United States "in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," instead of "in such
Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the
283. See supra notes 225, 268-271 and accompanying text.
284. Three days later, the Convention, eight states to one, with two delegations
divided, accepted Madison's weakest mechanism for restraining state law-the oath. See 2
Farrand, supra note 2, at 461, 468 (Aug. 30, 1787).
285. See id. at 547, 553 (Sept. 8, 1787).
286. See id. at 590-603 (Sept. 12, 1787).
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Legislature of the United States."28 7 Any change here is subtle. But (1) by
replacing "establish" or "constitute[ ]"-the words used respectively, in
the two Committee of Detail drafts288-with "ordain and establish," it
confirmed that inferior courts would be entirely the creation of Congress,
not reupholstered state courts. 289 And (2) by substituting "may from
time to time ordain and establish" for "shall, when necessary, from time
to time. .. constitute[ ]," it accentuated the legislature's discretion while
jettisoning an awkward formulation that probably emerged as a result of
290
nationalist and confederationist jockeying for quantitative advantage.
Second, the Committee combined into a single section the prior
draft's section 1, vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court and in
all legislatively created lower federal courts, and section 2, giving all such
courts tenure and salary protections. 29 1 Doing so confirmed the qualitative content of "[t]he judicial power" by literally attaching it to the
292
article's most explicit qualitative specification-independence.
2. The Supremacy and Oath Clauses. - The Committee of Style's
supremacy clause, in Article VI, recharacterized federal law from "the
supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants" to
"the supreme law of the land."293 This change elegantly confirmed the
special, quasi-fourth branch (or intermediate) status of state judges, who
already had come to be described in a more personal than institutional
manner, and now were made supremely beholden to a body of law that
was neither defined, even fictionally, as the law of the sovereignties that
selected them, nor identified, at least directly, as the law of the separate
sovereignty of the United States. Further emphasizing the supremacy
clause's impressment of state judges into quasi-national service was the
Committee's placement of the provision alongside the oath clause requir29 4
ing state judges and other state officers to swear fealty to national law.
287. Id. at 575, 600 (Sept. 10, 1787) (emphasis added).
288. See supra text accompanying notes 197, 215.
289. The Committee's decision to replace one creative verb ("constitute") with two
("ordain and establish") suggests that it understood the legislature's power with respect to

inferior courts to be bifaceted-i.e., arguably, to include a power to "ordain" lower courts'
existence and "establish" their jurisdiction.
290. The drafters' progression from references to such lower courts as "may" be
created, to "as shalg from time to time, be" created, to "as shall, when necessary, from time to

time, be" created, to "as the Congress may from time to time" create, suggests that the
contending forces worked hard to adjust to their liking the presumption governing the
creation, or not, of lower federal courts. See 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 146, 172, 186, 600.
291. Compare id. at 575-76 (Sept. 10, 1787), with id. at 600 (Sept. 12, 1787).
292. Treating judicial independence as partially definitive of "[tihe judicial Power"
are, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995); Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582-83 (1985); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of
Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
293. Compare 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 572 (Sept. 10, 1787), with id. at 603 (Sept.
12, 1787). The Committee also shortened "the several states" in one place to "every state"
and in another to "any state," and dropped the phrase "in their decisions." Id. at 572
(Sept. 10, 1787); id. at 603 (Sept. 12, 1787).

294. See id. at 603.
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I. The Convention in Retrospect and Prospect
1. The Course of the Convention Away from Madison's Original, VetoFocused Conception. - Madison came to Philadelphia with the principal
goal of creating a strong central government that had the tools needed to
control the encroachments on national authority and the internal mischiefs and injustices of the states and, particularly, of state law. He built
five mechanisms toward that end into the Virginia Plan. In short order,
however, Madison himself abandoned one of those mechanisms-the use
of force against recalcitrant states-and by mid-July, the Convention had
rejected the two additional mechanisms that Madison considered most
important-the national negative and the council of revision. The
Convention did so largely on the ground that some version of his remaining two proposals-state officials' oath of loyalty to federal law, and
judicial review of the state law those officials made-would suffice to assure that state law was consistent with national authority and 'just." Accordingly, notwithstanding Madison's own view that no version or combination of the last two mechanisms could effectively substitute for the veto
and council, the Convention's deliberations came to focus increasingly,
indeed obsessively, on the question of what version ofjudicial review, bolstered by what duty of loyalty on the part of state officials, would effectively restrain state law.
The Convention essentially got under way with the delegates, consideration of the mandated quantity of federal jurisdiction, prompting the
first Madisonian Compromise onJune 5. Abandoning the Virginia Plan's
system of mandatory original jurisdiction in inferior federal courts and
mandatory appellate review by one or more supreme courts, nationalists
accepted as merely a presumption the confederationists' momentarily
adopted irrebuttablerule that state courts would hear all cases of federal
concern as an original matter, subject to mandatory appeal to one federal
supreme court. But confederationists conceded to Congress the power to
overcome that presumption by (1) "appointing" state courts to serve as
federal tribunals and (2) shifting original jurisdiction to them.
The delegates then spent the middle months of the Convention trying to achieve a mutually acceptable specification of the strength of the
presumptions favoring state originaland federal appellatejurisdiction, especially in "arising under" cases addressing state law's consistency with federal law. Additionally, beginning just after the defeat of the national negative, and as an acknowledged substitute for it, the delegates sought a
mutually acceptable super-oath committing state judges not only to obey
the nation's "supreme" laws but to deploy those laws to neutralize their
own laws when the two conflicted.
Barely a week after the Madisonian Compromise, the Convention replaced it with the Randolph-Madison Substitute. Using "shall extend to"
jurisdiction-conferring language in place of "shall be," the nationalists
gave up mandatory, in favor of presumptive, supreme court appellate jurisdiction in return for an explicit invitation to Congress to use inferior
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federal courts to take over some state court original or Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction. The nationalists then fought off the New Jersey
Plan's attempted restoration of Rutledge's state-original/supreme courtappellate arrangement and its limitation of federal appellate "arising
under" jurisdiction to the giving of advice to state courts on the proper
"construction" of federal law.
When Madison offered the Compromise and Substitute, he considered them merely fail-safes for the legislative negative. That device's defeat, however, left the nationalists with no choice but to rely entirely on
judicial mechanisms, including the confederationists' alternative to the
veto-a requirement that state judges void at least some state law that was
inconsistent with at least some "supreme" federal law. The two
Committee of Detail drafts and its final report consolidated these developments in several ways: (1) emphasizing the merely presumptive nature
of the "shall extend to" language with an "exceptions and regulations"
invitation to Congress to limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction;
(2) inviting Congress to assign some of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
to lower federal courts; (3) protecting the quality of federal judicial decisionmaking by (a) extending the Supreme Court's tenure and salary protections to lower federal courts, (b) making the latter courts freestanding
creatures of Congress, not converted state courts, and (c) expanding the
"arising under" jurisdictional category; and (4) modestly expanding the
Supremacy Clause's co-optation of state judges to perform the national
function of reviewing state law for consistency with federal law.
The Convention virtually came to a close, then, with the nationalists'
August 27 relinquishment of all the quantitative adjustments of lower
court original jurisdiction they had achieved through the RandolphMadison Substitute and the Committee of Detail drafts in return for a
continued presumption of federal appellate review (presumptively but not
inevitably by the Supreme Court) and mandated qualitative protection of
federal judicial decisionmaking. On the quantitativeside, the "jurisdiction
shall extend to" language was replaced by "l[t] he JudicialPower shall extend to." And the "exceptions and regulations" invitation to limit federal
jurisdiction was preserved, while the invitation to assign Supreme Court
jurisdiction to lower federal courts was dropped.
On the qualitative side, the delegates rejected two proposals to give
Congress plenary control over the "manner" in which federal courts exercised "[t]he judicial Power." And the delegates approved (1) the
Madison-Morris extension of that "Power"-and the judicial independence that went with it-to any case to which jurisdiction was constitutionally extended and congressionally conferred on any federal court; (2)
Madison's anti-advisory opinion caveat; and (3) Dickinson's "whole case"
expansion of federal appellate jurisdiction to questions of "law and fact."
Perhaps the most important qualitative gain, however, was the broadening (on John Rutledge's motion) of the federal courts' capacity in "arising under" cases to apply the "whole supreme law." This change made
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federal judges' authority in such cases precisely "conformable" to state
judges' ever-more personalized and (at Rutledge's insistence) ever-more
state-law-subordinating, federal-law-protecting, and thus federally cooptive obligations under the Supremacy Clause. Whenever Congress acted in conformity with the constitutional presumption in favor of conferring federal appellate "arising under" jurisdiction vis-a-vis state decisions,
therefore, Congress would give federal courts a power independently and
comprehensively to superintend state court decisionmaking that was substantively commensurate with the state courts' obligation to keep state law
consistent with federal law.
2. The Effect of the Convention's Substitution ofJudge-Focused Madisonian
Mechanisms. - Such, then, was the judge-centered plan for constraining
offensive state law with which the Convention replaced Madison's original conception. As Madison and his allies explained the new plan in the
ratification debates, the national judiciary would "under a wise management.., be made the keystone of the arch, the means of connecting and
binding the whole together [and] of preserving uniformity in all judicial
proceedings of the Union"2 9 5-the "quarter... [to] look [to] for protection from an infringement on the Constitution," 29 6 and, short of "coerthe
only "rational way of enforcing the [nation's]
cion by military force," 29
7
states.
the
against
laws"
But to restate the question with which this Article began, how adequate a replacement for Madison's veto-centered proposal, in which
mandatory federal courts and jurisdiction played only a supporting role,
was a plan that lacked any veto (or council of revision) and ceded to
Congress the "wise management" of the plan's principal, judicial check?
How could ajudiciary-centered plan succeed if Congress (1) could forgo
creating all but one of the federal courts supposed to be the "keystone" of
the edifice for controlling state law; and (2) via the "shall extend to" and
other language, could limit the amount of jurisdiction that federal, as
opposed to state, courts would exercise in most matters of national concern? How could the plan succeed when, in Hamilton's words in The
Federalist:
If some partial inconveniences should appear to be connected
with the incorporation of any of [the jurisdictional categories]
into the plan, it ought to be recollected that the national
legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions
will be calculated to obviate
and to prescribe such regulations2as
98
or remove these inconveniences.
295. 4 Elliot, supra note 4, at 258 (Jan. 16, 1788) (statement of Charles Pinckney at
South Carolina ratifying convention).
296. 3 id. at 554 (June 20, 1788) (statement of John Marshall at Virginia ratifying
convention).
297. 4 id. at 155 (July 29, 1788) (statement of William R. Davie at North Carolina
ratifying convention).
298. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 3, at 450 (emphasis omitted); see The
Federalist No. 81, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (Congress's
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The answer to these questions is supplied by five alternative
Madisonian mechanisms through which the conveners undertook their
own "wise management" of the judicial check on errant state law-in the
process achieving nearly the same effect as Madison had sought from his
original conception. In lieu of the national negative, the conveners relied on a combination of: (1) state judges co-opted by the Supremacy
Clause to serve the national function of supervising state law for consistency with federal law; and (2) federal judges commissioned by their
"arising under" jurisdiction-which the Framers carefully conformed to
state judges' Supremacy Clause duties-to superintend state judges' performance of their Supremacy Clause obligations. And in lieu of
mandatory federal courts and jurisdiction, the absence of which might
otherwise have neutralized the federaljudiciary's role, the conveners: (3)
calculated that placing the scope of the federal judiciary and federal jurisdiction in the hands of a naturally ambitious Congress would keep that
judiciary and (particularly its "arising under" variety of) jurisdiction as
broad as Congress's nationalizing ambitions; (4) subjected Congress to a
set of "quantitative" presumptions favoring conferral on the Supreme
Court or, alternatively, the lower federal courts of appellate jurisdiction
over state courts in "arising under" cases; and, most importantly, (5) invested federal courts with a muscular set of "qualitative" capacities definitive of "[t] he judicial Power" that Congress could not withdraw when it
conferred jurisdiction. We discuss each mechanism below.
power to declare exceptions and regulations "enable [s] the government to modify [federal
jurisdiction] in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security");
The Federalist No. 82, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (appeals
from state to federal courts will occur only in "cases in which they may be deemed proper"
by Congress); Velasco, supra note 8, at 734-37 & nn.304-07 (collecting numerous
statements by nationalists during the ratification debates acknowledging Congress's
control over federal jurisdiction); supra note 208 (similar). Hamilton also said that it
would not offend the states to withhold jurisdiction from them in cases over which they
had never previously exercised it (e.g., cases arising under newly made federal law), and he
no doubt preferred that outcome, See The Federalist No. 82, supra, at 459. But,
hypernationalist though he was, Hamilton did not say in the passages quoted above or
elsewhere that the Constitution requiredfederal court participation in "arising under" cases.
The furthest he went was a statement that "[t]he evident aim of the plan of the convention
is that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their
original or final determination in the courts of the Union." Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
This statement, however, in no way disputes Congress's power to withhold jurisdiction over
enumerated cases in the absence of weighty reasons to confer it. Similarly, other
nationalists assumed during the ratification debates that public reasons would compel
Congress to establish lower federal courts, even while they acknowledged Congress's power
to forgo creating lower federal courts. See, e.g., 2 Elliot, supra note 4, at 488-91 (Dec. 7,
1787) (statement of'James Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying convention); Oliver Ellsworth,
Letters of a Landholder (VI), Conn. Courant & Am. Mercury, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in
Essays on the Constitution of the United States, Published During Its Discussion by the
People, 1787-1788, at 161, 164-65 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1970) (1892) [hereinafter
Ford, Essays]; Roger Sherman, Observations on the New Federal Constitution, A Citizen of
New Haven (II), New Haven Gazette, Dec. 25, 1788, reprinted in Ford, Essays, supra, at
237, 240-41.
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a. Nationally Co-opted StateJudges. - The nationalists did not come
away empty-handed from their losing battle over the negative. Previously,
confederationists had resisted requiring state officials even to swear an
oath to follow federal law because doing so would conflict with state officials'-and especially state judges'-preeminent loyalty to state law.2 99
The price of defeating the negative, however, was confederationist support for the oath and, more importantly, for a Supremacy Clause.
Through the latter mechanism, the Convention impressed state judges
into national service, obliging them not only to subordinate their own
state law obligations to federal ones, but also actively to police state law
and void any (even the most fundamental) if it was inconsistent with any
(even the least important) federal law.30 0 The language of the
Supremacy Clause then was carefully adjusted (1) to distance state judges
from their local institutional roles (e.g., replacing "the judiciaries of' with
"the judges in every State") and (2) to commit state judges to deploy the
law of a different sovereign to void that of their own sovereign when the
two conflicted (replacing "the supreme Law of the respective States" with
that of "the Land").301

b. SuperintendingFederalJudges. - Neither nationalists nor confederationists were content to rely entirely on state judges to constrain state law,
even once those judges' loyalty to that law was tempered by an express
obligation to enforce a higher sovereign's supreme law.30 2 Central to the

Convention's constitutional mechanics, therefore, was a system of federal
appellate superintendency under Article303III of state judges' quasi-federal
functions under the Supremacy Clause.
In the Framers' view, the peculiar constitutional situation and structural duties of state judges would only discourage "biassed directions
[from] dependent [state] Judge[s]" and a proneness to "local
prejudices."3 0 4 But, in Hamilton's words in The Federalist,there remained
"much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices and from the
interference of local regulations."30 5 "That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts ofjustice, can.., not be expected
299.
300.
301.
302.
notes 87,

See supra notes 119, 121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-147, 166-173, 227-230, 238-239 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 229-230, 293 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-97, 163, 181 and accompanying text (nationalist views); supra
91, 92-94, 137-139, 169-173, 182-183 and accompanying text (confederationist

views).
303. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 17, at 249; Rakove, supra note 26, at 1036 ("Be as
clever as one will about its ambiguities, silences, and indirection, one still has to work
pretty hard to demonstrate that [federal] judicial review was not a major subject of [the
Supremacy Clause]."); Sager, supra note 17, at 48; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1959); supra notes 248-249 and

accompanying text.
304. 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 124 (June 5, 1787) (statement ofJames Madison).
305. The Federalist No. 22, at 182-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
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from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission" 3 06-eaving "reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular laws might
be preferred to those of the general laws[ ] from the deference with
look to that authority to which they owe
which men in office naturally
307
their official existence."
The Framers accordingly concluded that, as long as "there was a necessity of confiding the original cognizance of causes arising under [the]
laws to [state judges],"308 and as long as those 'Judges ... hold their
office by a temporary commission ... fatal to their necessary independence,"30 9 state "tribunals [should not be] invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction." 31 0 Rather, there was "a correspondent necessity for
leaving the door of [federal] appeal as wide as possible."3 11
"[At] its inception," therefore, "the American doctrine ofjudicial review was far more concerned with federalism than with separation of powers... [i.e., with] the principle of national judicial supremacy over state
legislative acts and judicial decisions." 312 Above all else, "thejudicialPower"
was understood as a power to preserve the supremacy offederal law over contrary
state law.
c. A NationallyAmbitious ManagerofFederaljurisdiction.- How, then,
did the Convention keep the door of appeal of state decisions as wide as
possible and assure the necessary judicial independence? As developed
above, the answer was not an array of mandatory federal courts with
mandatory jurisdiction over all cases of national interest. On the contrary, through a series of confederationist victories and the Madisonian
Compromise they precipitated, the Convention replaced Madison's proposal for multiple mandatory lower and supreme courts with a single
mandatory supreme court and a congressional discretion to create lower
federal courts.3 13 And via the Randolph-Madison Substitute and
Committee of Detail drafts, the nationalists themselves conceded away
mandatory Supreme Courtjurisdiction, notwithstanding that the confeder3 14
ationists were willing to accept it.
This latter concession was the product of a peculiarly Madisonian
calculation in the wake of the defeats leading up to the Compromise. As
Madison repeatedly argued, once mandatory original federal jurisdiction
was rejected, practical considerations meant that mandatory appellate jurisdiction in a single Supreme Court could not possibly suffice to secure
effective federal review of all cases in which there was a national interest.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

The Federalist No. 78, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
The Federalist No. 22, supra note 305, at 182-83.
The Federalist No. 81, supra note 298, at 454.
The Federalist No. 78, supra note 306, at 441.
The Federalist No. 22, supra note 305, at 182.
The Federalist No. 81, supra note 298, at 454.
Rakove, supra note 26, at 1034.
See supra notes 73, 86, 90-103.
See supra notes 126-133, 197, 215, 223-226 and accompanying text.
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This was partly because some litigants could not afford an appeal to a
distant Supreme Court. Of greater importance, however, was the Court's
inability to cope effectively with mandatory jurisdiction over appeals that
were brought, given (1) the Court's also significant original jurisdiction,
(2) the more substantial work the Court was called upon to do once the
focus of its appellate review switched from federal court decisions to
those of courts with less institutional fidelity to the national government,
and (3) the difficulty of enforcing its judgments from afar.3 15 By virtue of
these latter factors, a mandate to hear all appeals would overwhelm the
Court's capacity effectively to maintain national supremacy in those particular cases in which its superintendency was most needed. 316 Absent
mandatory original lower federal court jurisdiction, that is, there inevitably would be substantial slippage in any supposed system of mandatory
Supreme Court oversight.
What was required, therefore, again per Hamilton, was a 'Judicial
authority of the Union... extend[ing] to... all [cases] which arise out
of the laws of the United States ... [so as to] giv[e] efficacy to constitutional... restrictions on the authority of State legislatures... [and establish] some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them." 31 7 But to be effectual that power could not apply in
every case within the "arising under," or any other large jurisdictional,
category. Rather, still in Hamilton's words, the "most discerning cannot
see how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the
local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes .... In proportion to
the grounds of confidence in or distrust of the subordinate tribunals
3 18
ought to be the facility or difficulty of appeals."
For two classically nationalist reasons, the preferred agency for periodically gauging the confidence due the state courts and on that basis
proportioning the number of federal "arising under" appeals was
Congress. First was flexibility. As Wilson said at the Pennsylvania
Convention, "Congress [could] better regulate [appeals], as they rise
from time to time, than could have been done by the Convention[.] Besides, if the regulations [of appeals] shall be attended with inconven319
ience, the Congress [could] alter them as soon as discovered."
More importantly, as Madison well understood, if any branch of government would be disposed as a matter of its own ambitions to expand
315. See supra notes 95-97, 126-133, 226 and accompanying text; see also infra note
327 (Hamilton's similar views in The Federalist).
316. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2371 (1997) (at the time of the "socalled Madisonian Compromise... it was obvious that the Supreme Court alone could not
hear all federal cases throughout the United States" (citing Charles Warren, The Making
of the Constitution 325-27 (1928))).
317. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 3, at 445 (emphasis added).
318. The Federalist No. 81, supra note 298, at 454 (emphasis added); accord 2
Farrand, supra note 2, at 46 (statement of George Mason) (quoted supra text
accompanying note 183).
319. 2 Elliot, supra note 4, at 494 (Dec. 7, 1787).
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national power-and, in the process, to expand national judicial authority to facilitate that power-it was Congress.3 20 Indeed, carefully read,
Madison's post-Compromise criticism of the NewJersey Plan for failing to
provide for original federal criminal jurisdiction was not that the
Constitution should mandate such jurisdiction but rather that Congress
should have the ability (which it assumedly would exercise liberally) to
321
An often asserted "political axiom[ ]"of the day--that
authorize it.
"the judicial power of a government [should be] coextensive with its legislative [power] "322-strongly supported Madison's assumption that, when
Congress decided to supplant exclusive state control over an issue by exerting national legislative control, it also would be disposed to supplant
exclusive state judicial control over the issue with some amount of federal
judicial control. Indeed, a prominent anti-federalist criticism of the proposed Constitution was that it placed the legislative fox in charge of the
judicial chicken coop, assuring broad federal jurisdiction.3 23 Thus, absent exclusive original lower federal court jurisdiction, it was a practical
fact of life not only that some picking and choosing would necessarily
occur among cases in which federal judicial review of state decisions
might possibly take place, but also that Congress was the best picker and
chooser from a nationalist perspective-not because of its fastidiousness
about the justice of state
about the integrity of national law or its doubts
3 24
ambitions.
own
its
promote
to
simply
but
law,
d. PresumedFederal 'Arising Under"Jurisdiction. - The conveners did
not, however, leave Congress's discretion to determine the scope of federal "arising under" jurisdiction entirely unconstrained. Rather, their
Judiciary Article matched a presumption favoring state court original jurisdiction with one favoring federal court appellate jurisdiction in "arising
under" cases, and permitted the use of lower federal courts when neces320. See The Federalist No. 47, at 309-10 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) ("The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex....[i t is against the enterprising ambition of
this department that the people ought to ...exhaust all their precautions.").
321. See 1 Farrand, supra note 2, at 317 (June 19, 1787); supra note 150 and
accompanying text.
322. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 3, at 446; see 3 Elliot, supra note 4, at 532
(June 20, 1788) (statement of James Madison at Virginia ratifying convention); Amar,
supra note 17, at 250-51 & n.147 (citing numerous authorities); Harrison, supra note 9, at
241 (finding wide, but not unanimous, acceptance of the "coextensive powers" axiom
among the founding generation).
323. See Rakove, supra note 26, at 1050 (citing authority).
324. Here we follow Professor Wechsler:
[G]overnment cannot be run without the use of courts for the enforcement of
coercive sanctions and within large areas it will be thought that federal tribunals
are essential to administer federal law.... The withdrawal of such jurisdiction
would impinge adversely on so many varied interests that its durability can be
assumed.
Wechsler, supra note 9, at 1006; see Hart, supra note 5, at 1370-71; Van Alstyne, supra
note 10, at 257.
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sary to lighten the Supreme Court's appellate load. These presumptions
emerged, to begin with, from Article III's (1) baseline assumption of no
federal inferior courts, (2) rejection of the Virginia and RandolphRutledge proposals to confine lower federal courts to original tasks,3 25
and (3) assignment to the Supreme Court of significant original jurisdiction 326 (belying any blanket assumption that lower and supreme federal
tribunals were courts of, respectively, original and appellate jurisdiction).
All three factors encouraged the assignment of original tasks to state
courts. The two latter factors liberated Congress to make the jurisdiction
of any lower federal courts it created appellate, including vis4-vis state
27
courts.

3

The presumptions also emerged from (4) Article III, Section 2's
strong invitation to Congress to give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in a variety of enumerated cases3 28 and (5) its conformance of

federal courts' "arising under" jurisdiction to state judges' Supremacy
Clause duty to keep state law consistent with federal law, thereby creating
an especially strong presumption of federal (including lower federal
court) appellate jurisdiction in "arising under" cases. If state courts were
to be the presumptive filter for unconstitutional state law, federal courts
presumptively were to monitor the filters to assure that they served their
constitutionally crucial structural function.
e. Mandated Qualitative Attributes of "theJudicial Power."
Notwithstanding these presumptions, the Convention did not mandate appeals in
"arising under" cases as often as possible. But, as Hamilton said, the
Convention did "leav[e] the door of appeal as wide as possible" whenever
Congress opened it.329 Thus, particularly as a result of the ultimate,
August 27 Madisonian Compromise, the focus of Article III was not the
frequency but the breadth of appeals-not the quantity of appellate jurisdiction but the quality of "[t] he judicial Power" to decide any given ap-

325. See supra notes 73, 197, 226 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 215 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 272.
327. Enlarging on Madison's views at the Convention, see, e.g., supra notes 95-97,
132, 150 and accompanying text, Hamilton, in The Federalist,
perceive[d] ... no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the State
courts to the subordinate national tribunals[ I and many advantages attending
the power of doing it... [including] contract[ing] the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. The State tribunals may then be left with a more entire
charge of federal causes; and appeals, in most cases in which they may be deemed
proper, instead of being carried to the Supreme Court may be made to lie from
State courts to district courts of the Union.
The Federalist No. 82, supra note 298, at 461; see The Federalist No. 80, supra note 3, at
445 (discussing the "authority in the federal courts to overrule such [state law] as might be
in manifest contravention of the articles of Union" (emphasis added)); 3 Elliot, supra note
4, at 552-53 (similar statement ofJohn Marshall at Virginia ratifying convention); supra
notes 226, 281 and accompanying text; infra notes 380, 388, 890.
328. See supra note 215 and accompanying text; supra text following note 226; supra
text accompanying notes 273-278.
329. The Federalist No. 81, supra note 298, at 454 (emphasis added).

1998]

"SOMEEFFECTUAL POWER"

peal so as effectively to superintend the state judicial check on state law.
The Convention insisted upon at least five qualitative attributes of "[t] he
judicial Power."
First was "independence" of political influence in the decision of
cases. The Convention assured this quality by giving all Article IIIjudges
life tenure and forbidding the diminution of their salaries 330 and, most
decisively, by rejecting a congressional power to dictate the "manner" in
which federal courts exercise "[t] he judicial Power."3 3' As Hamilton said,
"nothing can contribute more [than such protections] to the independence of judges" 3 32 serving as "the bulwarks of a limited Constitution
against legislative encroachments," 333 particularly given that no similar
"prospect of... independence.., is discoverable in the constitutions of
3 34
any of the States in regard to their own judges."
Second was insulation from self-consciously political decisionmaking,
as might occur were judges drawn outside the confines of judicial disputes or subjected to legislative or executive revision of their decisions.
Again in Hamilton's words, federal "courts must declare the sense of the
law; and . . . [not] be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT."3 3 5 The conveners assured this quality by (a) limiting
"[t]he judicial Power" to the decision of "Cases" and "Controversies";3 36
(b) accepting the Madisonian caveat that "Cases" arising under the
Constitution include only "cases of ajudiciary Nature";3 37 (c) refusing on
judicial independence grounds to let members of the judiciary serve on a
Council of Revision, helping to doom it;3 3 8 (d) shelving Pinckney's proposal for Supreme Court opinions "upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn occasions" at the request of the President or Congress;3 39
(e) tabling Morris's suggestion that the Chief Justice participate in a
3 40
Council of State to advise the President and recommend legislation;
(f) putting the Article III 'judicial Power" on a constitutional par with the
Article I "legislative Powers" and the Article II "executive Power";341 and
(g) vesting the 'judicial Power" in all, but only, judges created by or
under Article I11.342
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See supra notes 73-75, 177, 197, 217-218, 246 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259, 268-271 and accompanying text.
The Federalist No. 79, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
The Federalist No. 78, supra note 306, at 440.
The Federalist No. 79, supra note 332, at 444.

335. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 306, at 440.
336. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
337. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 430 (Aug. 27, 1787) (discussed supra notes 250-252
and accompanying text).
338. See supra notes 65, 84-85, 104-108 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 231, 233-234 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
341. See Harrison, supra note 9, at 211-12; Velasco, supra note 8, at 697-700.
342. See The Federalist No. 47, supra note 320, at 305; The Federalist No. 78, supra
note 306, at 437-38.

[Vol. 98:696

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

Third was the Convention's insistence upon independence of, and
protection from revision by, state courts. The conveners thus (a) abandoned proposals to "appoint" state courts as federal courts, instead requiring Congress to "ordain and establish" freestanding federal tribunals, 3 43 and (b) rejected the New Jersey Plan's limitation of supreme
court cognizance of state "arising under" cases to the rendering of ab3 44
stract opinions on the "construction" of federal law.
Fourth was the capacity to decide the whole case, not just part of it.
The delegates assured this quality by (a) limiting federal jurisdiction to
"cases of ajudiciary Nature"; 345 (b) rejecting the NewJersey Plan's limitation of appeals to construing legal provisions; (c) adopting Dickinson's
amendment expanding the reach of appeals to include matters of "law
andfact";346 and, most importantly, (d) investing "[t]hejudicial Power"
with an elastic capacity to apply with full force in any case in which juris3 47
diction was conferred.
Fifth and finally was the obligation to decide cases on the basis of all
pertinent federal law and so as effectually to maintain the supremacy of
that law-a duty that applies with particular force to appeals of state decisions that address the validity of state law under federal law and thereby
reveal the perspicacity with which state judges are fulfilling their
Supremacy Clause duties. The Convention assured this quality by (a) expanding "federal question" jurisdiction from the Virginia Plan's "questions involving the national peace and harmony," to the Committee of
Detail's "cases arising under [federal] laws," to the August 27 draft's
"cases arising under this constitution the laws of the United States and
treaties," thereby self-consciously "conform [ing] " "federal question" jurisdiction to the Supremacy Clause duties of state judges; 3

48

(b) rejecting

the New Jersey Plan's limitation of "arising under" appellate jurisdiction
to questions of construction and the Pinckney Plan's limitation of that
jurisdiction to cases presenting such pure legal questions, in favor ofjurisdiction extending to "all" types of "arising under" cases; 3 49 and (c) extending the 'judicial Power" to "law and equity" cases and "law and fact"
questions on appeal.
343. See supra notes 198, 287-289 and accompanying text; supra text following note
216.
344. See supra notes 80, 137, 139, 201, 222, 250-252 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 250-252 and accompanying text; see also Letter from James
Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 Life and Correspondence ofJames Iredell
172, 173 (GriffithJ. McRee ed., Peter Smith 1949) (1857) (letter of future Supreme Court
JusticeJames Iredell to Richard Spaight, who was then serving as a North Carolina delegate
to the Constutional Convention: "It is not that the judges are appointed arbiters, and to
determine as it were upon any application, whether the Assembly have or have not violated
the Constitution; but when an act is necessarily brought in judgment before them, they
must, unavoidably, determine one way or another.").
346. See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 258, 261-267 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 73, 215, 238-239, 247-249 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 80, 137, 139, 201, 222, 250-252 and accompanying text.
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Explaining in The FederalistNo. 39 why the states had nothing to fear
from reposing jurisdiction over disputes between state and federal authority in courts established under the latter, Madison nicely summed up
the qualitative attributes of the judicial power:
[I]n controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be established under the general government. But this does not change
the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual350
and most
effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality.
Tracking Madison's, our summary of "[t]he judicial Power" is this:
Read, as designed, in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause, "[t]he judicial
Power" means the Article flIjudge's authority and obligation, in all matters over
which jurisdictionis conferred, independently,finally, and effectually to decide the
whole case and nothing but the case on the basis, and so as to maintain the
supremacy, of the whole federal law. By "independently,finally, and effectually
decide, "we mean dispositively to arrange the rights and responsibilities of
the parties on the basis of independently developed legal reasons, subject
to review only by a superior Article III court. By "case," we mean a court
action that can be resolved on the basis of enforceable law, and by "whole
case," we mean not only the "construction" of applicable provisions of law
but also their actual application to the facts to reach a decision. 3 5 1 By
deciding "nothing but the case," we mean a court's insulation from formally
giving advice to another agency of government, particularly advice of a
political nature, either inside or outside the context of particular disputes. By "maintainingthe supremacy of the whole federal law," we mean (1)
giving the entire body of hierarchically ordered federal law the effect on
the decision that the law, on its own terms, demands, and (2) treating as
void any law or judicial decision-most explicitly, any state law or judicial
decision-that is contrary to hierarchically ordered federal law and to
which the case necessarily calls the federal court's attention.
As a whole, the Madisonian mechanics of the system for controlling
state law are as follows: The oath of loyalty to federal law imposes an
internal check on state legislators. That check is reinforced by a stronger,
external check on state law exercised by state judges pursuant to their
internal obligation under, and the quasi-nationalizing influence of, the
Supremacy Clause. The federal courts then add a yet stronger (because
350. The Federalist No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(emphasis added); see 2 Elliot, supra note 4, at 196 (Jan. 7, 1788) (statement of Oliver
Ellsworth at Connecticut ratifying convention) ("If [Congress] make[s] a law which the
Constitution does not authorize. . ., the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality,
are to be made independent, will declare it to be void.... [I]f the states ...make a law

which is a usurpation upon the general government..., independent judges will declare it
... [void]."); id. at 489 (Dec. 7, 1787) (statement ofJames Wilson at Pennsylvania ratifying

convention); 3 id. at 553 (June 20, 1788) (statement ofJohn Marshall at Virginia ratifying
convention).
351. See infra notes 674, 774-799 and accompanying text (clarifying this principle).
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independent, final, and effectual) external check on state judges-or,
more accurately, a checking up on or spot-checking of state judicial decisions to assure that state judges are fulfilling their checking function vis4vis state law. Federal judges' exercise of this power is internally checked
by their obligation both to exert and to constrain themselves to decide
the whole case and nothing but the case, and to do so independently,
effectually, and finally on the basis of reason, not will, as dictated by the
whole supreme law. Although an internal check, federal judges' obligation to follow the whole law in deciding the whole case, no matter where
legal reason leads and notwithstanding where else political will might
lead, also confers a kind of power-i.e., the neutrality and integrity
needed to command the respect and acquiescence of states and federal
branches disadvantaged by the judges' decisions. Finally, Congress's con35 2
trol of the jurisdictional spigot externally checks the federal courts,
while Congress is itself checked by a variety of forces. Internally,
Congress's own oath to preserve federal law and Article III's presumption
in favor of federal appellate review-and externally, the legislature's
need for effective enforcement tools to pursue its own ambitions, and its
inability to alter the purity or quality of the judicial power it releaseskeep it from too severely constraining the judicial branch. But, on the
other hand, the constitutional presumption in favor of state court original jurisdiction (an internal constraint), together with the power of the
states in Congress 353 and Congress's judicially enforceable inability to alter the purity of the judicial power it releases even when that power is
turned against Congress itself (external constraints), discourages an overliberal use of the federal judicial check on state courts.
Although this system is classically Madisonian in its conception, it was
not the system that Madison himself favored. Not surprisingly, given his
preference for the national negative and council of revision, which a federaljudiciary with exclusive control over nationally important cases would
merely have backed up, "it was by no means certain [to Madison] that state
courts, or even federal courts [by themselves], would have the political
will and resources to oppose their judgment to the contrary whims of the
people . . . [given] the inherent factiousness and parochialism of state
politics that drove his constitutional theory."3 5 4 As he fretted in his postConvention letter to Jefferson:
It may be said that the Judicial authority under our new system
will keep the States within their proper limits, and supply the
place of a negative on their laws. The answer is, that it is more
352. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
841, 846 (1975) (Congress's power over federal jurisdiction is "the rock on which rests the
legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy").
353. See The Federalist No. 46, supra note 54, at 298; Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The R6le of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 544-52 (1954).
354. Rakove, supra note 26, at 1049.
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convenient to prevent the passage of a law, than to declare it
void after it is passed; that this will be particularly the case,
where the law aggrieves individuals, who may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the supreme Judiciary; that a State
which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would
not be very ready to obey a Judicial decree in support of them,
and that a recurrence to force, which in the event of disobedience would be necessary, is an evil 3which
the new Constitution
55
meant to exclude as far as possible.
Eventually, however, Madison came around-as revealed by his 1823
letter to Jefferson that we quote above, in which he rejected the neoconfederationist claim of the day that the Supreme Court lacked the constitutional power to review state court decisions.3 5 6 Thus, after 34 years of
judicial operations under a Judiciary Act designed by former nationalist
delegate Oliver Ellsworth and nationalist convert William Paterson, which
faithfully tracked the constitutional presumptions and practical predictions described above,35 7 and after 20 years of operations under the
strong nationalist hand of ChiefJustice John Marshall, Madison was able
to express substantial confidence in the system's federal-i.e., its simultaneously nationalist and confederationist-mechanics as conjointly codified in Article I and the Supremacy Clause.
II. "THE JUDICIAL POWER" EVER SINCE
As the events of August 27, 1787, had assured, "[t]he Courts of the
United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction
over any subject, at once become possessed of the [judicial] power... ;
[and] the attributes which inhere in that power and are inseparable from
it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative."3 5 8 But
what is "[t] he judicial Power"? What are its inseparable attributes?
In Part I, we showed that the Constitutional Convention systematically addressed this question. It defined "[t]he judicial Power" as, first,
Article IIIjudges' authority and obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred, independently, finally, and effectually, to decide the
whole case and nothing but the case on the basis of legal reasoning, not
political expedience. Also included is a requirement that, when federal
law by its own terms applies to the case, and particularly when the case
reaches the federal courts on appeal from a state court, Article IIIjudges
must decide the case on the basis, and so as to maintain the supremacy
of, the whole, hierarchically ordered federal law. In the latter regard,
355. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 55, at 211.

356. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 249, at 83-84
(quoted supra text accompanying note 249).
357. See infra notes 374-375 and accompanying text.
358. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); accord Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1995); see supra notes 216-218, 258,
261-267 and accompanying text.
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Article III judges have the power and obligation to treat as void-to deprive of force or effect as law-any legislative enactment or judicial decision (and, most especially, any state law orjudicial decision) that is inconsistent with federal law. Although Congress largely controls the
(quantitative, jurisdictional) question whether a case is before a federal
court, once Congress confers federal jurisdiction over a matter, Article III
itself controls the (qualitative, 'judicial Power") question whether the
matter constitutes a "case" and, if so, what that "case" entails. Insofar as
the Constitution does bear on the quantitative question, it is only by creating some more or less easily rebuttable presumptions in favor of particular grants ofjurisdiction (e.g., in favor of state court original jurisdiction
and federal court appellatejurisdiction) and (as we will see) by discouraging official steps to neutralize the practicalities on which the Framers relied to assure that enough cases would reach Article III courts to permit
them to maintain the supremacy of national law.
In this Part, we revisit a number of classic Federal Courts decisions to
show that they are most powerfully understood as letting federal courts
exercise all and only "[t]he judicial Power" as defined above. After
briefly discussing the "quantity ofjurisdiction" issue-to show, inter alia,
how rarely and disinterestedly the Supreme Court has discussed it-we
proceed in roughly the order in which the Court first authoritatively addressed particular aspects of "[t] he judicial Power."
We begin with the limitation of Article III courts to "cases," which
turns out to encompass not only a limitation of the judiciary to its area of
constitutional competence but also an empowerment of it to "decide"
cases-meaning to exercise 'Judgment," not "will," and a "final" and "effectual" authority. In this and following discussions we bifurcate our analysis into cases reviewing federal, then state, law and decisions-revealing
important affinities between cases that traditionally are treated as unrelated illustrations of distinct separation of powers and federalism principles. Next, in cases limiting or asserting the Court's authority on matters
over which the Constitution "extend [s]" jurisdiction, come perhaps the
most classic decisions, which, we show, insist upon a judicial power not
only to "decide" the case "independently" and "effectually" but also to
decide the "whole case" (or, more accurately, the "whole question") on
the basis of the "whole supreme law." These latter powers oblige Article
III courts to decide all aspects of the dispute that require a normative
judgment about the meaning of federal law, but permit those courts to
forgo deciding aspects of the dispute that do not implicate Article III
courts' supremacy-maintaining function. We then consider cases in
which the Court has forbidden non-Article III decisionmakers to use interpretive or remedial devices to neutralize the stare decisis effect of prior
Court decisions. Finally, after discussing a narrow set of practicalities-
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preserving cases, we acknowledge our debt to Henry Hart's Dialogue,359
while noting respects in which Hart's analysis was incomplete.
A. Not Quantity: Congress's Control of the Courts'Jurisdiction
Partisans on both sides of the debate over the quantity of constitutionally mandated federal jurisdiction have noted that the Court's statements on the topic-most suggesting that Congress can withdraw much
of the Court's and all of the lower courts' jurisdiction 3 6 0-are nearly all
enpassantand dicta.361 Advocates of mandatory federal jurisdiction treat
the Court's neglect of the issue as proof that it remains open, while their
opponents argue that the legal culture has so thoroughly accepted
Congress's power that counsel and the courts rarely take seriously the
claim that it is lacking. We take the latter view, but for this reason: The
Framers self-consciously swapped quantitative (jurisdictional) for qualitative (judicial power) protections of the federal courts. This explanation
calls into question the emphasis of much of the academic work in the
area, which tends to neglect qualitative issues, save for a passing and often
362
inaccurate discussion of Klein v. United States.
1. Permitting Congressional "Regulation". Wiscart. - Early on, the
Supreme Court did confront a quantity-of-jurisdiction question, but it was
just the sort of question that our history of the Convention would predict:
359. See Hart, supra note 5.
360. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697-98 (1992); Sheldon v. Sill,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
361. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 17, at 271 n.221 ("dicta"); Gunther, supra note 9, at
908; Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 250-52 ("advisory"). Even Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869), which let Congress withdraw the Supreme Court's appellate
habeas jurisdiction, was careful to note in a concluding paragraph that Congress had left
intact the Court's originaljurisdiction over the same cases-a jurisdiction the Court then
proceeded to exercise only a few months later in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85,
102-03 (1869). See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2338-39 (1996).
362. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). Contrary to the common "qualitative" reading of
Klein to forbid Congress to "'prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department ...in
cases pending before it,' " Velasco, supra note 8, at 749 (quoting Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at
146); see, e.g., Gunther, supra note 9, at 910; Sager, supra note 17, at 68, Congress
routinely establishes standards of relief that prescribe rules of decision, and has even been
permitted to command Article III judges to decide particular pending cases in particular
ways. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1992); Pope v.
United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1944) (discussed infra note 433 and accompanying text);
cf. infra notes 447-450, 678-686 and accompanying text (discussing limits on Congress's
power in this regard). Other qualitative commentary, usually supported by brief
discussions of Klein, emphasizes, variously, the "independence," "finality," "effectualness,"
and "whole supreme law" qualities of "[t]he judicial Power." See, e.g., Amar, supra note
17, at 233 (the judicial power "encompasses the power . ..to speak definitively and
finally"); Sager, supra note 17, at 87 (Congress may not "leave[ ] the basic jurisdiction of
the federal courts untouched but deprive[ ] them of jurisdiction to provide effective
relief"); Wechsler, supra note 9, at 1006 (Congress may not "employ federal courts as
organs of enforcement and preclude them from attending to the Constitution in arriving
at decision of the cause").
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How do Article III's jurisdictional presumptions affect the interpretation
ofjurisdictional statutes? The 1810 decision in Durousseauv. United States
typically is cited as establishing that Congress's explicit grant of appellate
Supreme Courtjurisdiction is "understood to imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate power as is not comprehended within" the grant,
i.e., as impliedly "intending to execute the power [Congress] possessed of
3 63
making exceptions to the [Court's] appellate jurisdiction."
In fact, the principle dates back to the 1796 decision in Wiscart v.
D'Auchy, which held that the 1789 Judiciary Act's authorization of
Supreme Court review of lower federal court admiralty decisions on "writs
of error," which bring up only legal questions visible on the face of the
lower court judgment, impliedly denied the Court the broader power to
hear admiralty "appeals" which, in addition, bring up factual questions
and the evidentiary record. 3 64 A dissent by Justice Wilson-nationalist
author of the second Committee of Detail draft-sometimes is cited as
arguing that the Constitution, not Congress, controls the Court's jurisdiction. 3 65 But Wilson said the opposite: "The legislature might... ma[k]e
exceptions, and introduce[] regulations" in regard to admiralty appeals. 36 6 He thus agreed with his former Committee of Detail colleague,
ChiefJustice Oliver Ellsworth, writing for a majority, that the Court's "appellate jurisdiction is ... qualified[ ] inasmuch as it is given 'with such
367
exceptions, and under such regulations, as the congress shall make."'
Where Wilson and Ellsworth disagreed, therefore, was only on the
question of how the presumptions ran. Focusing on the word
"Exceptions" and failing to answer his own question-"how [cases] are to
be brought hither for final adjudication .. . [when] congress makes no
provision on the subject," i.e., how "all the testimony which was produced
in the court below, should also be produced in this court" absent a statutory way to bring up the record-Wilson perceived a constitutional presumption favoring "appellate" jurisdiction unless explicit "words in the
judicial act[ ] restrict[ ] the power of proceeding by appeal." 3 68 Emphasizing the word "Regulations" and the absence as a practical matter of any
factual record to review, Ellsworth concluded that, "[i] f Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction." 369 Ellsworth made the same point three years later in
363. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Sager, supra
note 17, at 25.
364. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (Ellsworth, C.J.).
365. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Jurisdiction: Early
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1515,
1569-70 (1986).
366. Wscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 326 (Wilson, J., dissenting); see supra note 319 and
accompanying text (Wilson's similar views in the ratification debates).
367. Wscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327 (Ellsworth, C.J.).
368. Id. at 325, 326 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
369. Id. at 327 (Ellsworth, C.J.).
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Turner v. President of the Bank of North America,370 supported by Justice
Chase, who similarly discerned both a legal rule that "congress is not
bound" to grantjurisdiction and a "political truth... that the disposal of
the judicial power... belongs to congress," so that only "[i]f congress has
'' 71
given this power to the court" can "we possess it. 3
Wiscart supports our conclusion that Congress's "Regulations" power
is the source of its ability to control appeals by organizing the interactions
among courts that are a necessary attribute of appeals. 372 It also, if less
obviously, comports with the constitutional presumption we noted favoring Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Because, as a matter of efficient practice as well as law, the Court needs an affirmative congressional
"rule to regulate [its] proceedings" on appeal from each type of
subordinate court in each type of case, and because of the awkwardness
of statutorily specifying the cases over which the Court may not exercise
jurisdiction as opposed to the jurisdiction it may exercise, the Court sensibly has refused to treat the constitutional presumption of appellate jurisdiction as aimed at the form as opposed to the effect of statutes. Pace
Wilson, therefore, Congress may proceed by statutorily "ruling in" rather
than "ruling out" classes of cases as long as its statutes' overall effect is to
make appellate jurisdiction the rule, not the exception, in the cases
Article III lists. Proceeding according to this "ruling in" strategy,
Congress arguably has succeeded since 1789 in making appellate review
the general practice-justifying the Framers' gamble that Congress's ambitions would generate enough federal jurisdiction to let the qualitative
ingredients of "[t] he judicial Power" serve their structural, supremacy3 73
maintaining function.
2. Preserving CongressionalControl: The Judiciary, Full Faith and Credit,
and Anti-Injunction Acts. - The little the Court has said on the quantity
370. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.(a) (1799) (Ellsworth, C.J., during oral argument) ("the

federal Courts [cannot] exercise ajurisdiction, without the intervention of the legislature,
to distribute and regulate the power").
371. Id. (Chase, J., during oral argument). Justice Story often is associated with the
view that Congress must vest all jurisdiction listed in Article III. See Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-31, 337 (1816) (dicta). But when presented with the
issue, Story took Chase's "political" view: No matter how "mandatory to the legislature" it
was to vest the jurisdiction Article III delineates, a federal court may not actually take
"jurisdiction, which is not given by some statute." White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015,
1015-16 (C.C.D.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547).
372. See supra notes 208, 223-224 and accompanying text.
373. See Velasco, supra note 8, at 743-44; supra notes 320-324 and accompanying
text. Qualifying our conclusion in the text is the replacement early in this century of writs

of error as of right to the Supreme Court with a discretionary certiorari procedure, thus
undoubtedly reducing substantially

the proportion of "arising under" and other

enumerated cases in which actual federal review has occurred. The effect of this change
has been moderated, however, by the Court's exercise of its discretion to review with an eye
towards the policy of maintaining federal legal supremacy. Also important to our
conclusion is Congress's "appellate" use of federal habeas review of state convictions as a
surrogate for Supreme Court review in that large and important category of cases. See
infra notes 891-892 and accompanying text.
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of constitutionally mandated federal jurisdiction contrasts with how much
the Court has let Congress do to control that quantity. The pattern was
set immediately after ratification by the 1789 Judiciary Act, which conferred considerably less than the constitutionally permitted maximum jurisdiction and less than would be required by a principle of some federal
jurisdiction over all federal questions. 374 Instead, in keeping with the
constitutional design that we describe in Part I, the jurisdictional choices
the first Congress made conform to a presumption of federal appellate
(and also state court original) jurisdiction and strongly imply a spotchecking and supremacy-maintaining understanding of the federal
3 75
courts' role in reviewing state decisional and other law.
374. Notwithstanding some contrary views by individual members of Congress (none,
however, who attended the Convention), see, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 828, 831-32 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Smith); William Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First
Senate of the United States 1789-1791, at 86-87 (Harrisburg, Lane S. Hart 1880), the first
Congress as a whole assumed that the Constitution (1) let it confer substantially less federal
jurisdiction than that to which Article III, Section 2 provides that "[t]he judicial Power
shall extend"-including as to categories of disputes to which Section 2 attaches the
adjective "all"-and (2) let it withhold Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction from cases as
to "all" of which the second paragraph of Section 2 says "the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction . . . with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make." See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch.
20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (withholding, e.g., original federal "arising under"jurisdiction in civil
cases and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over federal criminal cases and over state
'arising under" cases in which the state court upheld a claimed federal right); see also 1
Annals of Cong. 854 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Stone) (noting that the
drafters of what became the 1789 Act "have modified the tribunal; they have restrained its
jurisdiction; they have directed appeals only to be had in certain cases; they have
connected the State courts with the District Courts in some cases; this shows that, in their
opinion, the articles of the constitution gave them a latitude"; quoted further, supra note
129); William R. Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of its Authority over the
Federal Courts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 1101, 1102 (1985) (noting "general
acceptance" among "the principal drafters of the Judiciary Act . . . of extensive
congressional control over federal court jurisdiction"). Professor Amar's claims that,
properly interpreted, Article III's "arising under" language only authorizes appeals of
decisions denying (as opposed to upholding) federal rights and that, properly interpreted,
the 1789 Act authorized Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over decisions upholding
(as well as denying) federal rights, compare Amar, supra note 17, at 262-63, with Akhil
Reed Amar, Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1530-31
(1990), not only are hard to reconcile with each other but also are inconsistent with the
actions of the First Congress, the 1914 Congress that repealed the bar to appeals of state
decisions upholding federal claims, Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790, and Court
decisions from 1806 on, e.g., Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 268, 269 (1806).
See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 1587.
375. The 1789 Act carefully rationed federal jurisdiction (including that of the
inferior federal courts it chose to establish) to assure the ample and effective exercise of
federal judicial authority in the types of cases in which Madison and other nationalists
thought such jurisdiction most crucial to the effectuation of national authority, including
by mandating original federal criminal jurisdiction, see An Act to Establish the Judicial
Courts of the United States, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78-79 (1789), and by
limiting Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state decisions, in a classically spotchecking manner, to ones that erroneously ruled adversely to a claim of federal right or of
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Less well appreciated in this regard are two other early assertions by
Congress of a broad power to decide whether and when federal courts
could review state decisions. Article IV of the Constitution requires "each
State" to give "Full Faith and Credit... to the... judicial Proceedings of
every other State."3 76 Conspicuously absent is any command that federal
courts give credit to state proceedings-an omission evidently dictated by
the federal courts' Article III and Supremacy Clause powers to reverse,
and thus deny credit to, state decisions in conflict with federal law. In acts
passed in 1790 and 1793, however, Congress clearly took the position (1)
that it would determine whether, when, and which federal courts could
review, and thus deny effect to, state decisions that violate federal law,
hence (2) that federal courts' 'Judicial Power" (even as bolstered by omissions from the Full Faith and Credit Clause) did not inherently confer that
federal jurisdiction. Rather than letting litigants aggrieved by state proceedings challenge them at will in federal courts exercising a supposed
inherentjurisdiction-or even letting litigants ask federal courts to deny
state decisions credit in later cases that they managed to fit within the
federal courts' general statutoyjurisdiction 377 -- the two acts assured that
federal courts could only review state proceedings when Congress exfederal immunity from state law, id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87. Moreover, the arguments
members of Congress made in 1789 in favor of superseding state court with federal
jurisdiction tended to rely not on constitutional imperatives but on the kinds of practical
considerations-mainly the need for federal jurisdiction to effectuate national authoritythat nationalists at the Convention had thought would cause Congress to keep the
jurisdictional spigot open. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 844 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)
(statement of Rep. Madison) (asking "how it could be made compatible with the
constitution, or safe to the Federal interests, to make a transfer of the Federal jurisdiction to
the State courts" (emphasis added)); id. at 864 (statement of Rep. Lawrence) ("[T]he
powers of the Judiciary ought to be employed so as to embrace all the cases which necessity
required ....[I]lt
was not.. a question on principle, but a question of expediency....");
see also Speech of William Paterson in Senate Debate on judiciary Act of 1789, recorded in
Paterson Papers, file 4, Rutgers University Library, reprinted in Casto, supra note 374, at
1108 (favoring extension of jurisdiction to lower federal courts because "[t]he Necessity,
the Utility, the Policy of them strikes my Mind in the most forcible Manner").
376. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
377. Suppose A successfully sued B in state court claiming that A was the rightful
owner of land in B's possession and that a federal treaty nullified a state statute conveying
the land to B. Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, B could not appeal that "federal question" to
the Supreme Court because the state decision upheld, and the Act only permitted appeals
when the state court denied, a claimed federal right. See supra note 375. Could B,
however, citing the "Arising Under" Clause and the negative implication of Article IV's
limitation of full faith and credit to other state courts, ask a federal court to enjoin the state
court order on the ground that it misinterpreted the federal treaty? Or, suppose that
thereafter a new state law repealed the prior law conveying the property to B, and B
unsuccessfully sued A in state court seeking to repossess the property and claiming, inter
alia, that the new law unconstitutionally impaired B's contract rights. On B's (permissible)
appeal of the adverse Contracts Clause decision, could B ask the Supreme Court to ignore
the earlier state decision and rule that the federal treaty did not nullify the earlier law
conveying the land to B and thus that the land was B's if the later repealing law was void
under the Contracts Clause? The 1790 and 1793 Acts' answer to both questions was "no."
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pressly authorized such review and regulated its timing, predicates, and
locus.
First came the 1790 Full Faith and Credit Act 37 8-now codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738-the black-letter interpretation of which from the beginning has been that, "absent a countervailingcommand in anotherfederal statute," federal courts must give full faith and credit to prior state decisions.8 79 As so interpreted, the 1790 Act effectively deprives federal
courts of the power to review and supersede state judgments save when
Congress expressly confers jurisdiction to conduct such review via, e.g.,
appeal, writ of error, certiorari, removal, or habeas.a8 0
Next came the 1793 Anti-Injunction Act, forbidding federal courts to
enjoin state proceedings. 3 8 ' Although the 1793 Act was framed as a
"seemingly uncompromising" bar on injunctions, "the Court soon recognized... exceptions" designed to preserve the "intended scope" of later
"Acts of Congress" granting lower federal courts jurisdiction to review or
supersede state court proceedings-including bankruptcy laws and laws
respecting "removal of litigation from state to federal courts .... the liability of shipowners .... federal interpleader actions,.. . farm mortgages,
378. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
379. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 1493 (emphasis added).
380. Compare Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 20 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (habeas statute's directive to federal courts to deny effect to unconstitutional
state court decisions supersedes full faith and credit requirement), and Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386 (1985) (leaving open
question whether statute giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims
"implie[s a] partial repeal of [28 U.S.C.] § 1738," thereby denying res judicata effect to
state court rulings on related claims), with Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980)
(requiring evidence clearer than that in the history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to warrant a
finding that it partially repealed the Full Faith and Credit Act by authorizing federal courts
to supersede prior state court decisions adjudicating the same claim). Since 1815,
Congress has sometimes permitted litigants to transfer specified (often federal question)
cases from state to federal court for independent determination after final state court
judgment. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198-99 (permitting
removal by certain federal officials before or after final state court judgment, in specified
circumstances, and characterizing posJudgment removal as an "appeal"); Act of Mar. 3,
1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756-57, amended byAct of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, § 4, 14 Stat.
46, 46 (same). In upholding the constitutionality of the 1863 and 1866 postjudgment
removal statutes over the objection that lower federal court denial of full faith and credit to
state court decisions offends federalism principles, the Supreme Court held that the
removal acts were permissibly designed to empower lower federal courts to hear "appeals"
from state courts, thus superseding the resjudicata constraint:
How jurisdiction shall be acquired by the inferior courts, whether it shall be
original or appellate, or original in part and appellate in part, . . . are not
prescribed. The Constitution is silent upon those subjects. They are remitted
without check or limitation to the wisdom of the legislature.... Every variety and
form of appellate jurisdiction within the sphere of the power, extending as well to
the courts of the States as to those of the nation, is permitted.
The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 251-52 (1868); see infra note 663 and
accompanying text.
381. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 23, § 5, 1 Star. 333, 334-35.
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. federal habeas corpus ....

and ...

control of prices."38 2 Codifying

this longstanding doctrine, the current Anti-Injunction Act forbids federal courts to "grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress," or in two other exceptional
38 3
situations.
Among the "reasons that led Congress to adopt [the 1793 Act]" was a
desire to preserve Congress's power to regulate the flow of cases across
the state-federal divide and thus, in Justice Black's words, "to work out
lines of demarcation between the two systems."3 8 4 Congress began that
regulatory process in the 1789 Judiciary Act, in which "lower federal
courts.. . were not given any power to review directly cases from state
courts" and "[o]nly the Supreme Court was authorized to review on direct appeal the decisions of state courts."38 5 Congress then adopted the
Anti-Injunction Act in 1793 to keep state court "[1]itigants who foresaw
the possibility of more favorable treatment in [the federal] system ...
[from] hasten [ing] to invoke" federal jurisdiction through mechanisms
38 6
other than those Congress had expressly provided.
With the Court's blessing, therefore, the 1790 and 1793 Acts let
Congress decide such questions as whether (as in the 1789 Act) to create
"essentially separate [state and federal] systems" that "proceed[ ] independently of the other [except for] ultimate [federal appellate] review in
th[e Supreme] Court of the federal questions raised, 3 8s 7 or instead (as,
e.g., in the habeas corpus acts of 1833, 1842, 1867, and 1948) to permit
infefior federal courts to review and enjoin state proceedings in given circumstances. 38 8 More generally, as vigorously enforced by the Court, the
382. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1972) (citing, e.g., Ex parte Royall, 117
U.S. 241, 248-49 (1886)).
383. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) (emphasis added); see Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 236.
384. Atlantic Coast Line P.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng., 398 U.S. 281,
285-86 (1970).
385. Id. at 286.

386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, §§ 3, 7, 4 Stat. 632, 633-35; Act of Aug. 29, 1842,
ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, 539-40; Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385-87; Act ofJune
25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 2241-2254, 62 Stat. 869, 964-67 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241 (c) (3), 2251, 2254(a) (1994)); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 857-58 (1994)
(federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to stay and review state judgments is an exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act); infra notes 888-895 and accompanying text. The habeas,
removal, civil rights, bankruptcy, interpleader, price control, ship owners, and farm
mortgage exceptions to the 1790 and 1793 Acts, see supra notes 380, 382-383 and
accompanying text, all depart from a "two-sided stepladder" arrangement, under which
state courts are joined to, and their cases are subject to review by, the federal courts only at
the "top rung" representing the Supreme Court. Those exceptions neatly conform to the
original understanding of Article III, which creates a presumption of Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over state decisions but permits Congress in appropriate
circumstances to overcome that presumption and confer appellate jurisdiction on lower
federal courts. See supra notes 374-375 and accompanying text; cf. Scheidegger, supra
note 75, at 894, 898-900, 902, 912, 915-16, 919, 936 (advocating a "two-sided stepladder"
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1790 and 1793 Acts have operated under the assumption, and have assured, that Congress has the sole "quantitative" power to confer or deny
federal appellate jurisdiction over state proceedings-and both treat that
power as strong enough to permit Congress to neutralize the expressio
unius est exclusio alterius implication of Article IV's omission of a full faith
and credit command to federal courts adjudicating issues previously ad89
3
dressed by state courts.

arrangement, but conceding that the Framers did not require it and that Congress
repeatedly has departed from it).
389. Also effectively barring losing litigants whom Congress has denied federal
jurisdiction to appeal from using general grants of original jurisdiction to obtain federal
review are, e.g., federal statutes that make state convictions predicates for federal crimes
while barring collateral attacks on the predicate convictions, and also the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994); the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994)
(discussed in Hart, supra note 5, at 1363); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57
(1978) (affording state judges absolute immunity from section 1983 damages for
deliberative conduct); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (because
Congress had withheld lower federal court jurisdiction over appeals from state court civil
judgments, a losing state court litigant could not-as "merely an attempt to get rid of [the
unappealable state] judgment"-bring an original federal question action claiming that
the unappealable judgment violated the Constitution); Fouvergne v. Municipality No. 2, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 470, 473 (1856) (forbidding litigant to use general equity jurisdiction as a
basis to challenge a 60-year-old Spanish probate decree, inasmuch as "[t]he courts of the
United States have no probate jurisdiction") (misdescribed in Scheidegger, supra note 75,
at 908 & n.120); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03, 209 (1830) (in order to
distinguish habeas jurisdiction, which the 1789 Judiciary Act granted, from jurisdiction to
hear criminal appeals, which the 1789 Act withheld, the Court refused on habeas to
"look[ ]" at routine appellate issues such as whether the indictment in the case was
procedurally flawed, and instead limited habeas review (pre- or post-conviction) to claims
attacking "the legality"-meaning, in the language of the day, the constitutionality-"of
the commitment") (discussed in James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice and Procedure § 2.4d, at 37-40 (2d ed. 1994); misdescribed in Scheidegger, supra
note 75, at 889 & n.2, 929-31).
The 1790 and 1793 Acts' quantitative function of preserving Congress's power to say
whether, when, and which federal courts have appellate jurisdiction over state decisions
reveals why the Acts are not appropriately understood qualitativelyas telling federal courts
how to decide cases within their jurisdiction. The Acts do not tell federal courts (1) to
affirm state decisions the courts have jurisdiction to review despite the decisions'
inconsistency with federal law, but rather (2) to forbear exercising the general jurisdiction
Congress has given them in a way that covertly arrogates to themselves an appellate power
to review state decisions that Congress has withheld. That the Court has not technically
labeled the two Acts "jurisdictional" does not undermine this understanding. Compare
Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 916 (Acts' identification as jurisdictional, or not, is
important), with id. at 918, 921 (doctrines' identification as jurisdictional, or not, is
unimportant). The two Acts come into play only when some kind of federal jurisdiction
concededly has been conferred that an unsuccessful state litigant is trying to use as a
substitute for a different type of federal appellate jurisdiction that Congress has withheld.
Because the Acts are not designed to deny all jurisdiction but, instead, to require courts to
disentangle exercises of jurisdiction that Congress has conferred from uses of the same
jurisdiction as shills for appellate jurisdiction that Congress has withheld-and because
nonjurisdictional screening devices may supply the most effective means of serving (and
for centuries have successfully served) that delicate function-the relevant doctrines'
denomination as jurisdictional vel non is not decisive.
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B. Nothing but the Case: The Bans on Advising and Being Revised
1. No Advising of or Revising by, a PoliticalBranch. - Many attributes
of the judicial power serve simultaneously as powers and constraints.3 9 0
The Supreme Court's tendency to discuss some of them mainly as constraints has obscured the extent to which they also enhance the quality
and force of the decisions through which the federal courts fulfill their
structural role of subordinating inferior to supreme law. A case in point
is the limitation of the judicial power to the decision of cases or controversies-in Madison's phrase at the Convention, the "limit[ation] to cases
of ajudiciary Nature."3 91 As did the Framers,3 92 the Court, starting in the
1790s, repeatedly has disapproved exercises of "[t]hejudicial Power" that
either merely advise, or are subject to being revised by, non-Article III
agencies of government.
a. No Advising. - Barred by the anti-advisingrule are an Article III
court's: (1) formally providing legal advice to a non-Article III entity
outside the context of a case in which the entity has an interest;393 (2)
"giving an opinion in a case which has not yet come regularly and judicially before us"; 39 4 and (3) deciding questions that depend on standards
"so vague and amorphous as to be beyond the competence of the
3 96
judiciary to enforce"3 95 or are "abstract, hypothetical or contingent."
Also barred by the rule against advising is an Article III court's (4)
adjudication of liability for harms that are not "likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision, '3 97 because: (a) the moving party has not (or has not
yet) suffered or is no longer suffering the kind of injury alleged (standing, ripeness, and mootness problems);398 (b) the court is being asked to
390. See supra notes 330-351 and accompanying text.
391. 2 Farrand, supra note 2, at 430 (August 27, 1787); see supra notes 250-252 and
accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 65, 84-85, 104-108, 231-234 and accompanying text.
393. See, e.g., Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices to
President Washington (August 8, 1793), in 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John
Jay 488, 488-89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., Burt Franklin 1970) (1890).
394. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 414 n.t (1792) (reprinting letter of
C.C.D.N.C. to President Washington rendering opinion that a statute under which no case
had yet arisen was unconstitutional, but expressing "doubts as to the propriety" of-which
soon turned into a blanket rule against-rendering such advice, "because we well know
how liable the best minds are, notwithstanding their utmost care, to a bias, which may arise
from a preconceived opinion, even unguardedly, much more deliberately, given").
395. Blessingv. Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (1997) (internal quotations omitted);
see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) ("A controversy is nonjusticiable...
where there is 'a ... lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it .... '" (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))).
396. Clinton v.Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1642 n.11 (1997) (internal quotations omitted);
see Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 242 (1937) (exercise of judicial
power requires a "dispute" that "calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical
basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts").
397. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976).
398. See, e.g., id.
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nullify only one of multiple sufficient legal causes of the alleged harm, so
that the harm will remain in place whether or not the moving party
wins3 99 (an "adequate and independent ground" problem); or (c) the

"court is powerless to enforce" its judgment in a way that would make a
difference to any party, as where the court has no remedy at its disposal
for the harm, 40° or, as sometimes happened when territories became
states, where the non-Article III court from which the case was appealed
was dismantled without replacement and no other means of making the
399. See, e.g., Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1522 (1997) (if "the state-law
determination is sufficient to sustain the decree, any opinion of this Court on the
[separate] federal question would be purely advisory" and beyond the Court's
jurisdiction); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).
Although not typically explained in this way, the harmless error doctrine is analogous.
If the facts predestine the outcome, so that a remand for provision of a federal right that
previously was denied would change nothing, reversal merely revises a ruling, without
deciding the case. Of course, determining whether curing the violation would make a
difference is difficult. This explains (1) why courts in harmless error situations (unlike
'adequate and independent state ground" cases, see Lambrix, 117 S. Ct. at 1522) often
ascertain the contours of the violation before assessing its harmfulness, and (2) why the
Court frequently uses proxies for probable harmfulness, instead of actually requiring harm
to be proved. In the latter regard, see, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737
(1993) (discussing errors as to which courts "presume prejudice" because prejudice is
likely but hard to prove); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (structural
errors that "infect the entire trial process" always require reversal). Given the uncertain
effect of errors, anti-advising concerns can tolerate considerable judicial discretion to
reverse decisions premised on errors that probably did not affect the outcome, but might
have. Compare Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring reversal of
criminal convictions on direct appeal upon finding a federal constitutional error that the
state cannot show was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"), with O'Neal v. McAninch,
513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995) (in cases involving nonconstitutional error in criminal cases on
direct appeal and constitutional error in habeas cases, reversal is required whenever the
error had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict or "the conscientious judge [is] in grave
doubt about the likely effect of an error on the jury's verdict"). But at least the modern
practice has been to forbear reversing whenever there is no reasonable possibility that an
error affected the outcome, and to reverse whenever the error's effect on the outcome is
more probable than not-the former practice being dictated (in our terminology) by the
'whole case and nothing but the case" or "anti-advising" ingredient of the judicial power
and the latter by the "effectualness" ingredient requiring Article III judges to effectuate
supreme law in cases within their jurisdiction. See infra Part II.B.I.c-D (effectualness
requirement). The claim of Professors Fallon and Meltzer that harmless error doctrine
reveals Article III courts' "remedial discretion" upon finding federal legal error, see Fallon
& Meltzer, supra note 37, at 1797-805, is incomplete, therefore, because it ignores the antiadvising limit on the power to grant, and the effectualness limit on the power to deny,
relief. See infra notes 697, 747, 774-799 and accompanying text (further discussing Fallon
and Meltzer's thesis).
400. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 129 & n.20 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("adjudication of rights which a court is powerless to enforce is tantamount to
an advisory opinion"); see Miller v. Albright, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 1146 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in thejudgment) (an Article III court must dismiss the case if the court "has no
power to provide the relief requested"); Sager, supra note 17, at 88 n.222 ("A denial of
jurisdiction to grant effective relief could 'in sufficiently extreme cases' also effectively put
the federal courts in the position of rendering mere 'advisory opinions,' in violation of the
case or controversy requirement of article III." (quoting Tribe, supra note 46, at 137)).
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Article III court's mandate or judgment legally binding on the parties was
available. 40 1 As the Justices said in 1793, in refusing to answer questions
put by President Washington concerning certain treaty and international
law obligations, "the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the government... [that] in certain
respects [are] checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in
the last resort,... afford strong arguments against the propriety of our
' 40 2
extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to.
b. No Revising: Hayburn's Case and Plaut. - The rule forbidding
revision of Article III court decisions by non-Article III agencies bars (1)
an Article III court's entry of a judgment that requires the approval of a
non-Article III agency before it can become final or enforceable against
the parties;40 3 and (2) Congress's annulment of, or its command that a
court reopen and consider revising, a judgment that previously has be40 4
come final within the federal "judicial department" under existing law.
In announcing the former rule, the Justices (on circuit) and judges joining the three 1792 lower court opinions collected in Hayburn's Case explained their refusal to rule on petitions for orphans' and veterans' pensions subject to War Department and congressional revision on the
401. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 704-05 (decided 1864, reported
1885) ("The Court has uniformly refused to take jurisdiction where there was not a court
... to which we were authorized by law to send a mandate to carry into effect thejudgment
of this court" because "[we] could merely express an opinion, which ... binds no one, is
no judgment in the legal sense of the term, and may or may not be carried into effect
...

.");

accord McNulty v. Batty, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 72, 79 (1850) ("[S]ince the termination

of the Territorial government, there is no court in existence to which the mandate of this
court could be sent to carry into effect our judgment. Our power, therefore, would be
incomplete and ineffectual, were we to consent to a review of the case."); Hunt v. Palao, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 589, 590-91 (1846).
402. Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices to President
Washington, supra note 393, at 488.
403. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
113 (1948) (decliningjurisdiction to review administrative order that thereafter could not
become effective without presidential approval: "[If the President may completely
disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only because it is one the courts were not
authorized to render. Judgments within the powers vested in courts... may not lawfully be
revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department .... ."); United
States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 478 (1886); United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641,
647-48 (1874); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46-47 (1851).
404. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) ("[having
achieved finality ... ajudicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department
with regard to a particular case ... and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation
that the law applicable to that vey case was something other than what the court said it was"
and order the court to reopen the suit to apply the new law (emphasis added));
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1856)
(dicta) ("congress cannot ... annul the judgment of the court already rendered, or the
rights determined thereby"); sources cited infra note 441; see also Pope v. United States,
323 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1944) (questioning whether Congress may "pendent lite... set aside a
judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of the Government and.., require relitigation of
the suit").
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ground that "revis[ion] and control[ ] by the legislature, and . . . the
executive department... [are] radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts; and, consequently, with that important [separation of powers] principle which is so
strictly observed by the Constitution of the United States. '40 5 Accordingly, although "congress may certainly establish... appellate jurisdiction
... [by] courts ... consist[ing] ofjudges appointed in the manner the
Constitution requires, and holding their offices by no other tenure than
that of their good behavior," Congress may not vest revisionary authority
in the Secretary of War, who lacks such tenure, nor may a "decision of any
court of the United States ...under any circumstances ...agreeable to
the constitution, be liable to revision, or even suspension, by the
'40 6
legislature itself.
Extending this principle in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., Justice
Scalia announced the second anti-revising rule:
[T]he Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department
with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide
them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III
hierarchy-with an understanding, in short, that "a judgment
conclusively resolves the case" because "a judicial Power' is one
to render dispositive judgments." By retroactively commanding
the federal courts to reopen final40judgments,
Congress has vio7
lated this fundamental principle.
c. No Other Limits on Effectualness: Gordon. - Straddling the antiadvising/anti-revising border, and distilling the effectualness principle
uniting the two doctrines, is Chief Justice Taney's fascinating opinion in
Gordon v. United States, which placed outside "[t]hejudicial Power," hence
outside the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the functions assigned the Court of Claims in its first incarnation. 40 8 Congress created
the claims court in 1855 to stem the flow of private bills seeking compensation from the government that Congress's assertion of sovereign immunity had previously prevented courts from providing. In 1863, Congress
405. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411-12 n.t (1792) (reprinting letter of C.C.D. Pa. (Wilson
and Blair, CircuitJJ., Peters, DJ.) to President Washington).
406. Id. at 413 n.t (reprinting letter of C.C.D.N.C. (Iredell, CircuitJ., Sitgreaves, DJ.)
to President Washington).
407. Plaut,514 U.S. at 218-19 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926 (1990)).
408. 117 U.S. 697 (decided 1864, reported 1885). Taney died before his opinion for
the Court in Gordon was published, leaving the court reporter to announce simplywithout publishing Taney's opinion-that "no appellate jurisdiction over the Court of
Claims could be exercised by this court." Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561,
561 (1864). Taney's draft opinion came to light, and was published in an appendix, in
1885. See United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 477-78 (1886) (discussing Gordon's
history). Treating Taney's opinion as authoritative are, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226;
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.38 (1982); ICC
v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 484 (1894) (plurality opinion).
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let the Court of Claims certify appeals to the Supreme Court in important
4 09
cases.
Taney based his conclusion that the Court of Claims's work did not
qualify as an exercise of the judicial power on a statute providing that "no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury for any claim passed upon by the
Court of Claims [or, if appealed, by the Supreme Court], till after an
appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the
Treasury."41 0 Thus, "[n]either the Court of Claims nor the Supreme
Court can do anything more than certify their opinion to the Secretary of
the Treasury," who then must "decide whether he will include it in his
estimates of private claims, and [even then] it rest[ed] with Congress to
determine whether they will or will not make an appropriation for its
payment."41 ' Notably, the statute did not invite the Secretary or Congress
to review or revise the judgmeat of the awarding court, nor was there any
reason to think that the Secretary treated his task as more than ministerial (adding up the accumulated judgments and requesting an appropriation) or that Congress treated the Secretary's "estimate[s]" as less than
obligatory. Even though the judgment thus seemed fully and finally to
resolve the dispute, Taney found missing a critical attribute of the judicial
power. The courts could not themselves make their judgments stick:
"Neither court can by any process enforce its judgment; and whether it is
paid or not, does not depend on the decision of either court, but upon
4 12
the future action of the Secretary of the Treasury, and of Congress."
Congress thus gave the Court either too much power or too little.
On the "too much" side, "Congress cannot extend the appellate power of
this Court beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution" by "confer[ring] or impos[ing] on it the authority or duty of... determining an
appeal from a Commissioner or Auditor, or ... other tribunal exercising
4 13
"[N]or," on
only [a] special power[ ]" to determine an amount owed.
the "too little" side, "can Congress authorize or require this Court to express an opinion on a case where its judicial power could not be exercised [because] its judgment would not be final and conclusive upon the
rights of the parties, and process of execution awarded to carry it into
414
effect":
The award of execution is ... an essential part of every judgWithout
ment passed by a court exercising judicial power ....
such an award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory
.... It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead
letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties,
unless Congress should.., pass a law authorizing the court to
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Gordon, 117 U.S. at 698.
Id.
Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 702.
Id. (emphasis added).
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carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this Court .... 415
In support of this effectualness ingredient of the judicial power-a
court's ability "to carry its opinion into effect" 4 1 6-Taney cited two types of
authority: the Court's decisions refusing to exercise appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding a power fully and finally to declare the parties'
rights, when the appealed-from territorial court had fallen casualty to
statehood legislation identifying "no [successor] ... court ... to which we
were authorized by law to send a mandate to carry into effect the judgment of this court,"417 and section 25 of "the [Judiciary] act of 1789, authorizing, in certain contingencies [i.e., appeals from recalcitrant state
courts].... [the] execution by this court" of its own appellate judgment,
without reliance on a mandate issued to the state court. 4 18 The judicial
power thus encompasses a power to bind an inferior court to effectuate
the Court's "opinion," or barring that, to issue its own order making its
judgment directly binding on the parties. 4 19
Taney carefully explained why the Court must "execute[ ] firmly all
the judicial powers entrusted to it ... [but] will abstain from exercising
any power that is not strictly judicial in its character."4 20 As had the
Convention, Taney linked (1) the empowering requirements of judicial
independence and effectualness and the constraining requirement that
the Court stay out of the political branches' business (even when they
entice the Court into it) to (2) the Court's "unusual power" under "the
second section of Article VI [the Supremacy Clause] ."421 In the process,
415. Id.; see id. (to qualify as an Article III court, "a judicial tribunal [must be)
authorized to render a judgment which will bind the rights of the parties litigating before
it, unless appealed from, and upon which the appropriate process of execution may be
issued by the court to carry it into effect"); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965-66
(D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950) (statute conferring habeas jurisdiction but placing the prisoner's overseas military
custodian, to whom a remedial order would have to be directed, beyond the court's
control violates Congress's duty under Article III "to confer the whole of the federal
judicial power").
416. Gordon, 117 U.S. at 702, 704 (emphasis added).
417. Id. at 704 (discussing cases cited supra note 401).
418. Id. at 705; see infra note 483 and accompanying text.
419. At the least, effectualness requires that an Article III court have the power to
make its judgment legally binding on the parties either by its own order, or by the order of
another court that is legally bound by its mandate-or by the res judicata effect of its
judgment-to enforce the judgment against the parties. See Gordon, 117 U.S. at 704-05;
infra notes 432-458 and accompanying text. Effectualness also encompasses the power to
make decisional law binding on the same and inferior courts in later similar cases. See
infra Part ll.D. Effectualness may not, however, require a coercive power to deploy
marshals or otherwise force the parties to obey. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
568-71 (1962) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the modem Court of Claims' power to
enter final orders binding on the parties suffices for Article III purposes, even absent a
power to make Congress appropriate funds to comply with the court's judgment).
420. Gordon, 117 U.S. at 700-01.
421. Id. at 706.
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Taney noted an important, but often ignored, connection between federalism and separation of powers. The Supremacy Clause directs the Court
to "decide between the Government of the United States and the government of a State whenever any controversy should arise as to their relative
and respective powers in the common territory" and, in doing so, to determine whether the law of either sovereign conflicts with the
Constitution and, if so, to declare it "null and void." 422 "The complex
character of the Government of the United States," with "separate governments exercising certain powers of sovereignty over the same territory," creates "an absolute necessity, in order to preserve internal tranquility, that there should be some tribunal" with both the authority to
fulfill that supremacy-preserving role without first securing the approval
of either sovereign and the pestige (based on its independence) to do so
with the acquiescence of both. 423 "Hence the care with which [the
Court's] jurisdiction, powers, and duties are defined in the Constitution,
and its independence . . .secured," and hence the independence- and
power-preserving rule that "[nlo appeal is given from its decisions, nor
any power given to the legislative or executive departments to interfere
with its judgments or process of execution. ' 424 Only insofar as the Court
had a self-contained power to make its judgments binding, that is, could
it command the respect needed to fulfill its supremacy-maintaining
function.
d. Implications. - Our analysis helps resolve a number of important
puzzles in anti-advising and anti-revising doctrine, including the doctrine's coherence, the Court's tolerance of federal judges' performance
of certain apparently advisory functions, the line between Congress's revision of prior decisions (forbidden) and its revision of the law governing
those and future decisions (permissible), and the constitutionally required effect of declaratory judgments.
Anti-advising and anti-revising doctrine sometimes is criticized as
standing for no single principle save the question-begging one that
Article HI courts cannot be assigned "duties, but such as are properly
judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner."4 25 Our analysis
reveals, however, that the anti-advising and anti-revising decisions belong
under the same umbrella because they all capture qualities on which the
422. Id. at 700; see id. at 705.
423. Id. at 700-01; cf. Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and
the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DePaul L. Rev.
299, 303 (1989) ("An Article III court reduced to acting as a mere administrative
functionary that assists or serves the political branches may have difficulty commanding the
prestige necessary to check the exercise of majoritarian will found to conflict with
constitutionalized values.").
424. Gordon, 117 U.S. at 700; see id. at 701.
425. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.t (1792); see Evan Tsen Lee,
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 603,
644-45 (1992) (doubting the coherence of rules grouped under the "advisory opinion"
rubric).
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Convention insisted to fortify and cabin the judicial power in ways that
permit its holders to fulfill their structural, supremacy-preserving function. "Thejudicial Power" thus is diminished in one or more ways when a
federal court is permitted or required to advise the President or
Congress, or otherwise to express opinions outside the confines of a particular case, or to do so within those confines but on an as-yet hypothetical matter, or on a matter to which no manageable legal standards apply,
or when nothing the court says can change the current status of the parties, or when the court lacks the enforcement power to make what it says
stick, or when it knows or fears that another agency of government will
revise its judgment or require it to do so.
On the "too little power" side, the court is not independent because it
is asked to cater to the interests, or forced to rely on the enforcement
proclivities, of another agency of government, and its judgment is not
final or, if final, is not effectual (i.e., capable of being carried into effect by
the court). On the "too much power" side, the court is invited to act
based on political "will" or expediency, not judicial "reason," and is relieved of responsibility for the effects of its opinions on the parties-undermining its prestige and single-minded commitment to the supremacy of
4 26
federal law.
Our analysis also explains why the Court has not forbidden its members or inferior judges in their "personal" capacities to advise officials of
the political branches or to serve in nonjudicial government roles (witness Chief Justice Jay's simultaneous service as Ambassador to England,
Justice Jackson's work at the Nuremberg trials, and the "Warren
Commission" on President Kennedy's assassination) or as "commissioners" to resolve petitions for government largesse subject to executive or
legislative revision. 4 27 Nor has it resisted the statutorily imposed duty to
428
generate legally binding procedural rules for use in the federal courts
or to perform nonjudicial duties "directly analogous to [those] that federal judges perform in other [Article III] contexts."4 29 Nor, combining
both caveats, did it disapprove a statute assigning judges to the
Sentencing Commission that produces binding sentencing rules for the
426. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 411 n.t ("the people of the United States
...

have placed their judicial power, not in Congress, but in 'courts' ...

[that] 'hold their

offices during good behavior,'" receive "'salaries [that] shall not be diminished,'" and
.are under the indispensable necessity of acting according to the best dictates of [their]
own judgment, after duly weighing every consideration").
427. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400 (1989); United States v.
Ferreira, 54 U.S. (15 How.) 40, 46-47 (1852) (districtjudges may act as "commissioners"
and "personally... perform" administrative duties subject to Treasury Department revision
that Article III forbids them to perform as courts); William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in
the Early Republic 71-72, 178 (1995) (discussing legal advice that first two Chief Justices
privately gave to President Washington); Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the
Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123.
428. See, e.g., Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
429. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677, 681-82 (1989) (quoted material at

681).
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federal courts. 430 These activities have caused no great expansion or tarnishing of the judicial power, because the advice sought was unofficial
and private; 43 1 the duties performed were so occasional, solemn, and momentous that independence of mind and commitment to reason were
crucial and assumed; the "advice" judges provided was to themselves in the
form of rules governing judicial matters about which courts are understood to exercise reason (rules, by the way, that kept the legislature from
imposing its own rules by fiat); or the tasks could not be mistaken for a
demeaning requirement to referee disputes that the court could not finally or effectually resolve.
Also explained by our analysis is the Court's recent voiding of an act
forcing federal courts to revisit previously final decisions, though earlier
cases had upheld similar statutes. The earliest case, Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., enforced an act declaring certain bridges
over the Ohio River "'lawful structures in their present positions and elevations"' and designating them "post-roads for the passage of the mails of
the United States," though four years earlier the Court had declared one
of the bridges "an obstruction of the free navigation of the said river...
and directed that the obstruction be removed." 43 2 In Pope v. United States,
the Court of Claims previously had denied Pope damages for a government contract breach, but the Court enforced a special act letting him
sue again for the same damages "'notwithstanding any prior determination [or] any statute of limitations"' and directing the claims court to use
a formula for valuing Pope's work that differed from the one the court
previously had used in denying relief.433 Additionally, the Court twice
upheld acts ordering the claims court to consider anew an Indian tribe's
previously rejected compensation claims. 4 34 Despite the Government's
waiver of res judicata in the latter Indian tribe case, the Court thought it
necessary sua sponte to consider (because itsjurisdiction was implicated),
but ultimately rejected, the argument that "Congress impermissibly has
Court of
disturbed the finality of a judicial decree by rendering the 435
Claims' earlier judgments in this case mere advisory opinions.
4 36
the
In the most recent case, however, Plautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
Court voided an act requiring federal courts to reinstate Rule lOb-5 actions dismissed earlier as untimely under the Court's ruling in Lampf

430. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412 (upholding 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 992 (1984)).
431. Cf. Casto, supra note 427, at 180 (suggesting implicit "distinction ...between
private opinions offered by individual Justices, and formal opinions issued by the Court as
an institution").
432. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1856) (discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851)).
433. 323 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1944) (Special Act of Feb. 27, 1942, Priv. L. No. 306, 56 Stat.

1122).
434. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 407 (1980); Cherokee
Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476, 484-86 (1926).
435. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 391 & n.22.
436. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.4 37 Lampf had rejected a
lower court consensus that federal law adopted state statutes of limitadons in 10b-5 cases, and instead had applied a shorter limitations period. 4

8

Plaut did not attempt to distinguish Wheeling Bridge and Pope, and

limited the Indian tribe cases to government resjudicata waivers which, it
said, pose no Article III problem because courts may reject them on
judicial economy grounds 4 9-though neither Indian tribe case had relied on the res judicata waiver or the courts' discretion to reject it. Nor
did Plaut consider interpreting the statute before it as merely withdrawing the defendant's right to assert res judicata while preserving the
court's discretion to decide whether to treat the prior judgment as
final. 440
Our analysis explains these cases by identifying as decisive the question whether the statute under review projects a message that Congress is
exercising a power to revise a judicial decision or merely one to revise
federal statutory law. It asks whether the statute evidently invokes a power
to rectify an Article III court's mistake, or whether it merely exercises
Congress's power (1) to modify its own prior enactment, (2) to adopt a
new statute governing matters that it previously had failed to regulate, or
(3) to forbid the Executive or a private party to raise a res judicata defense. In the former situation, the statute attacks the independence, finality, and effectualness of an Article III court's decision; 441 in the latter,
it merely exerts Congress's control over the law governing, or defenses to,
particular lawsuits.
Indicative of the latter, benign interpretation (although not always
individually dispositive) are (1) the statute's apparent intention to establish new, judicially enforceable rights (e.g., the Wheeling Bridge statute's
new definition of obstructive bridges and creation of new uses for two
437. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
438. See id. at 364.

439. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 231-32.
440. The Court made clear that Congress's intentionally retroactive withdrawal of
previously accrued defenses posed no due process, and only an Article III, problem, see id.
at 227, and noted, without disapproving, federal statutes that abrogated private parties' res
judicata defenses, for example, to enable soldiers to reopen decisions obtained against
them while they were serving overseas, see id. at 235.
441. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) ("When the
political branches .. .act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases . ..the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles .

. . .");

United

States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 431 (1980) (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (" [I]
t
is not the province of Congress to judge the persuasiveness of the opinions of federal
courts-that is thejudiciary's province alone."); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 541
(1962) (plurality opinion) ("Congress may not by fiat overturn the constitutional decisions
of this Court.

. .

.");

William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 Duke LJ. 291, 314
(1996) ("Was Congress ... ever put in charge of 'overruling' the Supreme Court, and
given power to 'reverse' the Court's decisions... ? It seems seriously doubtful that this can
be so.").
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bridges, and the new rights to compensation that the Court interpreted
the "inartistically drawn" statute in Pope and the later Indian tribe act to
provide) ;442 (2) the statute's placement on the Government of a new obligation (e.g., the duty to use a specified bridge as a post road (Wheeling
Bridge), to compensate a government contractor for services previously
deemed noncompensable (Pope), or to provide or risk additional compensation for lands ceded to the Union (Indian tribe cases)); (3) the
passage of a significant amount of time between the court's prior decision
and Congress's resurrection of the issue (Indian tribe cases), 443 or the
previous judgment's operation against the parties in a manner that the
new statute does not entirely change retroactively (as in Wheeling Bridge,
in which the new act reopened the bridge but did not compensate its
owners for the period while it was condemned) ;444 (4) the formation of a
new moral or legal consensus in favor of previously withheld rights (as in
the later Indian tribe case); 445 (5) Congress's broad discretion to renegotiate the terms of the agreement the prior decision interpreted (e.g., the
government contract in Pope and the treaties in the Indian tribe cases);
and/or (6) the statute's apparent intention to forbid the Government or
a private party44 6 to assert a res judicata defense (Pope), and the Govern-

ment's actual waiver of the defense (the later Indian tribe case).447
In Plaut, no such factors were present. On the contrary, Congress
retroactively applied the longer statute of limitations only in Lampf and
other previously closed cases, while endorsing Lampfs shorter limitations
period for pending andfuture cases. Congress thus validated its prior enactment as interpreted in Lampf, leaving as the only clear target of the
new statute the (by implication) unfair way in which the Court had applied
the prior act to the defendants in the cases that Congress sought to reo442. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 406-07 ("When the Sioux returned to the Court of
Claims following passage of the amendment, they were there in pursuit of judicial
enforcement of a new legal right."); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 9 (1944) ("While
inartistically drawn the Act's purpose and effect seem.., to have been to create a new
obligation of the Government to pay petitioner's claims where no obligation existed
before."); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431-32
(1856).
443. In CherokeeNation Congress acted 13 years, and in Sioux Nation 36 years, after the
priorjudgment in question. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 384-87, 395; Cherokee Nation v.
United States, 270 U.S. 476, 477-78 (1926).
444. See WheelingBridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431-32.
445. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 389, 397-98.
446. See supra note 440.
447. See, e.g., Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 392 & n.22. Although relevant, Congress's
waiver of resjudicata or the court's ability to ignore the waiver is not decisive. Compare id.
at 396-97, with id. at 432-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing over Article III
implications of the act's treatment of a prior decision, but agreeing that Congress's waiver
of res judicata was not decisive and omitting mention of the court's discretion to ignore
the waiver). Thus, if Congress conveys the message that it is waiving resjudicata to provoke
reconsideration of a mistaken final decision, Article III may bar the suit's reopening
though there is no judicial economy or similar objection to relitigation.
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pen and, evidently, to "reverse." 44 8 The statute's unadorned directive to
"reinstate[ ]" previously final causes of action likewise left no room to
interpret it as withdrawing a party's res judicata defense rather than the
prior decision's finality. 44 9 Perhaps even more clearly indicative than the
Plaut statute of the forbidden message that Congress is exercising a revisory power would be a statute neutralizing a party's victory in a case involving constitutionalfights that Congress has no or only a tenuous power
450
to modify.
Finally, our analysis illuminates the question whether a declaratory
judgment lacking immediate enforceability is impermissibly advisory if it
also lacks res judicata effect.4 51 As just noted, the message of the antireopening decisions is that federal court decisions must remain final and
binding on the parties by operation of the res judicata principle unless
those courts themselves approve a statutory or litigating party's waiver of
that principle that does not impugn the independence, finality, and effectualness of Article III judgments. 45 2 Moreover, as applied in Gordon and
the "defunct territorial court" cases, the effectualness requirement de448. Congress apparently objected to what it saw as Lampfs unfairly retroactive
application to the losing plaintiffs of a new limitations rule different from the one the lower
court consensus previously had established. Given, however, the Court's understanding of
its actions in such cases as supplying the interpretation the law always had deserved (a
contrary lower court consensus notwithstanding), see Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511
U.S. 298, 307, 312 (1994), the new act clearly embodied an unconstitutional "declar[ation]
...that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the court['s prior
decision had] said it was" and that Congress was acting to overturn the erroneous decision.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995). Importantly, the problem in
Plaut was not the statute's retroactivity per se, see id. at 226-27, but how surgically the
statute targeted only the outcomes of cases previously decided under Lampf-while
adopting a different policy for future cases-thus conveying the message that Congress
had, and was exercising, a power to overturn the final, but assertedly "erroneous," Article
III court decision in Lampf
449. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217.
450. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-84
(1982) (plurality opinion) (contrasting decision rules that are "incidental to Congress'
power to define the right that it has created" and decision rules Congress imposes "when
the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation," and concluding that the
latter rules have "[n ] o comparable justification" and make "unwarranted encroachments
upon the judicial power"); infra notes 678-686 and accompanying text.
451. Compare Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 477 (1974) (White, J., concurring)
("there is every reason for not reducing declaratoryjudgments to mere advisory opinions,"
so "a final declaratory judgment entered by a federal court holding . . . conduct . . .
immune on federal constitutional grounds from prosecution under state law should be
accorded resjudicata effect in any later prosecution of that very conduct"), with id. at 470
(majority opinion) (a declaration that a threatened but not yet initiated state prosecution
is unlawful "may have some resjudicata effect [on a later prosecution], though this point is
not free from difficulty" (citation omitted)), and id. at 482 & n.3 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (a federal "declaratory judgment is simply a statement of rights" that "State
authorities may choose to be guided by" (emphasis added)). See generally Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 37, at 96-98, 1275-91 (discussing competing views on the resjudicata
question).
452. See supra notes 403-407, 441-450 and accompanying text.
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mands that Article III courts have an ability to carry theirjudgments into
practical effect, if not through their own direct orders (as under section
25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act), then at least through statutorily mandated
obedience to their judgments by another court with jurisdiction.45 3 The
Declaratory Judgment Act meets this requirement by providing that, in
addition to the declaration, "[f]urther necessary and proper relief...
may be granted" 454 and that federal declarations "shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree."4 55 Insofar as the Court's abstention doctrines keep declaration-issuing federal courts from imposing
"[f]urther necessary and proper relief" through injunctions or contempt
citations against responding state officials, the only means left for the effectual enforcement of the judgment is the Act's obliging of other courts
with jurisdiction to give the declaration "the force and effect of a final...
decree."
Accordingly, a blanket rule adopted ab initio that a type of federal
declaration is unenforceable, either by the issuing court via injunction or
contempt, or by the declaration's res judicata effect on state courts to
which it is presented, would violate not only the Act but also the requirement that "[t] he judicial Power" be powerful. 456 Nor does an Article III
court's after-the-fact ability to accept "waivers" of res judicata on a case-bycase basis-after assuring itself that doing so does not endorse a negative
message about the finality and effectualness of Article III judgments that
other agencies of government dislike-justify a federal court's before-thefact announcement that its judgments are ineffectual as a class.4 57 As the
Supreme Court implied in Samuels v. Mackell, if an Article III court cannot enforce a declaratory judgment against an ongoing state enforcement action by injunction, and is not prepared to insist that its judgment
be given res judicata effect in the state court hearing the enforcement

453. See supra notes 408-424 and accompanying text.
454. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1994).
455. Id. § 2201.
456. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (Article III
"gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them"; "'a
"judicial Power" is one to render dispositivejudgments'" (quoting Easterbrook, supra note
407, at 906)); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) ("attributes" of the
judicial "power . . . can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative");
Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (decided 1864, reported 1885) (Article III
court judgments may not be "inoperative and nugatory"); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329 (1816) (judiciary's central role is "to expound and enforce
[federal law, and] ... to carry into effect.., the express provisions of the constitution"
(emphasis added)); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725
F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (KennedyJ.) ("[Tihe essential, constitutional role
of the judiciary... [requires] both the appearance and the reality of control by Article III
judges over the interpretation, declaration, and application of federal law.").
457. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 526-27 (suggesting distinction between
Article III decisions that are advisory from the start or only become, ex post, advisory).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:696

action, it must decline to exercise what, by the Article III court's own
458
definition ab initio, does not constitute "[t] he judicial Power."
2. No Advising of, or Revising by, a State Court: Murdock, Martin,
Osborn, Cohens, and Ableman. - Although rarely grouped together, a
number of well-known Supreme Court cases bar federal courts from advising and being revised by state courts, paralleling the more famous set
of decisions barring advising and being revised by other federal branches.
As we develop in this section, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 459 Martin v.
0
Hunter's Lessee,415
and Osborn v. Bank of United States46 ' bar direct federal
court advising of state courts, either (1) through federal question opinions on appeal of state judgments that rest comfortably on state law, regardless of whether the state court correctly analyzed any federal issues it
discussed, or (2) by providing interpretive advice on federal law without a
power to apply the law to the facts to decide the case. Martin and Cohens
v. Virginia4 62 also bar implicit advising of state courts, holding that the
Supremacy Clause and Article III not only permit Congress to subject
state court judgments to federal appeals, but also assure federal courts
the capacity to effectuate their (thus nonadvisory) appellate judgments, including by commandeering state courts to execute federal judicial mandates. Finally, to keep state courts from revising federal judgments,
Martin requires state courts subject to federal appeal to enforce federal
mandates they believe are wrong, and Ableman v. Booth4 63 forbids state
courts to subject federal decisions to appellate review of any sort.
a. No Direct Advising: Murdock, Martin, and Osborn. - In Murdock
and (particularly) its progeny, the Supreme Court established that, even
when a statute gives the Court appellate jurisdiction to review federal
questions adjudicated in final state court proceedings, Article III forbids
the Court to do so if an independent state ground of decision supports
the state courtjudgment, thus depriving an appellate opinion on the federal question of any practical effect on the parties. 464 Tracking the
458. 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (federal court must abstain from declaratoryjudgment on
the legality of ongoing state prosecution, given declaration's "practical impact" on state
proceedings: " 'I[f] the declaration... [is] resjudicata,so that the [state court] cannot...
decide.., for itself... the federal court has virtually lifted the case out of the State [court]
before it could be heard. If not, the federal judgment serves no useful purpose as a final
determination of rights.'" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also David L. Shapiro,
State Courts and Federal DeclaratoryJudgments, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 759, 764 (1979) ("The
very purpose of the declaratory judgment proceeding would appear to be thwarted were
this determination to be regarded, in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties,
as no more than the view of a coordinate court.").
459. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
460. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
461. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
462. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
463. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
464. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 636 (dicta) (although a federal act purports to give
the Courtjurisdiction over a federal issue arising in a state case and to require the Court to
"examine the judgment so far as to enable it to decide whether this [federal] claim... was
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Convention's rejection of the limited "arising under" jurisdiction in the
courts
NewJersey Plan, 4 65 Murdock thus forbids Congress to order4 federal
66
to give state courts advice on the meaning of federal law.
The anti-advising principle supported expansive interpretations of
federal "arising under" jurisdiction in Martin and Osborn. In Martin, the
Supreme Court had earlier concluded that a Virginia Court of Appeals
decision awarding property to Hunter's lessee instead of Fairfax's heir
violated 1783 and 1794 treaties with England securing then-existing property rights of English citizens. 467 Reversing the Virginia court's conclusion that Fairfax lacked treaty protection because his title had lapsed
before the 1783 treaty was made, the Court's prior decision had held that
(1) the Court's appellate "arising under" jurisdiction brought before it
the question whether Fairfax retained title as of 1783 under general legal
principles as applied to the facts of the case, because that question was
necessarily preliminary to the federal question of the treaty rights of
Fairfax's heir, and (2) Fairfax had title as of 1783.468 On remand, the
Virginia Court of Appeals refused to obey the Supreme Court's mandate,
concluding, inter alia, that Article III's "arising under" clause gave the
Court no authority to determine any issue-including whether, on the
facts of the case, Fairfax retained "title" as of 1783-that did not itself
constitute what we today would call a "pure" question of federal law deof the words of a federal
pending entirely on the proper construction
4 69
provision.
treaty
or
statutory,
constitutional,
correctly adjudicated by the State court," the Court should deny the appeal if "there is any
other matter.., adjudged by the State court, which is sufficiently broad to maintain the
judgment of that court, notwithstanding ... error in deciding the issue raised by the
Federal question"). The Court now seems to treat Murdock's dictum as a jurisdictional
requirement of Article III, not merely a prudential or statutory concern, thus demanding
threshold consideration whether an adequate state ground is present and, if so, dismissal
of the suit without reaching the federal merits. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75
(1985); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917);
Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 366 (1893); decisions cited supra note 399.
465. See supra notes 80, 137, 139, 201, 222, 250-252 and accompanying text.
466. Likewise, only state law issues were raised in one of the "defunct territorial court"
cases, so the "advice" the Court refused to give through the medium of an unenforceable
judgment would have run mainly to state courts. See McNulty v. Batty, 51 U.S. (10 How.)
72, 79 (1850); supra notes 401, 417 and accompanying text. The Court cannot always tell
whether a state decision can rest entirely on state law, and the Court's response to
ambiguities in this regard has vacillated. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 526-27,
538-44. Our analysis suggests that an Article III court should not decide federal issues in
state cases when there is so much ambiguity as to whether a federal decision would affect
the outcome that deciding the case would project the message that the federal court is
undertaking merely to advise the state court on the federal issue.
467. See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 626-28 (1813).
468. See id. at 627; cf. id. at 632 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority
on point (1) because "otherwise, an appeal to this court would be worse than nugatory,"
but dissenting on point (2)).
469. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 49-50 (1814).
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On appeal to enforce the Court's prior judgment, it reaffirmed its
jurisdiction to decide the "title" question. Although Justice Story's analysis focused on the 1789Judiciary Act's grant ofjurisdiction over "'a suit,"'
his analysis applies no less clearly to Article III's confinement of the
judicial power to "cases or controversies." Story based his conclusion on
an "advisory opinion" point following directly from the Framers' rejection
of the Pinckney and New Jersey proposals to limit federal question jurisdiction to "pure" federal questions: 4 70 If the Court could only address
the pure question of a federal legal provision's abstract meaning, but
could not decide what we today might call the "mixed" question of how
that meaning emerges from the provision's application to the facts of the
case or interaction with state law questions, it would lack the independence,
finality, and effectualness needed to "decide" the "whole suit," dependent
as the Court would be on a state court's ability to determine the actual
effect of the Court's interpretation in the actual circumstances of the
case:
[T]he case for which the [1789 Act] provides a remedy by writ
of error... [is] a suit where is drawn in question the construction of a treaty, and the decision is against the title set up by the
party. It is, therefore, the decision against the title set up with
reference to the treaty, and not the mere abstract construction of the
treaty itself, upon which the statute intends to found the appellate jurisdiction. How, indeed, can it be possible to decide,
whether a title be within the protection of a treaty, until it is
ascertained what that title is, and whether it have a legal validity?
*

. .

[E] vely error that immediately respects that question [of the

treaty's protection of the tide] must, of course, be within the
cognizance of the court. 471
ChiefJustice Marshall expressed the same "whole case" conclusion in
Osborn, finding constitutional a grant of "arising under" jurisdiction to
lower federal courts that effectively withdrew an important class of cases
from state courts and, as the Court noted, set the outer limits of its own
"arising under" jurisdiction on appeal of state decisions. 472 At issue was
an act granting original federal jurisdiction over all suits by the Bank of
470. See supra notes 80, 137, 139, 201, 222, 250-252 and accompanying text.
471. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 358-59 (1816) (emphasis
added). Justice Johnson agreed:
The tide may exist, notwithstanding the decision of the State Courts to the
contrary; and in that case, the party is entitled to the benefits intended to be
secured by the treaty. The decision to his prejudice may have been the result of
those very errors, partialities, or defects, in state jurisprudence against which the
constitution intended to protect the individual. And if the contrary doctrine be
assumed, what is the consequence? This court may then be called upon to decide
on a mere hypothetical case-to give a construction to a treaty without first
deciding whether there was any interest on which that treaty, whatever be its
proper construction, would operate.
Id. at 369-70 (Johnson, J., concurring).
472. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821 (1824).
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the United States, even when all issues raised "depend on the general
principles of the law, not on any act of Congress" or other federal provision. 473 As an uncontroversial step towards what remains today the controversial conclusion that Congress could do so, Marshall said that
Congress could not limit a federal court's "arising under" jurisdiction to
merely declaring the abstract meaning of relevant federal constitutional,
statutory, and treaty provisions, else federal court decisions would be rendered unconstitutionally ineffectual and advisory.
Marshall noted that forbidding consideration of the federal legal
provision's actual effect in the circumstance of the case would undermine
the federal judicial power in one of two ways. It would denigrate federal
question jurisdiction to the minuscule category of cases that could be finally and effectually resolved based entirely on "pure" questions of federal law. Or it would force Article III courts to reach judgments lacking
the constitutionally necessary "[ ]secure" effect on the outcome of the
case-thus letting state courts control the actual force, and risk the
supremacy, even as federal courts controlled the "construction," of federal law. Thus, if every case that did not itself require the interpretation
of federal law automatically were
withdrawn... from the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, almost
every case . .. would be withdrawn; and [the "arising under"]
clause in the constitution, relating to a subject of vital importance to the government, and expressed in the most comprehensive terms, would be construed to mean almost nothing.
If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the...
right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of
the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by
the opposite construction, provided the facts necessary to support the action be made out, then all the other questions must be
decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction....
On the opposite construction, the judicial power never can be
extended to a whole case, as expressed by the constitution, but to
those parts of cases only which present the particular question
involving the construction of the constitution or the law...
[A]nd words obviously intended to secure... rights under the
constitution, laws or treaties of the United States... will be restricted to the insecure remedy of an appeal, upon an insulated
point, after it has received that shape which may be given to it by
another tribunal. 47 4
b. No Implicit Advising: Martin and Cohens. - Anti-advising and related issues arose in another guise in Martin. On remand from the
473. Id. at 819.
474. Id. at 819-20, 822-23 (emphasis added); accord Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at
357 (if section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act is limited to federal appellate review of pure
legal determinations, "it will be wholly inadequate for the purposes which it professes to
have in view, and may be evaded at pleasure").
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Supreme Court's initial decision, the Virginia Court of Appeals reached
three conclusions, each suggesting an alternative limitation on the federal judicial power: (1) The Constitution gives the Supreme Court no
power to review final state court decisions. 4 75 (2) Whatever power the
Court may have over state cases, the Constitution gives it no power to
force state courts (in today's lingo, to "commandeer" them) to effectuate
the Court's mandate, hence "obedience to its mandate [may] be [and
was] declined." 47 6 Or (3) the Court's decision was legally erroneous because it reached a question (the "title" issue) beyond the Court's competence 477-- a conclusion adding nothing to the others unless the Virginia
court thought the federal judicial power could operate on state cases or
courts only insofar as the state courts found the federal appellate court's
opinion convincing or correct. Conclusions (1) and (2) (discussed in
this section) effectively denied federal courts the power to render any but
advisory opinions on review of state decisions; conclusion (3) (discussed
in the next section) invested state courts with a power to revise federal
court appellate decisions by declining to enforce any that the state courts
found unpersuasive.
One might have expected the Virginia court-as did the lawyers defending it in the Supreme Court-to premise its three conclusions on the
redundancy and insult of federal appellate review, given the oath its
members took and their Supremacy Clause duty to enforce federal law.478
The Virginia judges relied instead on a different premise, one that even
their closest ally on the Court found "alarming,"4 79 though it derived a
certain logic from the constitutional history we set out above. Although
conceding that they were bound as "individuals, in their individual capacities," to follow federal law, the Virginia judges claimed they were not
bound as a court of a different sovereign, hence their decisions as a court
could not be subjected to review by another sovereign's court, nor could
they be compelled as a court to act as the mechanism through which
475. See Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 58 (1814) ("the appellate power of the
Supreme Court of the United States, does not extend to this court, under a sound
construction of the constitution of the United States").
476. Id. at 59; see id. at 9 ("nothing in the constitution... gives to the Federal Courts
any . . .claim to prevent or redress, by any procedure acting on the state Courts, an ...
encroachment on the Federal jurisdiction").
477. See id. at 49-50, 59.

478. Compare Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 346-47 (discussing argument of counsel;

quoted infra note 656), with id. at 347 (Justice Story's response: although "the judges of
the state courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity and wisdom, as those
of the courts of the United States ....the constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its
own'-"that state attachments ...and.., interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control
...the regular administration ofjustice," and that in "cases arising under the constitution,

laws and treaties of the United States ...reasons of a higher and more extensive nature,
touching on the safety, peace and sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of
[final federal appellate] .. .jurisdiction").
479. Id. at 364-65 (Johnson, J., concurring).
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another sovereign enforced its law-unless they were sufficiently per480
suaded by the other court's opinion to adopt it voluntarily.
The Virginia judges thus declined to fall willingly into the double
trap the Supremacy Clause had laid for them by (1) creating a rationale
for subjecting their formal decisions of federal law to review by federal
courts and (2) forcing them, in a structurally novel fashion, to divide
their loyalties between the sovereign that employed them and a supreme
national sovereign:
If this Court should now proceed to enter a judgment in this
case, according to the instructions of the Supreme Court, the
Judges of this Court... must act either as Federal or as State
Judges. But we cannot be made Federal Judges without our consent, and without commissions... [which are] wanting .... We
must, then, in obeying this mandate, be considered still as State
Judges. We are required, as State Judges to enter up a judgment, not our own, but dictated and prescribed to us by another
Court ....
But, before one Court can dictate to another, the
judgment it shall pronounce, it must bear, to that other, the relation of an appellate Court. The term appellate, however, necessarily includes the idea of superiority. But one Court cannot be
correctly said to be superiorto another, unless both of them belong to the same sovereignty. . . . The Courts of the United
States, therefore, belonging to one sovereignty, cannot be appellate Courts in relation to the State Courts, which belong to a
different sovereignty-and of course,
their commands or in48
structions impose no obligation. '
We discuss below the Supreme Court's reasons for rejecting the
Virginia court's first conclusion, that there is no federal judicial power to
review state decisions. 482 Martin formally avoided the Virginia court's second conclusion, that the Court could not force state courts to enforce its
judgments, by taking the 1789 Judiciary Act's invitation, when a state
court rejected its prior mandate, to issue its own judgment directly
against the private parties to the suit.483 The Court refused, however, to
"assent" to the Virginia court's underlying premise that the Constitution
"was never designed to act upon state sovereignties . . . and that if the
power exists, it will materially impair the sovereignty of the states, and the
independence of their courts." 48 4 The Court thought it "obvious that
th[e Supremacy Clause] obligation is imperative upon the state judges in
their official, and not merely in their private, capacities" and that "l[t] hey
were not to decide merely according to the laws or constitution of the
state, but according to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
480. Hunter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) at 8-12.
481. Id. at 12.
482. See infra notes 488-498, 654-673 and accompanying text.
483. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 354 (1816) (applying Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 86); supra note 418 and accompanying text.
484. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 343.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:696

States-'the supreme law of the land." 48 5 State judges thus could not
avoid the trap "the American people, by whom [the Constitution] was
adopted," had set for them. 4 86 Because "the constitution ... meant to
provide for cases within the scope of the judicial power of the United
States, which might... depend before state tribunals," and because of
those judges' "imperative [obligation] ...to decide ...according to the

constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, '487 there was no escaping that,
[i]n respect to the powers granted to the United States, [State
judges] are not independent; they are expressly bound to obedience, by the letter of the constitution; and if they should unintentionally transcend their authority, or misconstrue the
constitution, there is no ...reason for giving theirjudgments an
absolute and irresistible force ....488

Cohens v. Virginia489 formally decided the issue Martin avoided. The
Cohens appealed Virginia antigaming convictions, claiming federal statutory authority to sell District of Columbia lottery tickets in Virginia. Because the Court could enforce an order reversing criminal convictions
only through the state courts, Virginia again claimed that the Court
lacked "power to compel State tribunals to obey your decisions" and,
thus, lacked a crucial component of the judicial power absent which it
could not constitutionally take jurisdiction. 490 In affirming Congress's
power to command state courts to enforce the Court's mandate, Chief
Justice Marshall cited the Supremacy Clause's "authoritative" "subordination" of state courts to national authority. 49 1 Under that Clause, the
Court was not "[a]t liberty to insert in [Article III's] general grant [of
appellate 'arising under' jurisdiction], an exception of those cases in
which a State may be a party."492 Rather, to avoid "prostrat[ing] ... the
government and its laws at the feet of every State ... the Courts of the

Union" had to have an efficacious power to "correct the judgments by
which [state criminal] penalties may be enforced" inconsistently with national lav. 493 The supremacy and "arising under" clauses thus empowered Congress to force state courts to "transfer [the] ...record into" and
"submit [their] judgment[s] . . . to re-examination" by the Court, and
485. Id. at 340-41.

486. Id. at 347.
487. Id. at 340-41, 342.
488. Id. at 340-42, 344.
489. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).

490. Id. at 317 (argument of counsel for Virginia) ("you have not the power to
compel State tribunals to obey your decisions" and thus may not exercise the "[(j]udicial
power, [which] includes power to decide, and power to enforce the decision"); see supra
notes 408-424 and accompanying text.
491. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 381-82.
492. Id. at 382-83.
493. Id. at 385; see id. at 388 (it would not suffice "to give efficacy to the present
system" to require the Court "to act on individuals directly, instead of acting through the
instrumentality of State governments").
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required that the judicial "department" have effective "power to revise
the judgment[s]" by binding state courts to execute the Court's
4 94
mandates.
Although resisting Virginia's hyperbole that "[t]he American people
[could not] give to a national tribunal a supervising power over those
judgments of the State Courts, which may conflict with [national law] ...

without converting them into federal Courts," Marshall acknowledged
the intermediate or "'auxiliar[y]'" status the Supremacy Clause gives
state courts.4 95 He justified that status as central to what we here have
called the Convention's "state court filtering/federal court spotchecking" compromise. In lieu of "'[a] complete consolidation of the
States, so far as respects the judicial power,'"496 and so that "'the local
courts [not] be excluded from a concurrent jurisdiction in matters of
national concern"' by exclusive federal jurisdiction, the Framers gave the
state courts original cognizance of many such matters.4 97 But to preserve
national prerogatives, the Constitution "'extend[ed the national
judiciary's appellate power] to the State tribunals"' in an effectual, if limited, way-"authoriz[ing] the legislature to confer on the federal Courts
appellate jurisdiction from the State Courts... in a few specified cases in
4 98
the decision of which the nation takes an interest."
In Pfrintz v. United States, the Court recently affirmed state courts' susceptibility to congressional commandeering for national purposes-noting that the Supremacy Clause commandeers them for the same purpose-while strictly forbidding Congress to commandeer state legislative
and executive officials. 499 The Court was not being inconsistent nor
drawing into question its established rule that Congress may use state
courts for national purposes. 500 Instead, it was strongly affirming the
Virginia court's complaint in Martin that such commandeering
compromises state officials by situating them simultaneously in both state
and federal governments 5 0 1 -while also affirming Martin's conclusion
that the Constitution itself gives state judges that hybrid status, in service
of their designedly crucial national structural function.
c. No Revising: Martin and Ableman. - Martin also rejected the
Virginia Court of Appeals' third conclusion-that state courts need only
enforce the Court's judgment if they find it legally persuasive. Story's
opinion makes clear that state courts, like other non-Article III agencies
of government, lack authority thus to "revise" the Court's judgments or to
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.

Id. at 410, 415; see id. at 413-15.
Id. at 419, 421 (quoting The Federalist No. 82, supra note 298, at 460).
Id. at 422 (quoting argument of counsel for Virginia, id. at 320).
Id. at 419 (quoting The Federalist No. 82, supra note 298, at 460).
Id. at 419, 422 (quoting The Federalist No. 82, supra note 298, at 460).
117 S. Ct. 2365, 2371, 2381 (1997).
See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389-92 (1947).
See Printz,117 S. Ct. at 2370-72; Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 12 (1814).
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provoke the Court to "reopen" its own judgments by refusing to enforce
them when they are not found persuasive:
[I] t is contended that [as] the formerjudgment of this court...
was pronounced by an incompetent jurisdiction, it was utterly
void, and cannot be a sufficient foundation to sustain any subsequent proceedings.... [A] second writ of error has never been
supposed to draw in question the propriety of the first judgment, and it is difficult to perceive how such a proceeding could be
sustained, upon principle. A final judgment of this court is ...
conclusive upon the rights which it decides, and no statute has pro-

vided any process
by which this court can revise its own
50 2
judgments.
Justice Johnson agreed. Begging "a little more moderation" of the
Virginia high court, 50 3 he characterized its statement that the case was
"coram nonjudice, in relation to this court '5 0 4 as
assuming a truly alarming latitude ofjudicial power. Where is it
to end? . . . Are, then, the judgments of this court to be reviewed in every court of the Union? ...

We pretend not to more infallibility than other courts composed of the same frail materials .... But... we are constituted
by the voice of the Union, and when decisions take place ...
ours is the
superior claim upon the comity of the state
5 05
tribunals.
To effectuate its anti-revising views, the Court went beyond (1) substituting its own directly effective judgment for the one its prior mandate
had unsuccessfully ordered the state high court to enter. In addition, it
(2) granted a new writ of error, (3) declared the Virginia high court's
decision on remand in error, and (4) explicitly undertook by its judgment to "reverse" that decision. 50 6 Because the 1789 Act only authorized
(and petitioning counsel only requested) the first step,5 0 7 something
more-evidently, the constitutionalpolicy against a state court's revision of
an Article III court's judgment-drove the Court's additional steps of reviewing and reversing a state court decision that was the revisory
"equivalent to a perpetual stay of proceedings upon the [Court's] man50 8
date, and a perpetual denial of all the rights acquired under it."

Understanding Martin this way makes sense of another case marking
a flashpoint of federalism, Ableman v. Booth.50 9 Ableman has been triply
5 10
damned by association-with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (FSA),

502. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 354-55 (1816) (emphasis

added).
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

Id. at 364 (Johnson, J., concurring).
Hunter, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) at 59.
Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 364-65 (Johnson, J., concurring).
See id. at 353-54, 362.
See id. at 315 (argument of counsel); supra note 375.
Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 353-54.
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
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whose constitutionality it declared in dicta;51 1 with its author, Chief
Justice Taney, in his Dred Scott phase;5 12 and with the excesses of Tarble's
Case,5 13 through which many readers are introduced to Ableman. 5 14 The
case bears reexamination.
Ableman jointly decided two cases involving three federal actors in
whose business the Wisconsin Supreme Court had interfered-a federal
commissioner (similar to a modern federal magistrate judge), a federal
district judge, and the United States Supreme Court. In the first case,
Booth aided and abetted a fugitive slave's escape from federal custody.
Finding probable cause that Booth had violated the FSA, a federal commissioner ordered Booth arrested. While in federal marshal Ableman's
custody, Booth persuaded the Wisconsin Supreme Court to release him
on habeas because he was being held under an unconstitutional act and a
defective warrant. The United States Supreme Court issued a writ of error directing the Wisconsin high court to send up its record for review,
5 15
and that court complied.
In the second case, a federal grand jury thereafter indicted and a
federal jury convicted Booth under the FSA, and the presiding district
judge overruled Booth's constitutional objections and imposed a jail
term. Booth again convinced the Wisconsin Supreme Court to release
him from federal custody on habeas because the act under which he was
convicted was unconstitutional, depriving the federal court ofjurisdiction
and rendering Booth's conviction and incarceration illegal. Following
the Government's request for and the United States Supreme Court's issuance of a writ of error to send up the record, the Wisconsin court forbade its clerk to respond. Granting the Government's motion to proceed
on a certified copy of the record, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment "in each of the cases now before the Court," holding that in both
the Wisconsin court had unconstitutionally interfered with federal officials' execution of federal law. 516
Ableman's difficulty lies in the plural nature of the federal officialdom with which the Wisconsin high court interfered (a non-Article III
commissioner and an Article III district court and Supreme Court) and
the federal authorizations that its actions lacked (statutory and constitutional). The decision thus might mean that a state court may never constitutionally interfere with the official acts of any federal officer, judicial
or otherwise (the approach taken in Tarble's Case);517 that a state court
may constitutionally interfere with the acts of a federal officer, judicial or
not, unless Congress forbids the interference, which it impliedly had
511. See Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 526.
512. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

513. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
514.
515.
516.
517.

See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 459.
See Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 507-09.
Id. at 526.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 412.
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done in Ableman (a theory sometimes used to tame Tarble's);5 18 or that it
depends on the kind of federal acts at issue. Taney's opinion strongly
suggests the last interpretation-that the only question before the Court
was state court interference with the judiciary's power to enforce the national law, and that the answer followed from the anti-revising principle,
which forbids all state court interference with exercises of the judicial
power, whether or not authorized by Congress.
In the unified history of the two conjoined cases, Taney discerned a
single proposition towards which the Wisconsin Supreme Court had advanced in steps-a proposition "new in the jurisprudence of the United
States," namely,
the supremacy of the State courts over the courts [note the plural] of the United States, in cases arising under the Constitution
and laws of the United States ....
The supremacy is not, indeed, set forth distinctly and
broadly, in so many words, in the printed opinions of the
judges.... But the paramount power of the State court lies at
the foundation of these decisions; for their commentaries ...
were out of place, and their judicial action upon them without
authority of law, unless they had the power to revise and control
the proceedings in the criminal case of which they were speak19
ing .... 5
In its first step, the Wisconsin high court had "claimed... the right
to supervise and annul the proceedings of a commissioner of the United
States, and to discharge a prisoner... [held] for an offence against the
laws of this Government."520 Taney's emphasis on the criminal nature of
the proceeding explains why the commissioner's non-Article III status was
unimportant: The single object of the commissioner's acts as to "a prisoner ... committed for [a federal] offence" was a criminal trial before an
Article JIljudge with exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 5 21 "In the second case, the State court [went] a step further, and claimed... jurisdiction over the proceedings.., of a District Court of the United States, and
522
...by habeas corpus, has set aside and annulled its judgment .... ,,
Then, in its final step, the Wisconsin court "determined that [its] decision is final and conclusive on all the courts of the United States, and...
refuse [d] obedience to the writ of error issued by this court, pursuant to
the act of Congress of 1789, to bring here for examination and revision
5 23
the judgment of the State court."
Ableman rejected the Wisconsin court's assertion of "the supremacy
of the State courts over the courts of the United States" because: (1) the
518. See Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 515-16; Sager, supra note 17, at 81.
519. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 514; see id. at 513 (explaining why the Court
thought it appropriate to address both cases together).
520. Id. at 513.
521. Id. at 515; see id. at 513.
522. Id. at 513-14 (first emphasis added).
523. Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
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"Government" must be able to "enforc [e] its laws by its own tribunals...
without the consent of the State"; (2) "any defect of power in the commissioner, or in his mode of proceeding . . . was for the tribunals of the
United States to revise ... and not for a State court"; and (3) "the District
Court ... had exclusive and final jurisdiction by the laws of the United
States, and neither the regularity of its proceedings nor the validity of its
sentence could be called into question in any ... court.., of a State...
524
by habeas corpus or any other proceeding."
Taney's explanation for this strong anti-revising rule reveals its constitutional status and immunity from statutory modification. The need
"to secure union and harmony at home"-to keep "local interests, local
passions or prejudices... [from] lead[ing] to acts of aggression and injustice by one State upon the rights of another"-led the States to cede
some of their sovereignty to a "General Government."525 Doing so enabled the national government to serve as "a common arbiter between
[the states], armed with power enough to protect and guard the rights of
all, by appropriate laws" that were to be "execute[d] ... by [the national
government's] own tribunals, without interruption from a State or from
State authorities."15 26 The Supremacy Clause was central to the plan.
"But the supremacy ... could not peacefully be maintained, unless it was
clothed with judicial power, equally paramount in authority to carry it
into execution .
*...
"527 That duty could not be "left to the courts of
justice of the several States ... [which] could hardly be expected to be
always free from the local influences of which we have spoken," making it
"essential" to the Government's
very existence ... that it should have the power of establishing
courts ofjustice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into
effect its own laws; and that a tribunal should be established in
which all cases which might arise under [federal law] ... should
be finally and conclusively decided.... [T] he supremacy, (which
is but another name for independence,) so carefully provided in
the clause of the Constitution above referred to, could not possi-

524. Id. at 515, 525-26 (emphasis added); see also Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408, 412-13 (1964) (discussing "old and well-established . . . rule that state courts are
completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions").
Because the Wisconsin court had held that the federal court lacked "jurisdiction" to try
Booth because the statute under which he was being tried was unconstitutional, see In re

Booth, 3 Wis. 157, 211-16 (1855), Ableman's conclusion that the state court had no
authority to reach the FSA's constitutionality after the federal district court had decided
it-which the Court careftlly set off from its concedediy "unnecessary" additional
conclusion that the state court's resolution of that question was wrong, Ableman, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) at 526-seems to bar state court review to determine if a federal judgment is
void, as well as merely voidable.
525. Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 517.
526. Id.
527. Id.
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bly be maintained peacefully,
unless it was associated with this
528

paramountjudicial authority.

Taney gave other evidence of a constitutional basis for the anti-revising rule that immunizes the rule from waiver by Congress. First, Taney
concluded that the independence- and prestige-protecting reasons that
dictated the rule were the same reasons why the Convention had "not left
[it] to Congress to create" the Supreme Court-namely, (1) that "the
States could hardly be expected to confide in the impartiality of a tribunal created exclusively by [the] General Government" and (2) that the
Court's decisions might "conflict with individual ambition or interests,
and powerful political combinations," causing Congress, e.g., at the behest of particular states, to "repeal[ ]" the act creating the Court "in order
'5 29
to establish another more subservient to the ... passions of the day.
Moreover, Taney took the position that the mandate to "'make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper to carry [the Supremacy Clause] into
execution' ... [made it] the duty of Congress" to adopt "the 25th section of
the act of 1789," providing for Supreme Court appeals in "arising under"
cases in which state courts ruled against federal rights and permitting the
Court to "award execution" when a state court refused to do so. 53 0 Only
in this way could Congress "make th [e federal] appellate power effectual,
5 31
and altogether independent of the action of State tribunals."
Thus, none of the three ways in which the Wisconsin court had "obstruct[ed]" the "General Government['s] ... tribunals" that are "clothed
with the judicial power" would seem to be within Congress's power to
permit:
It has not only [1] reversed and annulled the judgment of the
District Court of the United States, but it has [2] reversed and
annulled the [supremacy and judiciary] provisions of the
Constitution itself; and the act of Congress of 1789, and [3]
made the superior
and appellate tribunal the inferior and
532
subordinate one.

This analysis reveals how badly Tarble's Case mangled Ableman's
rule-not by affirming the rule's constitutional status but by assuming
that the rule governs state court interference with exercises of federal
power besides "[t]he judicial Power."53 3 Tarble's Case notwithstanding,
the Supremacy Clause does not stop Congress from allowing state courts
to restrain federal official acts found to be unlawful-indeed, the Clause
528. Id. at 517-18 (some emphasis added).
529. Id. at 521.
530. Id. at 521-22 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added).
531. Id. (emphasis added).

532. Id. at 522-23 (emphasis added); see id. at 515-17 (Wisconsin court violated
Constitution when it undertook to "revise and correct" a federal district court judgment,
"refuse[d] obedience to the writ of error, and regard[ed] its own judgment as final").
533. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 403-07, 411-12 (1872) (barring state
court interference with military officer's induction of allegedly under-aged civilian into

Army).
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may require state court consideration if no federal court is available to
restrain federal action offensive to federal law.5 34 The rule changes, however, when the federal action is an Article Iff court's decision-or even the
formal triggering of that decisional process, as when a federal commissioner initiates criminal proceedings. In that situation, Article III's protection of the independence, finality, and effectualness ingredients of the
judicial power, bolstered by the federal courts' supremacy-maintaining
duties vis-a.-vis state judges, creates a constitutionalprohibition, evidently
beyond Congress's power to alter, against state court interference with or
53 5
revision of the federal court's judgment.
Martin and Ableman thus appear to keep Congress from inviting state
courts to do what cases from Hayburn's to Plautkeep Congress from doing itself. As Justice Scalia broadly stated in Plaut, Article III gives "the
Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide
them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III
5 6
hierarchy."
d. SeparationofPowers/FederalismParallels. - Focusing on the constitutionally protected quality, not quantity, of federal judicial decisionmaking not only identifies the unitary principle binding the disparate strands
of the anti-advising and anti-revising doctrine-protection of the "independence," "finality," "effectualness," and "reason, not will" ingredients
of "[t] he judicial Power"-but also reveals that a doctrine traditionally
understood in separation of powers terms extends as well to the federal534. See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 463; Laurence Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 513-14 (2d ed. 1988); Sager, supra note 17, at 41 n.70.
535. Compare Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976) (Congress may
'affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation'" by the states
(quoting Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-48 (1943))), with Second Employers
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 58 (1912) ("[Als was so clearly shown... [by] Ableman v. Booth,
... the state courts have no power to revise the action of the Federal courts, nor the
Federal the state, except where the Federal Constitution or laws are involved."). See
generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 462 (prior to Tarble's Case, courts read
Ableman only to bar state court interference with "actual federal judicial process"). As we
read Ablean, Congress could permissibly authorize state courts to determine the legality
of federal executive detention, with the absence of any such authorization explaining
Tarble's holding (but not its language). Indeed, a careful review of the standard history of
the subject reveals (1) that most pre-Ableman uses of the state writ on behalf of federal
prisoners involved executive (usually military) detention, and (2) that unlike the state writ's
generally uncontroversial use against executive detention, its infrequent use to interfere
with federal judicial detention "caused considerable excitement" and opposition well
before Ableman. Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
345, 353-59 (1930).
536. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (some emphasis
added). Subject to the Supreme Court's constitutional superiority, the "Article III
hierarchy" to which Plaut refers is defined by Congress exercising its power to ordain and
establish inferior courts. That Congress has empowered federal district courts (e.g., in the
district of a prisoner's confinement) to review the judgments of other such courts (e.g., the
one that sentenced the prisoner) in federal-prisoner habeas proceedings, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(d) (1994), thus is not offensive to the Plaut rule.
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ism context, where, indeed, it gains additional force from the Supremacy
Clause. Paralleling nearly every strand of separation-of-powers-focused
anti-advising and anti-revising doctrine are federalism-focused strands forbidding Article III court judgments that only serve to advise state courts
because they: (1) have no practical effect on the outcome (the "adequate
and independent state ground" cases); (2) do not decide the "whole
case" but only a component of it, giving state courts effective control over
the force and supremacy of federal law (decisions refusing to limit "arising under" jurisdiction to "pure" questions of law); (3) cannot be enforced effectually ("defunct territorial court" cases; Cohens' and Ableman's
insistence that state courts obey federal mandates and writs); or (4) are
subjected to purported state court revision or reopening (Martin and
Ableman).
C. The Whole Case and the Whole Law: JudicialReview Reconsidered
In this section we show that a qualitative understanding of "[t]he
Judicial Power" also helps make sense of-and uncovers important unifying principles that link-a number of classic decisions on the availability
ofjudicial review of (1) federal law and federal administrative decisions
and (2) state law and state judicial decisions.
1. Denying Deference and the Choice of Law to Federal Decisionmakers:
Hayburn's Case, Marbury, Klein, Crowell, St. Joseph, and Yakus. - In
three lower court statements in 1792-collected in the United States
Reports in Hayburn's Case because they "involve a great constitutional
question"-a substantial portion of the existing federal judiciary joined in
invalidating an act of Congress on anti-revising grounds.5 37 The impertinence of doing so did not go unnoticed by the Justices and judges, who
rued the "painful" task: "To be obliged to act contrary, either to the...
directions of Congress, or to a constitutional principle ...

excited feel-

ings in us, which we hope never to experience again."5 3 8 But despite
their "inclination... [and] duty, to receive with all possible respect every
act of the Legislature," the courts felt "obliged to object to the [statute's]
execution": "[H]owever lamentable a difference in opinion really may
be, or with whatever difficulty we may have formed an opinion, we are
under the indispensablenecessity of acting according to the best dictates of our
own judgment, after duly weighing every consideration ....
Thus, along with the independence, finality, and effectualness powers
that (as we saw earlier) Hayburn's anti-advising holding read the
Constitution to vest in Article IIIjudges540 came three responsibilitiesthat
537. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.t (1792) (collecting statements (one opinion and two
letters) joined by five of the nation's six Supreme Courtjustices, on circuit, and three of its
sixteen inferior federal judges).
538. Id. at 411-12 n.t (reprinting letter of C.C.D. Pa. to President Washington).
539. Id. at 412 n.t (reprinting letter of C.C.D.N.C. to President Washington)
(emphasis added).

540. See supra notes 403-406 and accompanying text.
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those judges were "oblige[d]" to exercise: (1) "acting according to the
best dictates of [their] own judgment," no matter how "difficult[ ]" the
issue; (2) doing so independently of and without deference to the
legislature, notwithstanding (a) the "respect [due] every act of Congress"
and (b) the matter's status as a mere "difference in opinion" on a "difficult[ ]" issue on which reasonable minds could differ; and (3) not just
"object[ing]" on constitutional grounds, but making their opinion final
and effectual by "act[ing] contrary to the direction of congress" in declining "execution" of it.
Now, all this may have a tinny ring to the modem ear, attuned to the
claim that judges live to strike down laws. But, in context, there is no
reason to doubt that ChiefJustice Jay and justices Blair, Cushing, Iredell,
and Wilson felt distress they "hope[d] never to experience again" at disagreeing with the constitutional judgment of Congress and the President
(many Framers among them)-and, worse, at insisting that their "opinion" trump the law, thus depriving disabled veterans, widows, and orphans
of pensions "founded on the purest principles of humanity."5 41 We may,
then, marvel at how strongly the Justices felt the independence, finality,
and effectualness duties that led them to insist on those very same powers,
for which Hayburn's Case stands.
The very same responsibilities more famously compelled exercise of
54 3
the same powers in Marbury v. Madison542 and United States v. Klein.
Moreover, just as Martin and Osborn used Article HI courts' supremacymaintaining obligation to define the "whole case" that those courts must
be able to decide, 544 Marbury and Klein used the same obligation to define the "whole law" based on which the courts must be able to decide.
a. Marbury. - Marbury wanted his commission as justice of the
peace for the county of Washington that the outgoing Secretary of State
had signed and sealed but that the incoming Secretary of State
(Madison) had refused to deliver. As carefully delineated by Chief Justice
Marshall, the Court had to decide (1) whether Marbury had "a right to
the commission"; (2) if so, "do the laws of his country afford him a remedy" for the Secretary's violation of the right; and (3) if so, is that "remedy ... a mandamus issuing from this court?"5 45 The Court held that the
signing and sealing established Marbury's right, 54 6 and that "where there

547
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy."
The decision is mainly famous for its treatment of the third question,
which Marshall immediately divided in two, answering the first half-

541. Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 412 n.t (reprinting letter of C.G.D.N.C. to
President Washington).
542. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
543. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
544. See supra notes 467-474 and accompanying text.
545. Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154.
546. See id. at 154-62.
547. Id. at 163 (citation omitted).
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whether mandamus could lie against a duty-defying executive official, despite the sovereign's immunity from suit-in Marbury's favor.5 48 Coming
to the second half of the third question-" [w]hether [mandamus] can
issue from this court"-Marshall again bifurcated: "[I]f this court is not
authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be
because [1] the law is unconstitutional, and ... [2] [if so, is] absolutely
incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its
words purport to confer and assign." 54 9 Marshall thought the first issue
easy: Article III makes the Court's 'Jurisdiction... original" in only "one
class of cases," mandamus not included, so that section 13 of the 1789
Judiciary Act, which purported to confer original mandamus jurisdiction,
was "not ...warranted by the constitution."55 0 Reaching the remaining
question-"whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become
the law of the land"-Marshall bifurcated yet again: (1) Does "the
constitution control[ ] any legislative act repugnant to it"e-a question
Marshall answered affirmatively based on an argument about the nature
of popularly ratified constitutions.5 51 (2) "If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstandingits invalidity, bind the
courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law,
does it constitute a rule as operative as ifit was a law?"552 Was Congress's or
the Court's view of supreme law "operative" in the case before the Court?
Marshall began the answer to this truly last question with his most
famous passage:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. (Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.) If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the
law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution,
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of
judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to
5 53
which they both apply.
548. See id. at 164-65, 170-71.
549. Id. at 173.
550. Id. at 174-76; cf. supra notes 204, 274 and accompanying text; supra text
following note 222 (discussing support in Convention records for a congressional power to
shift the Supreme Court's original to its appellate jurisdiction).
551. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77.
552. Id. at 177.
553. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
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The first sentence of this passage often is treated as declaring the
Court's interpretive independence from Congress: 5 54 The Court must "say
what the law is," giving it, not Congress, the light to "say" what Article
III's "original jurisdiction" clause means. In fact, what the first sentence
and, indeed, the first two paragraphs say is more mundane: To decide a
case dependent on the law, the court must first "say what the law is," and
if two opposed legal provisions potentially apply, the Court must choose
between them-which Marshall already had done in choosing Article
III's "original jurisdiction" clause over the 1789 Act's section 13. Only
implicitly, therefore, did the Court make the "independent determination" point-by exercising interpretive independence from Congress, thus
rejecting a statutory implication or separation of powers requirement that
the Court defer to Congress's presumed determination that section 13
was constitutional. 555
The question that most troubled Marshall, thus, was not whether the
Court could interpret the governing law independently but, rather, as his
third quoted paragraph asks, whether Congress's adoption of section 13
imposed a choice of law requiring the Court to ignore-to fail to "regard"-the Constitution, leaving only section 13 to qualify as "what the
law is." What troubled Marshall, as he said in his next paragraph, was the
claim by "[t] hose... who controvert the principle that the constitution is
to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, .. . that courts must close
their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law." 55 6 Rejecting this
claim led Marshall to identify a second crucial ingredient of the judicial
power in addition to interpretive independence, namely, the power to
554. See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
555. As Professor Van Alstyne has pointed out:
In Marbury . . . it could perfectly well be said that Congress was merely ...
"defining the content of"[ ] a provision in Article III . .. [by reading it as]
authorizing Congress to place within the Court's original jurisdiction some
additional cases it deems appropriate to so place, excepting them from its
appellate jurisdiction .... [S]uch a reading would not be, in any obvious way,
"unreasonable." And if all that is required is that the Court be able to see "a
reasonable basis" for the reading... Congressprovided, then.., the Court should
have sustained the Judiciary Act provision that did precisely this very thing
(though in its own view that reading of Article III was incorrect). [Instead], the
Court inquired into the constitutional interpretation on which the Judiciary Act
depended for its validity; it took Congress' [s] view into account... disagree[ing]
with that interpretation (such as it was, as made by Congress); and it accordingly
found that Congress had acted without authority ....
Van Alstyne, supra note 441, at 319-20; see Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6, 9 (1983) ("Marbury indicates that the court's
interpretational duty is that of supplying the full meaning of the relevant constitutional
provisions," which "requir[es] independent judgment, not deference, when the decisive
issue turns on the meaning of the constitutional text."); cf. James B. Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 133-36,
154-55 (1893) (separation of powers compels judicial deference to Congress's-but not
state legislatures'-implied constitutional interpretations).
556. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178 (emphasis added).
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apply the whole supreme national law to any case before the Court. The
"province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" thus
is notjust the power and obligation to say what the applicable law means
but to say what law applies-and to apply supreme national law whenever,
as independently interpreted, it governs of its own force. As Professor
Monaghan has written, "[t] here is no half-way position in constitutional
cases; so long as it is directed to decide the case, an article III court cannot be jurisdictionally' shut off from full considerationof the substantive con55 7
stitutionalissues."
Marshall rested this conclusion on four legs. One was the nature of
all written constitutions, which could be "reduce[d] to nothing" if the
legislature could compel their invisibility.55 8 Provisions "peculiar... [to]
the constitution of the United States" provided the other three legs, starting with "[t] he judicial power of the United States" as it "extend [s] to all
cases arising under the constitution." 559 Pursuing his ocular metaphor
and encapsulating the "whole supreme law" principle, Marshall wrote:
Could it be the intention of those who gave this ["arising
under"] power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should
not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution
should be decided without examining the instrument under
which it arises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by
the judges. And if they can open it at all, what parts of it are
560
they forbidden to read, or to obey?
Marshall's last two bases for the Article IIIjudge's duty always to "look[]
to" supreme law were the Oath and Supremacy Clauses. In regard to the
latter, Marshall wrote: "[I] n declaring what shall be the Supreme law of
the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the
United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance
'56
of the constitution, have that rank." '
Having impliedly established the "independent interpretation," and
having expressly established the "whole supreme law," aspects of the
Article III court's "Power" and obligation to "say what the law is," Marshall
concluded his opinion by recognizing a third aspect of the judicial
557. Monaghan, supra note 555, at 11 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Gunther, supra
note 9, at 910; Wechsler, supra note 9, at 1006.
558. Marbuty, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 179.
561. Id. at 180. Unlike others, see Rakove, supra note 26, at 1036; Wechsler, supra
note 303, at 5, we do not find it surprising that Marshall made the Supremacy Clause his
last and weakest argument. The Clause is, manifestly, a choice of law provision making
federal superior to state law-with potent "whole law" implications when state and federal
law conflict. As Marshall noted, however, the Clause only impliedly prioritizes among "the
Constitution... Laws... and... Treaties," making it less potent when the conflict is
between federal law.
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power-namely, the duty once having "read, ... to obey" the Constitution.
Just as the Court declined to read section 13 or separation of powers principles to make it give Article III's "original jurisdiction" clause Congress's
instead of its own interpretation and to make it ignore that clause when
applying the section, it also declined to read section 13 or interbranch
comity to bar it from effectuating governing law as independently interpreted by the Court. Instead, the Court treated the statute found "unconstitutional . . . [as] absolutely incapable of conferring the authority, and
and assign," and
assigning the duties which its words purport to confer
562
statute.
that
under
filed
petition
the
"discharged"
b. Klein. - Although ChiefJustice Chase's unruly analysis in United
States v. Klein 563-the opposite of Marshall's careful architecture of
Marbuy-has obscured Klein's importance, the case is no less definitive
of "[t]he judicial Power" than is Marbury. For in the statute Klein ruled
unconstitutional, the Radical Republicans made explicit very nearly all
the interpretive, "choice of law," and remedial limitations on the Court's
power that Marshall thought might be implied by Congress's adoption of
section 13 and accordingly rejected. Subjecting the Klein statute to our
qualitative analysis not only reveals the decision's importance but also
tames Chase's opinion. We first explain Congress's reasons for wanting
to use, but constrain, the courts. We then describe Congress's "belt and
suspenders" enactment towards that end. Finally, we use the inconsistency between the enactment's four constrictive mechanisms and four
qualitative aspects of the judicial power as the Rosetta Stone for deciphering Chase's opinion.
During the Civil War, Congress passed several acts authorizing the
Government summarily to seize, and to hold in trust, abandoned property encountered by the Union Army in the rebellious states, with individuals permitted to reclaim such property by convincing the Court of
Claims that they (1) owned the property and (2) had not aided the rebellion. 564 In United States v. Padelford, the Supreme Court held that owners
of abandoned and seized property who had aided the rebellion, but who
thereafter had signed a loyalty oath prescribed by certain presidential
proclamations granting blanket pardons to oath signers, also could recover. 5 65 Padelford at points based oath signers' right to recover on the
governing statutes, but elsewhere suggested that it was Article II of the
Constitution that required it to treat presidential pardons as neutralizing
5 66
prior disloyalty.
In the Court of Claims, Klein, administrator of the estate of Wilson,
owner of 600 bales of cotton seized as abandoned at Vicksburg, demon562. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173, 180 (emphasis added).
563. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 369
(Chase's
564.
565.
566.

opinion is "not a model of clarity").
See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 136-37; see id. at 137-38, 142.
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1870).
See id. at 542 (statutory theory); id. at 542-43 (constitutional theory).
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strated Wilson's ownership and postseizure loyalty oath and pardon but
admitted that Wilson had in fact been disloyal. 56 7 Under Padelford, the
Court of Claims ruled in 1871 that the oath neutralized Wilson's disloyalty and awarded $125,300.568 The Government appealed, perhaps hoping to distinguish Padelford in which the presidential pardon had preceded
the seizure (in Klein, the seizure came first).569
Radical Republicans in Congress were "[e]nraged by [Padelford's]
treatment of the pardoned disloyal" and Klein's costly award. 5 70 But they
were in a bind. They had it in for "wealthy [cotton] planters who financed the rebellion but . . . [took] the oath necessary to receive

Lincoln's blanket pardon."5 71 But they also had to satisfy the compensation demands of loyal citizens and their own need to leave compensation
to the courts to avoid being deluged by the flood of private bills that had
prompted Congress's creation of the claims court in the first place.5

72

Congress thus could not (as it had done for the first sixty years of the
Republic, before creating the claims court) stand entirely on its powers to
invoke sovereign immunity and withhold jurisdiction from compensation
suits.5 73

But the combination

of Lincoln's blanket pardons and

Padelford's apparent grant to such pardons of a disloyalty-neutralizing effect called into question the Republicans' preferred approach of limiting
compensation to claimants who could produce actual, "affirmative" evidence of continuous loyalty. 574 Congress's bind was aggravated by Klein's
progress into the Supreme Court, which meant that further efforts to
limit compensation suits would have to constrain a Supreme Court hostile to the Republican agenda. 575
The legislation Republicans initially proposed to satisfy their desire
for a judicially administered compensation scheme that avoided
Padelford's outcome made the existence of a pardon conclusive of disloyalty (unless the claimant's loyalty oath included a contemporaneous denial of prior disloyalty), and required the Supreme Court to "reverse"
567. See Professor Young's excellent history of Klein, Gordon G. Young,
Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v.
Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 1189, 1192-93, 1197-99.
568. Wilson v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 240, 247 (1871), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
569. See infra notes 580-582 and accompanying text.
570. Young, supra note 567, at 1193; see id. at 1203-05.
571. Id. at 1204.
572. See id. at 1225-27. Evidencing the strength of the latter consideration was
Congress's swift reformation of the claims court after Gordon v. United States had struck it
down based on Congress's attempt to keep a hand in the compensation process. See Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144; supra notes 408-424 and accompanying text.
573. Cf. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 142 (acknowledging Congress's power to invoke
sovereign immunity to bar suits for compensation for seized property held in trust by the
Government).
574. See Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 3, 15 Stat. 75, 75; United States v. Padelford,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 538, 542 (1870).
575. See Young, supra note 567, at 1207-08.
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Court of Claims judgments favoring claimants who were pardoned based
on loyalty oaths (absent the requisite disclaimer).576 Doubting that
Congress could constitutionally direct the Court to "reverse" a lower
court's decision, Senator Trumbull proposed (1) conditioning waiver of
sovereign immunity in the claims court on the absence from the case of a
loyalty oath and presidential pardon, and (2) withdrawing Supreme
Court jurisdiction altogether.5 77 Because this approach would have left
the Klein award (then pending in the Court) intact, the Republicans further revised the legislation to condition not only the sovereign immunity
waiver, but also Supreme Court (and, eventually, Court of Claims) jurisdiction, on the absence from the case of a loyalty oath and pardon. In
Senator Edmonds's words, the Supreme Court "shall dismiss the case out
of court for want of jurisdiction; not dismiss the appeal, but dismiss the
case-everything," upon becoming78 aware of a loyalty oath and pardon,
5
thus denying any access to relief.
As adopted, with four redundant means to the same end, the 1870
ActProvided, [1] That no pardon ... granted by the President...
shall be admissible in evidence on the part of any claimant in
the court of claims ... nor shall any such pardon ... be ...
considered by said court, or by the appellate court.., in deciding upon the claim . . .; but the proof of loyalty required [to
justify compensation], shall be made by ["affirmative" evidence
of loyalty], irrespective of the effect of any ...pardon .... [2]
And in all cases wherejudgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the court of claims in favor of any claimant on any
other proof of loyalty than such as is above required . . . the
Supreme Court shall, on appeal, have no further jurisdiction of
the cause, and shall dismiss the same for want ofjurisdiction[.]
[3] And provided further, That whenever any pardon shall have
heretofore been granted ... and such pardon shall recite...
that such person . . . was guilty of ... disloyalty ... and such
pardon shall have been accepted in writing, by the person to
whom... issued, without an express disclaimer of... such fact
of guilt... such pardon and acceptance shall be... deemed...
in the said court of claims, and on appeal therefrom, conclusive
evidence that such person did.., give aid and comfort to the
late rebellion... [4] and on proof of such pardon... the jurisdiction of the court [apparently, the Court of Claims and the
the court shall
Supreme Court] in the case shall cease, and
579
forthwith dismiss the suit of such claimant.
576. See H.R. 974, 41st Cong. (1870), reprinted in Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
3809 (1870); Young, supra note 567, at 1205.
577. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3816, 3824 (1870) (statements of Sen.
Trumbull).
578. Id. at 3824 (statement of Sen. Edmonds); see id. (statement of Sen. Morton);
Young, supra note 567, at 1206-08.
579. Act ofJuly 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
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Klein addressed whether Article III forbade the 1870 Act's restrictions on the Court's decision of the case; if so, whether the preexisting
statutes allowed compensation of owners like Wilson (in Klein), and unlike Padelford, who were disloyal when their property was seized and were
only pardoned thereafter; and if the earlier statutes did not allow such
compensation, whether they interfered with the Article II pardon power.
In answer to the first question, the Court unanimously concluded that the
1870 Act violated Article III.580 The Court split on the remaining ques-

tions. The majority held that the prior statutes entitled subsequently
pardoned owners of seized property to compensation, thus avoiding any
question of the prior acts' validity under Article II; 5 81 Justices Miller and
Bradley read the prior acts to deny compensation to subsequently
pardoned owners and concluded that Article II did not require that par5 82
dons be given a retroactive effect.

The whole supreme law, independence, and effectualness components of "[t]hejudicial Power" as designed by the Framers and applied in
Marbuy make short work of the 1870 Act. The Act conferred jurisdiction
on the Court of Claims and Supreme Court to resolve compensation
claims based on whether the claimant owned the seized property and was
loyal. If either court encountered evidence that the claimant had received a presidential pardon, the Act told the court to take three steps,
each (in "belt and suspenders" fashion) obviating the others: (1) ignore
the pardon insofar as it was asserted by the claimant (clause [1] in the
quotation above); (2) treat the pardon as conclusively proving the government's case (clause [3]); and (3) treat the pardon as requiring the
court to decline jurisdiction and dismiss the case (clauses [2] and [4]).
In effect (and rather nearly in terms), Congress said:
If offered evidence presenting the constitutional issue whether a
pardon neutralizes prior disloyalty, do not admit it. Divert your
eyes from the Constitution and treat only this statute as governing the decision. (Clause [1].)

580. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144-47 (1872); id. at 148
(Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although in an offhand paragraph
near the end of Chase's majority opinion, he suggested that, in addition to the 1870 Act's
Article III infirmities, the Act was "liable to... exception" as "infringing the constitutional
power of the Executive," id. at 147 (emphasis added), he did not actually interpose an
Article II objection to the Act, see id. at 147-48-perhaps because the Grant
Administration had waived any Article II claim by urging reversal of the award in Klein, see
Young, supra note 567, at 1204 n.83, 1210-12. Thus, Klein cannot be said to hold (much
less only to hold) that the 1870 Act violated Article II. Cf. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37,
at 369 (suggesting an Article-II-focused reading of Klein).
581. See Klein. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 142.
582. See id. at 148-50 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (under
the prior statutes, tile to abandoned and seized property passed immediately to the
government if the prior owner was then disloyal and unpardoned, and a subsequent
pardon could not retroactively restore tile).
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If you admit the evidence of the pardon, raising the Article
II issue, interpret that article as we do. Make the pardon "conclusive" proof of disloyalty. (Clause [3].)
If you reach the constitutional issue and decide it according
to your own best judgment, then you "shall... have no further
jurisdiction"-your 'Jurisdiction

. . . shall cease"-and you

"shall forthwith dismiss the suit." You lose authority either to
decide the constitutional issue based on your own independent
judgment or, at least, to grant the relief your judgment otherwise would require. (Clauses [2] and [4].)583
Or, more simply: "Look at the case but don't look at the Constitution. If
you look at the Constitution, give it our interpretation. If you look at the
Constitution and give it your interpretation, don't go on to decide the
case or don't award relief."
To which the unanimous Court responded, refusing to enforce the
Act:
You could have withheld jurisdiction. Instead, you told us to
resolve the case. Once a statute makes us resolve a case, the
Constitution makes us exercise "[t] he judicial Power." It makes
us look to supreme law; interpret it independently; decide according to its dictates; and award the relief it requires.
This understanding of what the 1870 Act said, and what the Court
did, solves the riddle of what Chief Justice Chase meant. On Congress's
power to withhold jurisdiction from the start, Chase wrote: "Undoubtedly
the legislature has complete control over the organization and existence
of [the Court of Claims] and may confer or withhold the right of appeal
from its decisions. And if this act did nothing more, it would be our duty
to give it effect."5 84 On what the Act instead did, Chase noted that "the

language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold
appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end." 58 5 Rather, "[i] ts
great and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which this court [in Padelford] had adjudged them to have
58 6
... as equivalent to proof of loyalty."
The Act's end was not to withdrawjurisdiction. Indeed, the Act conferred jurisdiction in compensation cases. Its midstream withdrawal ofjurisdiction thus could only be a means to the end of keeping the Court
from exercising "[t]hejudicial Power"-from looking to Article II, as the
Court independently interpreted it, to determine the pardon's actual
legal effect on the Court's decision and on the parties via relief. In Chase's
words:
The proviso declares that pardons shall not be considered by
this court on appeal ["don't look at the constitutional issue"].... It provides that whenever it shall appear that any
583.
584.
585.
586.

Cf. supra text accompanying note 579 (text of 1870 Act).
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145.
Id.
Id.
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judgment of the Court of Claims shall have been founded on
such pardons, without other proof of loyalty, the Supreme Court
shall have no further jurisdiction of the case and shall dismiss
the same for want of jurisdiction ["don't decide" or "withhold
relief"]. The proviso further declares that every pardon . . .
shall, if accepted in writing without disclaimer.., be taken as
conclusive evidence ... of the [disloyal] act ["adopt Congress's
interpretation"] .... 587
Chase then breached each of the 1870 Act's successive defenses to a
court's giving pardons the Article II "effect which this court [in Padelford]
had adjudged them to have."5 88 As to the "don't look" directive at which
Marbuy alms most of its fire, Chase wrote simply, "it [is] our duty to con5 89
sider [pardons] and give them effect."
On the independent interpretation point for which Marbuy is famous, but which it only silently decided,5 90 Klein is explicit. In explaining
why Congress cannot tell the Court how to interpret the Constitution,
Chase cited Wheeling Bridge, one of the anti-revising decisions we discuss
earlier.59 ' Doing so linked rules forbidding non-Article III agencies after
the fact to "reverse" (or render unenforceable) disagreeable federal court
interpretations of federal law and rules forbidding those agencies to spec5 92
ify in advance how Article III courts must interpret the Constitution.
What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in
a particular way? ... Can we [enforce the Act] without allowing
that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the
Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before
it?
We think not ....
[In Wheeling Bridge] the court was left to
apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created by the
act. In the case before us no new circumstances have been created by legislation. But the court is forbidden to give the effect
to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should
have, and is directed [by the conclusive presumption] to give it
an effect precisely contrary.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id.; see Young, supra note 567, at 1193-94, 1222; supra notes 362, 557 and

accompanying text.
590. See supra notes 553-555 and accompanying text.
591. See supra notes 432, 441-450 and accompanying text.
592. Likewise equating rules permitting a non-Article III agency to revise federal
court judgments and rules requiring federal courts to adopt a non-Article III agency's
interpretation of federal law are, e.g., Clinton v.Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1647 & n.31 (1997);
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218, 225 (1995) (" 'if the legislature cannot
thus indirectly control the action of the courts, by requiring of them a construction of the
law according to its own views, it... plain[ly] cannot do so directly, by setting aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, [or] ordering the discharge of offenders
.... '" (citation omitted)); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 398
(1980).
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We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the
593
limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power.
Finally, with the "don't look" and "interpret it as we do" belt gone,
Chase resolutely disregarded the "don't decide" and "withhold relief'
suspenders:
The [Act gives the] court jurisdiction of the cause to a given
point; but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists,
its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to dismiss the cause
for want of jurisdiction.
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe
regulations to the appellate power.
Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court
shall have jurisdiction of the judgments of the Court of Claims
on appeal. Can it prescribe a rule in conformity with which the
court must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred [i.e., to
decide and to order deserved relief], because and only because its
decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the governto the suitor? This question seems to us to anment and favorable
594
swer itself.
593. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47; see Hart, supra note 5, at 1373 ("[I]f
Congress directs an Article Ill court to decide a case, I can easily read into Article III a
limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court how to decide it ....[a point made]
clear long ago in UnitedStates v. Klein."); see also Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence Sager,
Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 471
(1994) ("Klein prohibits... the conscription of the Court by Congress to play a role in a
charade ...in which the Court is obliged to act as though its own judgment about a matter
of consequence is different than it actually is."). The clarity of the Act's attempt through
its conclusive presumption to tell courts how to read the Constitution makes up for the
imprecision of Chase's exposition, see id. at 470, which fails to distinguish permissible
instructions to decide cases (even retroactively) according to Congress's definition of the
statutory requisites for relief, see supra note 362, from impermissible instructions on how to
interpret the Constitution,see supra notes 552-561, 584-592 and accompanying text; infra
notes 678-686 and accompanying text, or (much more rarely) on how to interpret statutes,
see supra notes 448-450 and accompanying text.
594. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47 (emphasis added); see Sager, supra note 17,
at 87-88 (locating an "objection to legislation that ... deprives [Article III courts] of
jurisdiction to provide effective relief... at the very heart of... Klein"; arguing that Klein
would bar a statute giving federal courts jurisdiction to review government programs "and
then direct[ing] them to dismiss for want of jurisdiction only those cases involving...
programs they would otherwise find unconstitutional"; such a statute would improperly ask
Article III courts "to participate in an adjudicatory ritual, the end result of which would be
the preordained defeat of the [independently discerned] rights of constitutional
claimants"); Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 268. Because the 1870 Act clearly directed the
Court to withhold-i.e., to surrender jurisdiction to grant-relief upon finding a federal
right to it, and because the Court declined to follow the directive, Klein qualifies Fallon
and Meltzer's broad view of the remedial discretion that Article III courts may exercise at
their own or Congress's behest. See supra note 399; infra notes 697, 747, 774-799 and
accompanying text.
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Klein lacks Marbury's elegance. But it just as powerfully forbade a
more determined Congress, in the guise of regulating Article III courts'
jurisdiction (the quantity of their authority), to regulate their judicialpower
(the quality of their authority). 595 Congress may withhold jurisdiction.
But it may not choose how much of the "whole supreme law" an Article
III court may apply to a case it has told the court to decide. Nor may it
tell the court how to interpret that law. Nor, at the point when the
court's constitutionally mandated choice of law and independent judgment are about to generate a decision and relief, may Congress pull the
jurisdictional plug. The judicial power thus must include the capacity (1)
to apply the whole supreme law as the Article III court independently interprets
it to decide the case and (2) to impose the relief needed to give the court's
independent legal interpretation and its decision effect.
One thread is loose: What of the Government's (and Senator
Trumbull's) sovereign immunity argument "that the right to sue the government in the Court of Claims is a matter of favor" that Congress may
condition on a court's inability to consider or give effect to a pardon?5 96
Chase's response was to say that this argument "seems not entirely accurate," then to deem the Court of Claims an Article III court and explain
why Congress's power over such courts' jurisdiction could not justify the
statute. 597 Others have found this response insufficient and posed alternatives, 5 98 but it satisfies us: Assertions of sovereign immunity are sufficiently like denials of jurisdiction that an Article III analysis of the latter
applies as well to the former. Congress has plenary authority to invoke
immunity from the start and in that way forbid courts to "look" at suits
against the sovereign. What Congress may not do, however, is waive immunity "to a given point; but [tell the court that,] when it ascertains that a
certain state of things exists, [the waiver] is to cease and it is required to
dismiss the cause" based on the now resurrected immunity. 599
Under Klein, therefore, Congress may no more constitutionally use
midstream assertions of immunity than midstream withdrawals ofjurisdicton to deny Article III courts the power (1) independently, finally, and
effectually to look at and decide constitutional questions raised by cases
within their jurisdiction, or (2) to order the relief needed to effectuate
those decisions, as long as denying either power would deprive the
Constitution of the status in the case of supreme law. Clearly the socalled "greater power" to withhold jurisdiction or assert sovereign immu595. The Court and the Court of Claims soon extended the same conclusion to the
Act's clause [4], which placed identical limits on a lower federal court. See Armstrong v.

United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155-56 (1872) (ordering claims court, contrary to
clause [4], to give a pardon the effect that Padelfordand Klein required); Witkowski's Case,
7 Ct. Cl. 393 (1872); see also Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144-45 (identifying the claims
court as an Article III court).
596. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144; see supra notes 577-578 and accompanying text.
597. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 144-45.
598. See Young, supra note 567, at 1224-33.
599. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (emphasis added).
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nity from the start does not include the so-called "lesser power" to grant
jurisdiction and waive immunity conditioned on a court's particular
choice of issues to address, law to apply, or legal interpretation, or on the
court's remedial impotence.
c. Law Versus Fact;Anti-Revising Versus the Whole Law. - Because the
power and duty to "decide the whole case based on supreme law" inheres
in the judicial power as defined by the Convention and applied by
Marbury and Klein, Congress may not oblige an Article III court to review
or enforce government, including administrative, action while keeping
the court from determining the action's legality under federal law and
effectuating the determination insofar as it bears on the parties.
"Congress may be free to establish [an administrative] scheme that operates without court participation. But that is a matter quite different from
instructing a court automatically to enter a judgment pursuant to [an
administrative] decision the court has no authority to evaluate. '600 In
Marbuy and Klein, the Court rejected implied and express choice-of-law
rules taking the Constitution entirely out of cases within Article III courts'
jurisdiction to which the document (as independently construed) applied
of its own force. Two more Federal Courts classics, Crowell v. Benson60 1
(as confirmed by St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States)602 and Yakus v.
United States,60 3 relied on the logic of the federal courts' supremacy-maintaining function to clarify two aspects of the Marbuwy-Klein rule-Crowell
by extending the "whole case" aspect of the rule to "mixed," but withholding it from factual, questions; Yakus by identifying situations in which the
"whole law" aspect of the rule gives way to the anti-revising principle.
(i) Crowell and St. Joseph. - In Crowell, a federal agency ordered
Benson to compensate Knudsen under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 60 4 and Benson invoked the Act's provision

for district court review, claiming that Knudsen was not employed in a
maritime occupation as the Act required. 60 5 In response to the claim
that the Act's judicial review provisions offended "the judicial power of
the United States," the district court decided it could address Benson's
suit only if it had the power to give him a "hearing de novo upon the facts
[of Knudsen's employment status] and the law."'60 6 Based on such a hearing, the district court ruled that Knudsen was not employed in a maritime
job and enjoined the agency award. 60 7 The government appealed the de
novo hearing ruling.
600. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 429-30 & n.6 (1995) (citing
Klein; other citations omitted).

601.
602.
603.
604.

285 U.S. 22 (1932).
298 U.S. 38 (1936).
321 U.S. 414 (1944).
Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424.

605. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36-37, 44.

606. Id. at 37.
607. See id.
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Chief Justice Hughes began the Court's consideration of "the
judicial power of the United States" with a "whole case" principle similar
to that of Marbury and Klein: In a dispute over which Congress had conferred admiralty jurisdiction, it could not "'withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at...
admiralty.' "608 Hughes then approved two features of the Act's judicial
review provisions: (1) The ordinary fact "findings of the deputy commissioner," if "supported by evidence and within the scope of his authority,
shall be final"-there being "no requirement that, in order to maintain
the essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in
constitutional courts shall be made byjudges." 60 9 (2) The agency's resolutions of "questions of law are without finality [and] ... full opportunity
is afforded for their determination by the Federal courts," giving those
courts "complete authority to insure the proper application of the
law." 610 Hughes justified the former feature based on the unreviewable
status of many jury findings and the rule that appellate courts generally
defer to the fact findings of trial courts. 61 1 He justified the latter feature
based on Article III courts' duty to protect the supremacy of federal lawi.e., on "the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial power in
requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions." 612 Hughes reaffirmed Crowell's second, "whole supreme law" conclusion in St. Joseph:
"[T]here is no warrant for the view that the judicial power of a competent
court can be circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to
give effect to administrative action going beyond the limits of constitu613
tional authority."
Between questions of law and ordinary questions of fact, Crowell located a third category: questions "of facts . . . [decisive of] a constitutional right properly asserted," including "where the determinations of
fact are... jurisdictional"' because they are critical to a constitutionally
appropriate exercise of federal power. 614 Hughes put in this category the
Act's limit of relief to maritime workers because "only where the relation
of master and servant exists in maritime employment" could Congress
constitutionally order workers' compensation. 615 Hughes thus ruled that,
once required to review administrative action, Article III courts must be
able to review all questions of law orfact decisive of the constitutionality of
that action: "In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the
judicial power of the United States necessarily extends to the independ608. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
609. Id. at 46, 51.
610. Id. at 45-46, 54 (emphasis added); see infra notes 871-872 and accompanying
text (discussing the consistency of this holding with the Chevron doctrine).
611. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51-54.
612. Id. at 56; see St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51-52
(1936); id. at 84 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
613. St. Joseph, 298 U.S. at 52.
614. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46, 54.
615. See id. at 38-40, 55-56.

1998]

"SOME EFFECTUAL POWER"

ent determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the
'616
performance of that supreme function.
61
7
In Crowell and St. Joseph, Hughes gave various examples of ordinary fact questions as to which Congress could make Article III courts
with jurisdiction defer to agencies: the scope of a maritime worker's injuries, his intoxication or suicidal intent (each a statutory defense), and the
real property and "going concern" value on which administratively set
rates had to give fair return. 6 18 Hughes also exemplified "fact" questions
that Article III judges must determine independently: whether an agency
finding "is... 'contrary to the indisputable character of the evidence"'
(i.e., sufficiency of the evidence generally);619 whether "the relation of
master and servant exists in maritime employment... [where] that relation is the pivot of the statute and.., underlies the constitutionality of
[the Act]"1;62° whether lands the federal Land Department was attempting to sell "'never were public property'-;621 "whether a publication is a
'book' or a 'periodical"' for purposes of acts governing "carriage... [of]
second class mail matter";62 2 whether a rate is "confiscat[ory]";623
whether an individual subject to deportation is a "citizen[ ] -1;624 and, generally, any "'review of the law as applicable to facts finally determined
below.'-"625 Whatever one makes of Hughes's linguistic categories-"constitutional" or 'Jurisdictional" facts versus "subordinate or primary" facts
bearing on the same issue-his examples manifestly distinguish historical
fact questions (on which independent judgment is not required) from
what today are commonly called "mixed questions of law and fact" (as to
which Article III courts must exercise independent judgment).626
Much has been made ofjusice Brandeis's dissent in Crowell. But less
was in contention than has been suggested. As his concurrence in St.
Joseph confirmed, Brandeis agreed with Hughes that "[t] he supremacy of
law demands... the independent judgment of [the Article III] court on
the ultimate question of constitutionality[ ]. .. [b]ut . .. does not demand that the correctness of every finding of fact to which the rule of law
616. Id. at 60.
617. St. Joseph reaffirmed Crowell after moderating Crowell's requirement of de novo
hearings, see id. at 64, to let Article III courts rely on the administrative record and the
administrator's "subordinate or primary findings," St. Joseph, 298 U.S. at 52-54.
618. See St. Joseph, 298 U.S. at 60, 62, 64; Crowell, 285 U.S. at 47.
619. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50 (quoting Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913)).
620. Id. at 56.
621. Id. at 59 (quoting Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 641 (1881)).
622. Id. (quoting Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U.S. 53, 59 (1912)).
623. Id. at 60 (citing Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289

(1920)).
624. Id. (citing Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 285 (1922)).
625. Id. at 53 (quoting The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1881)).
626. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 110
n.12 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
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is to be applied shall be subject to review by [the] court. ' 627 Brandeis
also agreed (using more modem terminology) that Congress may not
withdraw questions from federal courts when they encounter "difficulty
in reaching conclusions of law without consideration of the evidence as
well as the findings of fact," including "the weight of the evidence," the
"citizenship" of an individual subject to deportation, whether "rate orders
confiscatory," and other "difficult questions of mixed law and
[are]
...
628
fact":
[W] here what purports to be a finding upon a question of fact is
so involved with and dependent upon questions of law as to be
in substance and effect a decision of the latter, the Court will, in
order to decide the legal question, examine the entire record,
as it does in cases coming
including the evidence if necessary,
629
from the highest court of a State.
Brandeis simply did not place the "maritime employment" question
in the "mixed" category--largely because he did not think Congress's
power to order injury compensation was limited to maritime workers, so
that, for him, that question's resolution did not determine the boundary
of Congress's regulatory power. 630 The narrowness of Brandeis's disagreement with Hughes-over whether the existence of "maritime employment" was a mixed question, or instead a purely factual question-is
illustrated by Brandeis's willingness, after initially thinking "confiscatoriness" a question entirely of fact, to accept the view of others on the Court
that it instead63 1was a mixed question requiring full Article III court
consideration.
The harder question is one on which Hughes and Brandeis agreed:
Why, if Article III courts must effectually decide the whole case, is there
no Article III requirement of independent review of questions of pure
627. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see Crowell, 285 U.S. at 68, 88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
628. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 80, 88, 89, 92 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
629. St. Joseph, 298 U.S. at 74 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
630. See Crowel, 285 U.S. at 80-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
631. Compare Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 299 (1920)
(Brandeis,J., dissenting) (confiscatoriness is a fact question on which deference is owed to
the trier of fact), with St. Joseph, 298 U.S. at 74, 83 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(confiscatoriness is a mixed question, which Article III courts must review independently),
and Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443-44 (1930) (Brandeis, J.)
(same). In his response to this Article, Mr. Scheidegger erroneously claims that the Ben
Avon majority's conclusion (eventually accepted by Brandeis)-that confiscatoriness is a
mixed question requiring independent federal court review-applies only to agency, as
opposed to judicial, determinations of confiscatoriness. See Scheidegger, supra note 75, at
907-08. In fact, the Hughes Court (with Brandeis's concurrence) also affirmed its
obligation of plenary review of state court determinations of confiscatoriness (and other
mixed determinations), and gave the same explanation for the obligation as in Crowell i.e.,
that plenary review was necessary so that the Court could "perform [its) own proper
function in deciding the question of the law arising upon the findings which the evidence
permits." United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 143 (1938); see infra note 671
and accompanying text.
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fact on which the decision of the case turns? There are three sufficient
answers. First, Article III expressly lets Congress declare "Exceptions,"
inter alia, to the Supreme Court's (and, by implication, the lower federal
courts') appellate "Jurisdiction ... as to Law and Fact," prompting the
Court in Wiscart, its first Article III decision, to let Congress deny itjurisdiction over factual questions on appeal. 63 2 Second, a different reading
would put Article III, Section 1 and the first two paragraphs of its Section
2 on a collision course with Article III, Section 2's last paragraph and the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments, which embody constitutional rights to
trial by jury with which judicial redetermination of facts (e.g., on appeal)
cannot easily cohere.
Third, and most crucially, this treatment of facts is not truly an exception to the "whole case" rule, properly understood, but a consequence of it.
As Hughes said, Article Ill imposes the "whole case" rule "to the end that
63 3
the Constitution as the supreme law of the land may be maintained."
The rule thus is not a postulate ofjudging itself, but of Article IHjudging
as defined by the Supremacy Clause, i.e., of "the Federal judicial power in
requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions." 63 4 This aspect of
the judicial power thus applies only (as, e.g., in Marbury and Klein) to
those aspects of a case that implicate the normative content of some provision of federal law.63 5 If the question in Crowell had been whether
Benson had paid Knudsen's wages each week, it would be hard to see any
normative federal legal question at issue. But the question, instead, was
the range of connection between Knudsen's work and the maritime aspects of Benson's business. Moreover, in Hughes's view (but not
Brandeis's), the constitutionality of a federal workers' compensation program depended on a sufficient nexus between the employment relationship and maritime work. For Hughes (but not Brandeis), therefore,
resolving that ("mixed") question required a determination not only of
where, when, and how Knudsen worked, but also of what combination of
those factors sufficed to cross the line between businesses within and
without Congress's constitutional reach and, indeed, where that constitutional line lies.
It is no surprise, then, that the Court defines "mixed questions" requiring independent Article III review, and distinguishes them from
purely "factual" questions as to which deference to an agency or
subordinate court is allowed, based on whether "the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its application to the particular
circumstances of a case" 6 3 6 -i.e., whether "norm elaboration occurs"
632. U.S. Const. art. Ii, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see supra notes 254-257 and
accompanying text (discussing role of Law and Fact Clause in Exceptions and Regulations
Clause); supra notes 364-369 and accompanying text (discussing Wiscart).
633. St.Joseph, 298 U.S. at 51-52.
634. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 56.
635. See Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 263.
636. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
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through the courts' "power to consider fully a series of closely related
situations involving a claim of constitutional privilege."63 7 As we began to
discern from Martin and Osborn, Article III courts do not sit "to decide on
a mere hypothetical case-to give a construction to a [federal law] without first deciding whether there was any interest on which that [law],
whatever be its proper construction, would operate"-but instead to decide the meaning of federal law as applied to, and as revealed by its application to, the actual facts. 638 In Hughes's words in another classic case:
When a federal right has been specially set up and claimed... it
is our province to inquire not merely whether it was denied in
express terms but also whether it was denied in substance and effect.
If this requires an examination of evidence, that examination
must be made. Otherwise, review by this Court would fail of its
purpose in safeguarding constitutional rights.... [W]henever a
conclusion of law.., as to a federal right and findings of fact are
so intermingled that the latter control the former, it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order that the
appropriate
63 9
enforcement of the federal right may be assured.
637. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 273-75
(1985); see id. at 264 ("independent judgment on the evidence is constitutionally
mandated... when the application issue involves an appreciable measure of additional
norm elaboration- . . where it seems correct to state that the judicial duty to 'say what the
law is' is implicated').
638. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 369-70 (1816) (Johnson, J.,
concurring); see supra notes 467-474 and accompanying text.
639. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935); see, e.g., Ornelas v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996) ("reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" are treated as
questions of law because those constitutional concepts "acquire content only through
application" to the facts); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111-16 (1995) ("mixed
question[s] of law and fact" are "ranked as issues of law" because "case-by-case elaboration
when a constitutional right is implicated may more accurately be described as law
declaration than as law application"); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 659
(1945) (a question is mixed, and independent review is required, "where reference to the
facts is necessary to the determination of the precise meaning of the federal right or
immunity, as applied"); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662 (1944) ("federal courts must
for themselves appraise the facts .... [when i]t is only by the performance of this
obligation that a final and uniform interpretation can be given to the Constitution, the
,supreme Law of the Land.' "); cases cited infra note 671. Not to the contrary, of course,
are Court decisions deferring to state court determinations of thoroughly fact-dependent
questions whose independent resolution by a reviewing federal court "will do the cause of
legal certainty little good," Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983),
e.g., because "the issue involves the credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on
an evaluation of demeanor," Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (discussing jurorbias cases) (misdescribed in Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 904; see also Ornelas, 116 S.CL
at 1663 (explaining that Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (misdescribed in
Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 905), gives a decisive legal effect to a magistrate's beforethe-fact issuance of a search warrant, irrespective of the validity of the magistrate's
probable cause determination, and in no way undermines the longstanding rule requiring
independent federal court review of another court's after-the-fact resolution of the
probable cause question in a warrantless search case).
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Vesting the judicial power in Article III courts thus does not assure them
the power to decide the "whole case"-of which the facts obviously are
part-but only those aspects of the case that implicate the courts' obligai.e., only those facts revealing the nortion to keep federal law supreme,
64 0
mative meaning of that law.
(ii) Yakus. - In Yakus v. United States, Justice Rutledge encapsulated the "independent judgment" and "whole law" principles that
emerge from our history of the Convention and our discussion of
Marbury and Klein:
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is entirely
another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a manner
inconsistent with constitutional requirements or, what in some
instances may be the same thing, without regard to them. Once
it is held that Congress can require the courts ... to enforce
unconstitutional laws . . . or [enforce laws] without regard for
their validity, the way will have been found to circumvent the
supreme law and, what is more, to make the courts parties to
doing so. This Congress cannot do.... [W]henever the judicial
power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundato force or aumental law and no other authority can intervene
1

thorize the judicial body to disregard

it.64

Although the Court, the canonical literature, and Congress have treated
Rutledge's statement as authoritative, 64 2 he wrote in dissent. It is important, therefore, to see why ChiefJustice Stone's majority opinion is not to
the contrary.
A federal district court convicted Yakus of selling wholesale meat
above price limits set administratively pursuant to emergency legislation
during World War II. At trial, he claimed that the price limits were confiscatory. Because the statute barred federal courts before which enforcement actions were pending from ruling on the legality of the price-setting
regulations, the trial court refused to consider Yakus's constitutional
claim.
As in Marbury and Klein, the Supreme Court ruled that, given its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, it also had to determine the constitutionality of the statute under which the conviction occurred-"[e]ven [if] the
statute should be deemed to require... a[ ] ruling at the criminal trial
which would preclude the accused from showing that" the act was unconstitutional. 643 The Court then reviewed, but rejected, several constitu640. See also infra notes 674-675 (additional qualification of the "whole case"
principle).
641. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
642. See, e.g., United States v. ,Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 392 (1980);
Hart, supra note 5, at 1373; see also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 430
(1995) (quoted supra text accompanying note 600); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,
434 U.S. 275, 290-91 & n.2 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing Congress's
attentiveness to "Mr. Justice Rutledge's eloquent dissent" in Yakus).
643. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 447.
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tional attacks on the statute, including that it violated Article III by keeping Yakus from relying on the unconstitutionality of the price-setting
644
regulations as a defense to the criminal action.
The Court's reason for letting Congress deny it and the district court
'Jurisdiction" to consider the regulations' constitutionality was simple:
Although the statute barred objections to the regulations in enforcement
proceedings, it gave wholesalers like Yakus a fair preenforcement opportunity as of right to challenge the regulations by administrative protest and
review (consistent with Crowell and St. Joseph) in the Emergency Court of
Appeals (an Article III court) and to seek review by the Supreme
Court.645 Relegating constitutional challenges to an Article III court

other than the one in which enforcement actions later occurred did not
violate Article III, the Court held, because such challenges need not be
heard "in one [Article III] tribunal rather than in another, so long as
there is an opportunity" for a fair challenge in one of them. 646 True,

Yakus had passed up the preenforcement remedy and was convicted at a
trial at which he was prevented from raising constitutional objections.
But "[n] o procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a
constitutional right may be forfeited . . .by the failure to make timely

assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine
7
it."

64

Recalling Crowell's procedural posture helps explain Yakus's holding.
Crowell was not an enforcement action to compel Benson to compensate
Knudsen but, rather, Benson's preenforcement action to enjoin the
agency's compensation order. Suppose Benson had challenged the
award as beyond Congress's power and confiscatory but the district court
had ruled against him. If Benson had then refused to comply with the
agency order and a statutory criminal enforcement proceeding had been
brought in another district court, assumedly the prior court's decision of
the relevant constitutional questions would have bound the later courtelse the prior court's decision would have lacked the finality Article III
itself requires. 648 Even if Benson had made some, but not all of his constitutional challenges in the prior court, the later court quite properly
could have treated the previously omitted (i.e., "waived") claims as well as
the previously litigated ones as res judicata. 649 Assuming, therefore, that
(at least in the emergent circumstances of the War) 65 0 Yakus was constitutionally required to challenge allegedly confiscatory price regulations
in the period before the regulations went into effect, it only requires re644. See id. at 418, 429-31.
645. See id. at 428-29, 435-36.
646. Id.*at 444.
647. Id.
648. See supra Part II.B; supra notes 605-607 and accompanying text.
649. See 18 Charles A. Wright et. al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4414, at 111
(1981).
650. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 420, 431-32, 442-43 (discussing "compelling public
interest" in truncated procedures during wartime).
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sort to that same res judicata principle to see how unexceptional Yakus
was. 65 1 For, in keeping with good Article III policy, all the decision did
was require one Article III court to respect the finality of the unappealed
judgment of another such court or, more accurately, the final effect of a
party's inexcusable failure to invoke that judgment in a timely fashion.
Yakus's treatment of the seller's waiver, like Crowell's treatment of
pure fact questions, thus locates the "whole case" and "choice of law" aspects of the judicial power not in the inherent function of judges, as
judges, but in the Article Illjudge's constitutional function of maintaining
the supremacy of federal law. So far as that function is concerned, as Stone
said, one Article III tribunal's "look" at the regulations' constitutionality
is as good as another's, and Yakus had no constitutional right to choose
between them. Also revealing is Stone's single caveat: 'We have no occasion to decide whether one charged with criminal violation of a... price
regulation may defend on the ground that the regulation is unconstitutional on itsface."652 If a preenforcement Article III court has looked (or
was designated to look) at the regulation and found no constitutional
violation, the enforcement tribunal need not do so when Congress forbids it-unless the later tribunal cannot help looking because the regulation's affront to the supremacy of federal law is manifest on its face, in
which case the later court's supremacy-maintaining obligations may
trump the congressional will and the first court's finality. In this light, the
only-and, from our perspective, not very important-difference between the Rutledge and Stone positions is over whether the Article III
supremacy-maintaining obligation trumps the Article III anti-advising and
anti-revising protections in all cases (Rutledge's view) or in only those
cases in which there is no blinking the constitutional violation (Stone's
view) .653
2. Denying Deference and Applying the Whole Supreme Law to State Decisions: Martin, Cohens, The Mayor, and the Mixed Question Cases. - Much
651. See Hart, supra note 5, at 1373-74; see also Yakus, 321 U.S. at 481 (RutledgeJ.,
dissenting) (assuming that majority opinion rested on "such notions as waiver and... res

judicata").
652. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 446-47 (emphasis added).

653. Cf. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-39 (1987) (holding that a
defendant charged with unlawful entry into the country following deportation who
previously was denied a fair opportunity for judicial review of the deportation order has a
due process right to challenge the deportation order in the later criminal proceeding).
Anticipating Yakus, the Court has long treated its prior direct appeal judgments on the
merits and waivers of writ of error review as of right as preclusive of later federal court
habeas actions reprising the same claims. See, e.g., Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 105
(1898). Congress codified the same rule in 1948. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1994). For a
short time, the Court even treated its prior denials of direct appeal certiorarias preclusive of
later habeas actions, see, e.g., Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (per curiam)
(misdescribed in Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 933, 944), until abandoning the practice
because certiorari denials are not merits rulings, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489-97
(1953); Liebman & Hertz, supra note 389, at 49-50, 55-56, 60-62 (explaining Hawk and
discussing its revision by Brown).
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as the Marbuiy Court confronted whether inter-branch comity required it
to defer to Congress's implied interpretations of the Constitution in ruling on congressional enactments, 6 54 the Cohens and Martin Courts faced
Virginia's claim that federalism required the Court to defer to state court
interpretations of federal law when reviewing their decisions. Even if, as
Story said in Martin, the Constitution creates no absolute state court immunity from appeal-no "reason for giving [state court] judgments an
absolute and irresistibleforce" 655-should state judges' oaths and presumptive learning and integrity, and the sovereignty of the governments of
which they are part, not at least warrant a presumption that their legal
opinions are correct?6 56 Cohens and Martin rejected this logic as inconsistent with the independence and supremacy-maintaining ingredients of
the Court's judicial power. Martin also rejected the implication that
Congress could adopt a choice of law rule blinding the Supreme Court to
otherwise applicable federal law in the course of reviewing state decisions.
The Mayor and the Mixed Question Cases extended these same conclusions to lowerfederal court review of state decisions.
Virginia's argument for federal court deference or prudential abstention in the face of state court determinations of law went to the heart
of the Framers' spot-checking approach to federal appellate jurisdiction
in cases begun in state courts. Given the many "instances in which the
constitution might be violated without" any federal court having 'Jurisdiction" to cure the problem, why, Virginia asked, should a federal court feel
obliged to reverse a state court in any particular instance in which jurisdiction existed save, perhaps, in the "extreme and improbable" situation
in which a state court blatantly disregarded federal law?657 Short of having lightning strike now and again, what good would reversal do when
federal jurisdiction happened to exist but the case presented an infraction at a "gradation[ ] of opposition to the laws[ ] far short" of "extreme"
and no worse than "violations of the constitution, of which the Courts can
take no cognizance?" 658 Marshall gave three answers to this question.
The first two answers-also given by Story in Martin-were "the necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness in expounding the
constitution and laws of the United States. '659 On "correctness,"
Marshall juxtaposed Article III's requirement of federal judicial indepen654. See supra notes 553-555 and accompanying text.
655. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816) (emphasis added);
see supra notes 475-501 and accompanying text.
656. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 302, 312-14, 318-20 (1821)
(argument of counsel); Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 343, 346 (quoted supra note 478,
discussing Virginia's argument for Supreme Court deference to "state judges['] ... oath"
and "presumed... learning and integrity" and to "the sovereignty of the states[ ] and the
independence of their courts").
657. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 386-87, 404-05; see id. at 304-07 (argument of
counsel).
658. Id. at 386, 405.
659. Id. at 416.
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dence from political and parochial pressures, and the absence of any
such assurance as to state judges, to explain the Constitution's evidently
prophylactic reliance on the former's independent "re-examination" of
the latter's judgments in the "few specified cases" in which "the
legislature [chooses to] confer on the federal Courts appellate
660
jurisdiction":
It would be hazarding too much to assert, that the judicatures of
the States will be exempt from the prejudices by which the legislatures and people are influenced, and will constitute perfectly
impartial tribunals.... When we observe the importance which
that constitution attaches to the independence ofjudges, we are
the less inclined to suppose that it can have intended to leave
these constitutional questions to tribunals where this independence may not exist, in all cases where a[n] 6 ...
individual...
61
claims the protection of an act of Congress.
On "uniformity," Story in Martinidentified "the appellate jurisdiction...
[as] the only adequate remedy for" the "truly deplorable" "public mischiefs" that arise when "Uj]udges of [albeit] equal learning and integrity,
in different states ... differently interpret" national law. 662 Forty years
later, in The Mayor v. Cooper, in upholding the constitutionality of Civil
War-era statutes permitting postjudgment removal of state cases to federal
district courts, the Court reiterated these same two reasons for rejecting
an objection to Congress's conferral on inferior federal courts of
nondeferential "appellate jurisdiction... extending.., to the courts of
663
the States."
Marshall's third answer relied not only on Article III courts'
supremacy-maintaining power but also-harkening back to the "painful
obligation" analysis of Hayburn's Case6 64 -on their "reason not will" constraint. True, Article III "does not extend the judicial power to every violation of the constitution which may possibly take place." 6 65 But "if, in
any controversy depending in a Court, the cause should depend on ...
[federal] law, that would be a case.., to which the judicial power of the
United States would extend" 66 6 -else the courts would forsake their crucial constitutional commitment to follow the supreme law wherever it
leads, no matter (or, especially given) how doubtful, close, controversial,
or difficult the federal question might be:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if
it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a
660. Id. at 410, 422.
661. Id. at 386-87; accord Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 328-29, 346-47.
662. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 347-48; accord Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 377,
386, 415-16.
663. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868); see id. at 253 & n.*; supra note 380.
664. See supra notes 537-541 and accompanying text.
665. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 405.
666. Id. (emphasis added).
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measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution.
We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever
doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more
right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would
gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is,667
to exercise
our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.
The Constitution's clear subordination of state to federal law has
suppressed attempts to require federal courts to choose state over federal
law in reviewing state decisions. In Martin, however, the question
whether the 1789Judiciary Act did or could be read to blind the Court to
federal law applicable of its own force to a state decision arose because
the Act limited appellate review to questions "apparent upon the record,"
and the state court had awarded the property in question without mentioning the federal treaties on which federal question jurisdiction was
premised.6 68 To explain the Court's application of the treaties despite
the statute's "apparent upon the record" limitation, Story recurred to
Marbury's ocular imagery of judges unable to divert their eyes from
supreme law: "The treaty ...was not necessary to have been stated [in
the state record], for it was the supreme law of the land, of which all
courts must take notice."6 69 A similar principle animates the Court's sedulous refusal to surrender jurisdiction over state judgments premised on
state law that can be shown to be even the slightest bit dependent on, or
670
decisive of, the meaning of federal law.
667. Id. at 404 (emphasis added); see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910); supra
note 345; supra notes 420, 537-540 and accompanying text. Compare Wechsler, supra
note 303, at 3-10 (deeming crucial federal courts' duty to follow supreme law where it
leads), with David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 547-74
(1985) (finding support for judicial power to abstain). The Court's (in our terms)
"quantitatively" focused power to deny certiorari does not violate the "qualitative" duty that
Cohens recognizes. See Wechsler, supra note 303, at 9 (certiorari "is addressed not to the
measure ofjudicial duty in adjudication of a case but rather to the right to a determination
by the highest ... court[ ]"). Similarly operational at the threshold as bars designed to
protect Congress's control over jurisdiction are the Full Faith and Credit, Anti-Injunction,
Tax Injunction, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts discussed supra notes 378-389 and

accompanying text.
668. See supra notes 467-469 and accompanying text (discussing Martin'sfacts).
669. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 360 (1816); see supra notes
470-471 and accompanying text.
670. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (although
federal courts generally defer to state courts on questions of state law, they refuse to do
so-and recognize a'"'duty to exercise our own judgment' "--whenthe normative content
of a federal legal provision depends in part on the meaning of state law (quoting Appleby
v. City of NewYork, 271 U.S. 364, 380 (1926)) (citation omitted)); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 260 (1989) (although a state law ground is adequate to support a state decision, the
ground cannot bar the decision's review by a federal court, including on habeas, if the
state ground even marginally depended on the resolution of a federal claim); Ward v.
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The "no deference" and "whole case/whole supreme law" principles
have arisen in an even larger set of federal question appeals of state decisions, namely, the Mixed Question Cases. Extending the efforts of
Martin, Osborn, and Crowell to define the issues to which federal courts
must "look" in order to keep control over supreme law, these cases ask
whether a state court's resolution of an assertedly "factual" issue actually
implicates the normative scope, and thus the supremacy, of federal law.
Depending on the answer to this question, the cases exercise sharply divergent levels of federal review. When faced with state court determinations that appreciably elaborate the normative content of federal law, the
Court repeatedly has held that Article III courts have a "solemn duty to
'67 1
make independent inquiry and determination of [any] disputed facts."
Othenvise, "in recognition of [state courts'] superior opportunity to appraise conflicting testimony, [the cases] give deference to [state court] con672
clusions on disputed and essential issues of what actually happened."
Again, we encounter a supremacy-based qualification on the "whole case"
Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 23 (1920) (when an adequate state ground is
asserted, the Court-to keep from "neglecting or renouncing ajurisdiction ... designed to
protect and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and [federal] laws'--"inquire[s]
not only whether the [federal] right was denied in express terms, but also whether it was
denied in substance and effect, as by putting forward nonfederal grounds of decision that
were without any fair or substantial support").
671. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939) (emphasis added and citation
omitted); accord, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
567-68 (1995); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115-18 (1985) (habeas case applying same
distinction to lower federal court review of state court decisions); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 403-04 (1977) (same); Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) (same);
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316 (1951); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335
(1946); Chambers v. Florida, 369 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1940); Truax v., Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
325 (1921); Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912); cases
cited supra notes 631, 639. Although a plurality of Justices in Burns v. Wilsondistinguishing military from state courts on separation of powers grounds-deferred to a
military tribunal's fairly considered conclusion that a confession was voluntary, 346 U.S.
137, 140-42, 144 (1953) (plurality opinion), a majority of the Court declined to reach that
conclusion, see id. at 146 (Minton,J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that Court
lacked jurisdiction); id. (JacksonJ., concurring in the judgment without explanation); id.
at 149 (Frankfurter, J.) (concluding that due process requires less in military than other
contexts); id. at 153-54 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Court must review voluntariness
independently). The Court's recurrent description and consistent exercise of its "duty" to
review mixed questions, as defined supra note 639 and accompanying text, belies the claim
that "[a] federal court may, consistently with Article III, decline to reexamine any question
previously decided between the same parties by any tribunal with the authority to finally
decide it, whether the tribunal be federal, state, or Spanish," Scheidegger, supra note 75, at
908-unless, of course, the word "finally" is meant to turn the statement into a tautology.
672. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 61 (1951); see, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S.
278, 281-82 (1909) (direct appeal decision treating existence of racial discrimination in
jury selection as a question of historical fact and deferring to a state court finding on the
issue); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1891) (same on habeas review) (misdescribed in
Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 932-33, as providing less review of the jury discrimination
question on habeas than was then available on direct review); Liebman & Hertz, supra
note 626, § 2.4d, at 51 & n.186.
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principle. Although Marshall's broad language in Cohens and Osborn
might suggest that a federal court with jurisdiction commits "treason to
the constitution" by declining to resolve factual issues determinative of
the outcome, the Court (going back to Wiscart) has limited that principle
to questions implicating the normative content, hence the supremacy, of
67 3
national law.
3. The Overriding Supremac-Maintaining Objective of "[t]he Judicial
Power". - The omission of questions of historical fact from the issues
that Article III courts must consider in cases within their jurisdiction illustrates a more general qualification. Article III appellate courts need not
address the "whole case and instead need only address such "whole questions" as implicate the normative content, and thus the supremacy, of national law. Also exemplifying this qualification are (1) the rule limiting
the nonconstitutional federal claims over which federal courts exercise
habeas "jurisdiction" to nontechnical violations, (2) the Court's willingness to limit grants of certiorari to fewer than all federal questions
presented, and (3) other limitations that rescue federal courts from a sea
of questions "concerned with . . .mere etiquette, ...
formalities and
6 74
minutiae of procedure."
This exception to the "whole case" principle, and Yakus's exception
to the "whole law" principle when another Article III court already has
discharged thejudiciary's supremacy-maintaining duty,67 5 in turn suggest
a more basic point: The decisionmaking qualities that define "[t]he
judicial Power" are not inherent attributes of judges as judges. Instead,
they are the Framers' chosen qualitative means to the supremacymaintaining objective to which the Constitution most fundamentally
commits federaljudges. Although the capacity and duty to achieve that
supremacy-maintaining objective through those qualitative means in a
case over which jurisdiction has been conferred does absolutely inhere in
the constitutional status of Article III judges, once that structural objective has been achieved in the case, the previously sacrosanct qualitative
means lose their absolute protection.
673. See supra notes 364-389, 467-474, 632-639 and accompanying text; infra notes
674-675, 774-799 and accompanying text.
674. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1939); see, e.g., Felker v. Turpin,
116 S.Ct. 2333, 2337 (1996) (noting limited grant of certiorari); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.
339, 344-46, 350, 357 (1994) (plurality and concurring opinions) (discussing rule of Hill
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962), barring habeas relief for " ' technical
violationts],'" or "'failure[s] to comply with the formal requirements,'" of federal statutes
absent" 'aggravating circumstances,'" "prejudice to the... defendant," or a showing that
the statute "'effectuates a constitutional right' "); cf. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at
1215-16 (under Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994), federal court with jurisdiction to
assess claim that state utility commission order interferes with interstate commerce or is
preempted by federal law may not consider order's legality under other federal
provisions).
675. See supra notes 643-653 and accompanying text.
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D. Resisting Interpretive Revision and Remedial Manipulation
Suppose Congress or a state court does not purport to bind an
Article IlI court to its view of federal law in a case before the court, or to
divert the court's attention from the Constitution, or to revise the court's
judgment in the case, but instead seeks to neutralize the impact of the
Article III court's interpretation of federal law by denying a remedy in
similar cases that thereafter reach the courts. Is the judicial power violated? Two recent cases, City of Boerne v. F/ores676 and Reynoldsville Casket
Co. v. Hyde,677 suggest that it is.
1. No Congressional Precedential Revision or Remedial Manipulation:
Boerne. - In 1963, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court read the
Free Exercise Clause to forbid imposition of substantial legal burdens on
religious practice absent a compelling state interest.678 In 1990, in
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court substituted a more lenient test,
allowing legal constraints on religious practice that apply equally to all
citizens. 679 In the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),
Congress invoked its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power as a
basis for affording individuals whom Sherbert but not Smith would exempt
from state or federal restrictions on religious practice a statutory right to
enjoin the restrictions' enforcement 680 RFRA had two possible interpretations-that it "overruled" Smith and restored Sherbert in subsequent
cases (but not prior ones, avoiding a direct anti-revising violation) or, as
its proponents claimed, that it supplemented the constitutional remedy
available under Smith with a statutory remedy coextensive with the remedy previously available under Sherbert.681 Either way, RFRA in effect neutralized Smith's reading of the First Amendment by affording a new (statutory) remedy in all and only those cases in which Smith had purported to
withdraw the same (constitutional) remedy.
Commentators argued that RFRA violated the independent interpretation and finality aspects of the judicial power as applied not to the result
of a particular past or pending case but to the precedent set by the
case. 68 2 But, assuming that RFRA creates a new cause of action, rather
than correcting the Court's view of how to resolve an existing one, and
assuming that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not let
Congress impose its view of the Amendment on the courts, RFRA is perhaps more accurately charged with violating the effectualness requirement.
To assure effectualness, the Court has forbidden congressional and state
court withdrawal of a prior decision's res judicata effect (Plaut and
676. 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
677. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).

678. 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406-09 (1963).
679. 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990).
680. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, § 2000bb-1 (c) (1994).
681. See Van Alstyne, supra note 441, at 307-09.
682. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 593, at 469-70; Van Alstyne, supra note
441, at 314 n.61, 319-20.
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Ableman) and their frustration of a federal court's power to enforce its
opinion, as, for instance, when Congress disbanded a territorial court
needed to carry out the Court's mandate, state courts refused to enforce
the Court's mandate (Martin and Ableman), or a statute aborted federal
jurisdiction as soon as a remedy became appropriate (Klein). Analogously, RFRA denied stare decisis effect to Smith by making available a
statutory remedy in all and only those cases in which Smith purportedly
had withdrawn a constitutionalremedy, notwithstanding that Congress (by
assumption) had no Section 5 (or other) power to make new law to replace the constitutional law the Court previously had made and thus
could only be exercising a supposed power to withdraw the effect of the
constitutional law the Court had made.
Boerne struck down RFRA on Article I grounds, concluding that
neither Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision authorized Congress to provide remedies for state laws
regulating behavior that was not itself protected by the Bill of Rights as
construed by the Court.68 3 In large measure, however, the Court premised its Article I conclusion on an Article III consideration-that
CongTess had rejected an early draft of Section 5 because it had
threatened the supremacy-maintaining aspect of the judicial power "by
vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the
meaning of the new Amendment through legislation." 684 Section 5's
drafters thus intended "[t]he power to interpret the Constitution in a
case or controversy [to] remain [ ] in the Judiciary," and RFRA's substitution of a constitutional interpretation different from the Court's-or,
more accurately, its extension of remedies precisely commensurate with
those that a different interpretation would require-would violate that
judicial-power-preserving intention. 6 5 The Court's penultimate paragraph emphasized the point, strongly intimating that Article III does not
tolerate attempts by Congress to withdraw the stare decisis effect of the
Court's constitutional interpretations:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the government respects... the
proper actions and determinations of the other branches.
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted
within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the
duty to say what the law is. Marbuiy v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177
.... When the political branches of the Government act against
the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due
them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. RFRA was designed to
control cases and controversies, such as the one before us; but
683. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. CL 2157, 2164 (1997).
684. Id. at 2166.
685. Id.
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. . . it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must
686
control.
2. No State Court Remedial Manipulation: Reynoldsville. In
Reynoldsville, the analogous remedial nullification of a prior Supreme
Court decision occurred at the hands of the Ohio Supreme Court, not
Congress. 68 7 In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises,Inc., the Court
read the Commerce Clause to bar Ohio from applying a longer statute of
limitations to suits by in-staters against out-of-staters than to suits between
in-staters. 688 In a separate case, an Ohio trial court then dismissed as
untimely Hyde's suit against Reynoldsville Casket Co., denying her the
longer statute of limitations for suits against out-of-staters that Bendix had
invalidated. 68 9 On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reinstated the action
because, under Ohio law, Bendix "may not be retroactively applied to bar
claims in state courts which had accrued prior to the announcement of
690
that decision."
Just before Reynoldsville reached the United States Supreme Court,
that Court had held-on Supremacy Clause grounds-that its own, not
state, retroactivity rules govern the applicability of new Court decisions in
cases pending when the new decisions were announced. 6 91 For that reason, and because the Court's retroactivity rules made Bendix applicable to
Hyde's suit, she abandoned the Ohio high court's reasoning when she
reached the Supreme Court and "ingeniously argue[d] that . . . [the
Court should] look at what the Ohio Supreme Court has done, not
through the lens of 'retroactivity,' but through that of 'remedy'"--"as if
[the Ohio decision] were simply an effort to fashion a remedy that takes
into consideration [Hyde's] reliance on pre-Bendix law."69 2 As the Court
noted, "the remedy [the Ohio court assertedly fashioned] would actually
consist of no remedy for the constitutional violation or, to put the matter
more precisely, of continuing to toll the [usual] 2-year statute of limitations in pre-Bendix cases ... as a state law 'equitable' device for reasons of
reliance and fairness." 693 In the mirror image to RFRA's restoration on
Section 5 grounds of a remedy that Smith's interpretation of superior law
686. Id. at 2172. The analogy between Plaut's ban on Congress "reversing" and
Boerne's ban on Congress "overruling" the Court suggests that Congress's impermissible
exercise of a Section 5 power to alter Fourteenth Amendment rights declared by the Court
may be distinguished from its permissible creation of remedies for those rights, see id. at
2163, in part by asking whether or not a statute (as did RFRA) conveys a clear message that
Congress disagrees with and can nullify Court precedent, see supra notes 441-450 and
accompanying text. If (unlike in RFRA) Congress clearly acts within its commerce or other
Article I power to declare new statutory law, the chance that it will convey the message
Article HI forbids is slim.
687. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
688. 486 U.S. 888, 889, 891-94 (1988).
689. See Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 751 (1995).
690. Id. at 751-52.
691. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993).
692. Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 752, 753.
693. Id. at 753.
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had withdrawn, the Ohio court thus, by hypothesis, had withheld on equitable grounds the remedy (nullification of Ohio's statute) that Bendix had
required.
The Court made short work of Hyde's argument: "[W] e do not see
how, in the circumstances before us, the Ohio Supreme Court could
change a legal outcome that federal law, applicable under the Supremacy
Clause, would otherwise dictate simply by calling its refusal to apply that
federal law an effort to create a remedy."694 Although relying entirely on
the Supremacy Clause, the Court seems implicitly to have reached an intermediate conclusion that Boerne made explicit-that because Bendix was
declaratory of supreme national law, Article III gave it a stare decisis effect
in subsequent cases that the state courts could not withhold. As was true
of Congress in Boerne, the Ohio court could not deny stare decisis effect
to the Court's interpretation of supreme law either (assumedly) by reading the Commerce Clause differently from the way Bendix previously had
done or by accepting Bendix's reading but denying a remedy for violations
of it.
Reynoldsville's separate ruling, also premised on the Supremacy
Clause, that Ohio could not invoke its retroactivity law as a kind of "adequate state ground" for denying relief to out-of-state victims of Bendix violations furnished another important bar to state court remedial manipulation nullifying the stare decisis effect of Court precedents in later
cases.6 9 5 The Court likewise has refused to let states rely on local harmless error law to deny relief for violations that are prejudicial under fed696
eral law.
Notably, Hyde did not build her "ingenious" theory out of whole
cloth. Instead, her lawyers drew heavily on Professor Fallon and Meltzer's
view that Article III courts have broad discretion to withhold relief in individual cases over which they have jurisdiction and in which they have
found violations of federal law-based, for example, on the novelty of the
legal principle on which the winning party prevailed-as long as the overall structure ofjudicial remedies is capable as a general matter of keeping
the government within the bounds of law.69 7 Following Fallon and
Meltzer, Hyde distilled this principle from three of the Court's own "remedial" doctrines. The first gives states "leeway in designing a remedy"
for previously collected unconstitutional taxes. 698 The second gives state
694. Id.

695. See id. at 752; Harper, 509 U.S. at 97; supra note 691 and accompanying text.
696. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1966).
697. See Brief for Respondent at *12, *16, *20, Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514
U.S. 749 (1995) (No. 94(-3) (available in 1994 WL 699710) (citing Fallon & Meltzer, supra
note 37, at 1765, 1789, 1798); supra note 399; infra notes 747, 774-799 and accompanying
text. Fallon and Meltzer discuss the remedial discretion of federal courts faced with
violations of federal law. Hyde asked that the Court permit the Ohio high court to exercise
the same discretion, or that the Court exercise its own remedial discretion and impose the
same remedy as the Ohio court had. See Brief for Respondent at *46 -*50.
698. Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 755.
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officials sued under section 1983 a qualified immunity from damages for
actions in violation of federal legal principles that were not clearly established when the official allegedly harmed the plaintiff.69 9 The third withholds "retroactive" habeas relief (under the doctrine of Teague v. Lane)
from prisoners relying on constitutional claims about the validity of which
reasonable judges could have disagreed when the prisoners' convictions
700
became final after direct review.
The Court easily distinguished the tax cases because there the state
courts provided a remedy, just not the one the claimant sought.70 1 The
qualified immunity and Teague analogies presented a harder question: If
the Supremacy Clause does not require relief against public officials or
courts that harmed or convicted individuals in violation of constitutional
principles announced in intervening Court decisions, why insist on a remedy for a discriminatory statute of limitations that the Ohio Legislature
adopted and the plaintiff sued under before Bendix held it unconstitutional? In answering this question, the majority first noted that the official action shielded from redress by the qualified immunity and Teague
doctrines arguably rests on "a previously-existing, separate constitutional
legal ground"-i.e., that when the action occurred there was no "'clearly
established"' law barring it.70 2 Any discretionary withholding of relief,
that is, benefited only state officials and courts that had not demonstrably
departed from their Supremacy Clause duties when they acted, thus evidently moderating an Article III court's constitutionally mandatory remedial response.
As we will soon see, this first explanation does not distinguish the
actions of the Ohio Legislature in Reynoldsville, and does not always justify
the official actions protected by the qualified immunity doctrine. 70 3 Perhaps for this reason, the Court offered another explanation. Accepting
that qualified immunity's and Teague's choice of constitutional law in
favor of that in existence when the official action occurred "does reflect
certain remedial considerations," the Court simply deemed those "policy
justifications"-a fear of dampening the ardor of public officials in the
discharge of their duties in the qualified immunity context; "finality-related concerns" in the Teague context-more "special... as a basis for...
an exception" to the Supremacy Clause than Hyde's "simple reliance" on
prior law.704 This explanation also is unsatisfying. Although it takes ac699. See id. at 757-58 (discussing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
700. See id. at 758-59 (discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
701. Compare id. at 755 (to cure discriminatory tax, state need not refund taxes to
disfavored group and instead may choose to collect additional taxes from previously
favored group (citing cases)), with id. at 753 (Ohio ruling "provid[ed] no remedy"); infra
notes 735, 775-777 and accompanying text (distinguishing effectualness implications of
denying all, and choosing among, remedies).
702. Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at 757-58 (citation omitted); see id. at 758-59.
703. See infra text following note 704; infra notes 757-760, 775-789 and
accompanying text.
704. Reynoldsville 514 U.S. at 759.
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count of Hyde's interests, it ignores those of the Ohio Legislature, which
presumedly left its preexisting statute of limitations in effect and forbore
selecting among alternatives (e.g., lengthening the limitations period for
all plaintiffs to accommodate those suing out-of-staters) in reliance on
preexisting constitutional law. A concern for Ohio's ability to devise its
own compensatory scheme within the confines of the Constitution as the
Legislature reasonably understood it at the time arguably warrants the
same dispensation as qualified immunity gives public officials, and Teague
gives state judges, who forbore acting differently based on preexisting
law.
Hyde's ingenuity thus presented the Court with a conundrum it did
not entirely solve: How can its entrenched qualified immunity and
Teague rules coexist with the Supremacy Clause and (in cases in which
they deny the Court's prior decisions stare decisis effect) Article III? If
Congress and the state courts cannot force Article III courts, in deciding
cases within theirjurisdiction, to choose law other than the constitutional
law of the matter, and if Chief Justice Marshall was right that a judgemade decision to do the same thing is "treason to the Constitution," how
can the Courtjustify choosing "old" as opposed to "new" constitutional
law in adjudicating civil rights and habeas cases? Recall Klein, which forbade Congress to rely on sovereign immunity to deny federal courts the
power to remedy violations of supreme law that the Court's grant ofjuris70 5
If
diction and the judicial power otherwise forced the Court to notice.
sovereign immunity acted as an unconstitutional remedial manipulation
in Klein, how can qualified immunity and Teague escape the same
conclusion?
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion begs the same question. Writing
separately to record his "doubt that the case ... presents any issue of
remedies or of remedial discretion at all" and resorting to Marbury's ocular imagery, Justice Scalia took a hard line on the Court's Supremacy
Clause duty to attend to supreme law and disregard-i.e., void-contrary
state law, thus ensuring that the latter does "not withstand" the former.
A court does not-in the nature of things it can not-give a
"remedy" for an unconstitutional statute, since an unconstitutional statute is not in itself a cognizable "wrong." (If it were,
every citizen would have standing to challenge every law.) In
fact, what a court does with regard to an unconstitutional law is
simply to ignore it. It decides the case, "disregardingthe [unconstitutional] law," Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803)
(emphasis added), because a law repugnant to the Constitution
70 6
"is void, and is as no law[.]"
Scalia relied on a distinction between (1) unconstitutional state "law"
(e.g., Ohio's unconstitutional statute of limitations), which federal courts
705. See supra notes 596-599 and accompanying text.
706. Reynoldsvile, 514 U.S. at 759-60 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376 (1880); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923)).
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always are obliged to "void," and (2) mere "cognizable 'wrong[s],"' or
official torts, which judges may properly be forbidden to "remedy" by
qualified immunity and like doctrines. Scalia failed, however, to say why
the distinction justifies the difference in treatment of unconstitutional
laws and torts and, particularly, how a court avoids constitutional treason
when an official's unconstitutional act is "cognizable"-i.e., when, as in
the qualified immunity cases, 70 7 the court has the act before its eyes-and
yet denies relief. He also failed to explain why (under his analysis) unconstitutional state court decisions of the sort reviewed in the Teague context fall in the "official tort," not the "state law," category.
Reynoldsville thus confirms the principle that Article III courts must
effectuate their independent federal legal determinations in reviewing
state decisions, but it does not adequately explain how qualified immunity and Teague can coexist with that principle. We answer that question
in Part III, after completing our exegesis of the doctrine through which
the Court has carried into operation the qualitative judicial protections
on which the Framers relied to cure the "vices" of state law.
E. PreservingSpot-Checking Practicalities: Northern Pipeline
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the

Court held in violation of Article III a bankruptcy act giving Article I
judges jurisdiction over all civil matters "'related"' to bankruptcy proceedings, subject to independent Article III court review of legal and
mixed conclusions and "clear error" review of factfindings.70 8 At issue
was a bankruptcy judge's adjudication of contract, coercion, and misrepresentation claims under state
law that a bankruptcy petitioner had as70 9
serted against a creditor.
The decision's limits on Article I court jurisdiction are not clear.
The plurality applied a rule that, although broad-all adjudicatory acts
encompassed by "the judicial power of the United States must be exercised by courts having the [independence-assuring] attributes prescribed
in Art. III"-was riddled with exceptions-e.g., territorial and District of
Columbia courts, courts martial, and administrative adjudication of "public rights" (roughly statutory rights lacking close constitutional or common law analogues).710 The plurality also acknowledged Congress's
power to assign "virtually all matters that might be heard in Art. III courts
...to state courts," but dismissed this qualification as unimportant because it raised no "separation of powers threat[ ] .""7
Two concurring
Justices adopted a narrower approach, objecting only to the act's assign707. See infta notes 753-760, 774-800 and accompanying text.
708. 458 U.S. 50, 55 & n.5, 69 (1982) (plurality opinion) (relying on dicta in, e.g.,
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48-49, 56-58 (1932); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)).
709. See id. at 56.
710. Id. at 59, 63-70 & n.25 (plurality opinion).
711. Id. at 64 n.15 (plurality opinion).
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ment to Article I judges of broad categories of state law claims. 7 12 Since

Northern Pipeline, the Court has taken a still narrower approach, letting
administrative agencies adjudicate certain private state law disputes, albeit ones generated entirely by agency proceedings. 7 13 Interestingly, if
the disputes at issue in these later cases had been excluded from Article I
courts, they probably would have been shifted by Congress to Article III
courts. The disputes accordingly presented a choice of federal forums
that did have significant separation of powers-but no important federalism-implications.
Without precisely teasing out the rule of Northern Pipeline and its
progeny, it is possible to discern several principles: (1) Article III places
some limits on Congress's ability to assign federal questions to Article I
courts lacking the independence "attributes prescribed in Art. III." (2)
An Article III court's ability independently to review the Article I court's
conclusions does not suffice to avoid the Article III problem, because
"the constitutional requirements for the exercise of the judicial power
must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal." 71 4 (3)
Congress may, though, leave virtually any federal question to the state
courts, despite their lack of Article III attributes and absent appellate review by Article III courts. And (4) factors weighing against allowing
Article I court authority are the breadth of the grant of adjudicatory
power, the proximity of the questions assigned to ones that have long
existed at common law, as opposed to ones exclusively of Congress's creation, and the intermingling of the questions assigned with, or their encompassing of, state law questions.
Scholars on both sides of the debate over whether Article III requires
federal court review of federal questions have found solace in one or another of the principles that emerge from Northern Pipeline and its progeny,
without, however, accounting for the remaining implications. Professors
Amar and Sager note Northern Pipeline's reasoning that adjudication by
Article I judges lacking "independence from political forces" neutralizes
Article III's insistence upon politically immunized judges and use that
reasoning to support a constitutional rule requiring federal appellate review of state court federal question decisions. 7 15 But a Northern Pipeline
analogy should push Amar and Sager to the view-which both reject 7 16-

712. See id. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
713. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858
(1986) (permitting administrative agency to entertain state law counterclaims in federal
reparation proceedings); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
593-94 (1985) (permitting Congress to require submission to private arbitrators of certain
disputes between private companies arising out of an administrative pesticides registration
process in which one company piggy-backs on data submitted by another).
714. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.39 (plurality opinion); see id. at 79-81
(plurality opinion); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
715. Id. at 60 n.10 (plurality opinion); see Amar, supra note 17, at 225-26 & nn.78 &
81, 234-38; Sager, supra note 17, at 62-65.
716. See Amar, supra note 17, at 212-13, 230; Sager, supra note 17, at 34-35.
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that federal appellate review cannot suffice because federal question
cases must begin as well as end before independent Article III judges. In
contrast, Professor Redish argues that the Constitution's independenceprotecting "provision means only that if and when Congress employs
judges of the federal courts as ... enforcers of federal law, it may not
interfere with their independence." 7 17 But, if so, why forbid Congress to
employ Article I judges (as NorthernPipeline did) when doing so does not
undermine Article III judges' independence in cases within their
jurisdiction?
Assimilating all of the principles that emerge from the Northern
Pipeline cases, our analysis identifies a previously unacknowledged mechanism through which the doctrine enables independent judges to discharge their Article III duties. Contrary to the plurality's justification of
NorthernPipelineon separation of powers, not federalism, grounds, 7 18 and
contrary to Amar's and Sager's use of the decision to justify decreasing
exclusive state court jurisdiction, the doctrine actually protects the
Framers' chosen federal structure by increasing Congress's incentive to
rely on state court jurisdiction-subject, however, to Article Iff court reviewwhenever Congress resists exclusive Article III court jurisdiction. The
doctrine thus provides a modest constitutional assurance of the practical
conditions on which the Framers relied to make their federal supremacyassuring mechanism work, by impelling Congress to give Article III courts
jurisdiction to review state court decisions often enough to provide a
credible supremacy-maintaining "spot check." If Congress wants to use
nationally committed tribunals to decide broad swaths of cases with common law analogues but affecting federal interests (cases the Framers
might have expected to arise in state courts but then to prompt federal
appeals), yet does not want to use Article III courts alone (e.g., because
those courts are too insulated from conditions "on the ground"), Northern
Pipeline makes Congress place those matters initially in state courts ("on
the ground"), subject to appeal to nationally committed Article III courts.
In this light, what triggers the Northern Pipeline doctrine is not the
assignment to Article I courts of any and all state law claims but, rather,
the assignment to those courts of particular types of state law claims that,
but for their conferral on Article I courts, almost assuredly would have
been conferred on state courts subject to later federal appeal. Northern
Pipeline thus creates a modest impetus to use the hybridized state-federal
adjudicatory mechanism that was one of the Framers' most important innovations and that the Court so strenuously defended in Martin, Cohens,
and The Mayor against attacks premised on its novelly hybridized structure.

717. Redish, supra note 9, at 150 (emphasis omitted); see Velasco, supra note 8, at
681-84 & n.52.
718. See supra notes 708-712 and accompanying text.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:696

F. Revisiting Hart's Dialogue
At the tail end of Henry Hart's famous Dialogue, he briefly discusses a
principal topic of this Article-the relative constitutional responsibilities
of state and federal courts in federal question cases-in identifying an allpurpose back-up to supremacy-maintaining federal courts.
A. The state courts. In the scheme of the Constitution,
they are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in
many cases they may be the ultimate ones. If they were to fail,
and if Congress had taken away the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction and been upheld in doing so, then we really would
be sunk.
Q. But Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of state
courts, too, in federal matters.
A. Congress can't do it unconstitutionally. The state
courts always have a general jurisdiction to fall back on. And the
Supremacy Clause binds them to exercise thatjurisdiction in accordance with the Constitution.
Q. But the Supreme Court could reverse their decisions.
A. Not lawfully, if the decisions were in accordance with
the Constitution. Congress can't shut the Supreme Court off
from the merits and give it jurisdiction simply to reverse. Not,
anyway, if I'm right ...

that jurisdiction always is jurisdiction

719
only to decide constitutionally.
Slightly recasting this passage reveals how deeply unsettling was the note
on which Hart ended his influential analysis of federal jurisdiction:
Q. You said the Constitution lets state courts hear nearly
all federal questions. Why is that a good way to protect federal
law?
A. Because the Supremacy Clause binds state courts to exercise that jurisdiction in accordance with the Constitution.
Q. Gee, that seems like a thin reed. Why can't Congress
give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction and require it to
reverse state court decisions made in accordance with the
Constitution?
A. Congress can't keep the Supreme Court from deciding
cases in accordance with the Constitution. In the appeal you
describe, the Court would have to ignore Congress's manipulation of its jurisdiction and affirm.
Q. What a reliefi But may Congress give state courts the
final say in most or all federal questions cases?
720
A. Yes, it may.

Q. What if Congress did that and the state courts shirked
their Supremacy Clause duty?
719. Hart, supra note 5, at 1401-02.
720. See id. at 1363-64 ("Congress seems to have plenary power to limit federal
jurisdiction when the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be brought, if at all, in

a state court.").
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A. We'd be sunk.
When written, a year before Brown v. Board of Education,721 as the
federal administrative state was expanding and federal judicial review appeared to be contracting, 722 Hart's assurance of review by state courts
that Congress could not keep from enforcing federal rights was a relief.
But after 45 years of federal court protection of federal rights to which
state courts have been less sympathetic, Hart's untempered concession
that, if Congress gives the state courts the final say over federal questions
and they shirk their Supremacy Clause duties, "we really would be sunk"
is not a relief. This has led Hart's disciples-relying on his admonitions
not to "read[ ] the Constitution as authorizing its own destruction" and
to read it instead to preserve "the essential role of the Supreme Court in
the constitutional plan"-to argue that Article III must require (at least
appellate) federal jurisdiction over all federal questions, else the federal
7 23
judiciary's essential role in the constitutional plan would be destroyed.
The problem, of course, is that Article III does not require federal "arising under" jurisdiction-as Hart was quick to point out.7 24 Our analysis
provides a different response to Hart's unsettling conclusion, based not on
the mandatory quantity, but on the mandatory quality, of Article III court
review of state decisions.
We begin where Hart began, with the principle that a constitution
generally should not be read to empower an agency the constitution creates and constrains to reconstitute itself so as to neutralize the constraints.
Although most observers accept this point, many roundly criticize Hart
for advocating an "essential role of the courts" limitation on Congress's
power to control the courts that (in Hart's own word) is "indeterminate"-i.e. (in his critics' words), "absolutely [lacking in any] indication
of exactly what [federal judicial] functions were deemed 'essential,' how
anyone was to answer that question, or on what basis [Hart] found a limitation in the Constitution." 725 This criticism is wrong in two senses. First,
"essential functions" analysis is determinate enough to have generated
huge chunks of American constitutional law, including all separation of
powers doctrine and much doctrine devoted to federal-state relations.
Consider, for example, ChiefJustice Marshall's analysis of state taxation
of the National Bank:
How far [the states' power to tax federal entities is] controlled
by [the Constitution] must be a question of construction. In
making this construction, no principle not declared, can be ad721. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
722. See Hart, supra note 5, at 1377-81, 1391-95.

723. Id. at 1365; see, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 522, 527; Ratner, supra note 18,
at 160-61; Sager, supra note 17, at 42-68; see also Amar, supra note 17, at 248-49
(advocating a similar position but not linking it to Hart).
724. See supra note 720.
725. Hart, supra note 5, at 1365; Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate

Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and
External Examination, 27 Viii. L. Rev. 900, 906 (1982).
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missible, which would defeat the legitimate operations of a
supreme government. It is of the very essence of supremacy to
remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to
modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operation from their own influence. This effect
need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the declaration
of supremacy, so necessarily implied
in it, that the expression of
726
it could not make it more certain.
Second, Hart did specify the essential judicial functions and where
they and their limitations on Congress are found in the Constitution.
That specification is the subject of his entire article. The reasons those
"essentialities" are obscure to writers focused on the quantity of federal
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the states are that (1) Hart discussed them entirely in
the context of federal jurisdiction vis-a-vis other federal branches, and (2)
they have nothing to do with the essential quantity of federal jurisdiction
and everything to do with the essential qualities that Article III requires
federal judges to exhibit in exercising whatever jurisdiction Congress
gives them to review federal official behavior.
What are those qualities? If Hart's Dialogue were instead a list it
would look something like this:
1. Congress's power to declare exceptions to federal jurisdiction to review federal agency action is plenary,
unless so little is left that the
27
exceptions "engulf the

7

rule."

2.

Congress also has nearly plenary control over whether to waive sovereign immunity and permit itself to be sued and over the appropriate
728
remedy for wrongs in cases in which it has conferred jurisdiction.
3. There are, however, a number of practicaland quality-focused limits
on Congress's power that, taken as a whole, entail the federal courts'
7 29
essential function:
a. Pragmatically, Congress often cannot immunize the United
States from suit or withdraw federal jurisdiction to review its behavior because (i) doing so is politically untenable; (ii) sovereign
726. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819); see, e.g., Printz v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997) (barring congressional commandeering of state
executive officials, on "consideration of the structure of the Constitution .. . [and] its
'essential postulate[s]'" (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322
(1934))); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (federal statute setting minimum
voting age in state elections interferes with states' "essential function"); Principality of
Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322, 328-29 (withdrawing states' sovereign and Eleventh Amendment
immunity when they are sued by the United States or another state for reasons "inherent in
the constitutional plan" and "essential to the peace of the Union"); Taylor v. Beckham, 178
U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900) (voiding federal statutory qualifications for state office because
they usurp a power "obviously essential to the independence of the states").
727. Hart, supra note 5, at 1364, 1367-68, 1372-73. Hart focuses at some points on
Supreme Court jurisdiction, see, e.g., id. at 1363-65, and at other points on lower federal
court jurisdiction, see id. at 1387-88, 1396.
728. See id. at 1366-74.
729. See id. at 1365.
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immunity only immunizes the United States itself and not individual officers from suit and, once its employees are sued, the
government has an incentive to protect them by providing a remedy against itself; and (iii) cutting out the courts deprives
730
Congress of too important a tool for enforcing its policies.
73 1
b. If Congress gives federal courts criminal or civil enforcement,
or even preenforcement, jurisdiction over agency behavior-including merely a "general" grant of federal question or habeas
jurisdiction 7 32-Congress may not then (i) forbid the Court to
apply the whole constitutional law in deciding the validity of the
government acts before it;733 (ii) tell the court how to decide the
constitutional question thus presented;78 4 or, apparently, (iii)
withhold particular remedies for violations thus found "'without
735
[providing] other modes of redress."
Hart's application of the very last set of principles to cases covered by
a general grant of habeas jurisdiction to review federal custody under
federal law illustrates his overall conclusions:
The great and generating principle of this whole body of law
[is] that the Constitution always applies when a court is sitting
with jurisdiction in habeas corpus. For then the court has always
to inquire, not only whether the statutes have been observed,
but whether the petitioner before it has been "deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," or injured in
any other way in violation of the fundamental law.
That principle forbids a constitutional court... from ever
accepting as an adequate return to the writ the mere statement
that what has been done is authorized by act of Congress. The
inquiry remains, if Marbury v. Madison still stands, whether the
act of Congress is consistent with the fundamental law. Only
upon such a principle could the Court reject, as it surely would,
a return to the writ which informed it that the applicant ... lay
730. See id. at 1367, 1370; id. at 1397 ("Were the framers wholly mistaken in thinking
that, as a matter of the hard facts of power, a government needs courts to vindicate its
decisions? Is there some new science of government that tells how to do it in some other

way?").
731. See id. at 1372, 1378-83.
732. See id. at 1373-75, 1387-88, 1396.
733. See id. at 1379-80, 1383.
734. See id. at 1373 ("[flf Congress directs an Article III court to decide a case, I can
easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court how to
decide it. Rutledge makes that point clearly in the Yakus case, as the Court itself made it
clear long ago in United States v. Klein." (footnotes omitted)).
735. Id. at 1368 (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 250 (1845) (emphasis
added)); see id. at 1366 ("The power of Congress to regulate jurisdiction gives it a pretty
complete power over remedies... [and] to deny rights," but the grant ofjurisdiction and
"[t]he denial of any remedy" is constitutionally problematic.).
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stretched upon a rack with pins driven in behind his finger nails
pursuant to authority duly conferred by statute .... 736
The extent to which Hart's Dialogue foreshadows our idea of the
judicial power should now be clear. The insight we claim is this: Hart's
brilliant conception of the "essential functions" of the federal courts and
the federal system-developed entirely in service of a separation of powers constraint on the capacity of the national administrative state to subvert the supremacy of federal law-was in fact the brilliant conception of
those courts and that system that the Framers and Supreme Court previously had developed in service of a separation of powers cum federalism
constraint on the power of Congress and the states to subvert the
supremacy of federal law. Hart, simply (brilliantly) retooled the Framers'
conception, and we (embarrassing to say, this far into a long article) have
simply re-retooled it back to its original conception.
III. "THE JUDICIAL POWER" AND THREE CONSTITUTIONALLY
EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF LAW RULES: QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY, TEA GUE, AND
SECTION 2254(d) (1)

737

The Framers' gamble paid off. Except for Congress's temporary
withdrawal of appellate (but not original) habeas jurisdiction in the
McCardle affair, 738 and despite recent proposals to withdraw jurisdiction

over desegregation, school prayer, abortion, and other cases, 73 9 the juris-

diction-preserving practicalities on which the Framers relied (boosted
modestly by Northern Pipeline) have sustained (1) federal jurisdiction over
controversial federal questions and (2) credible supervision of state
judges' Supremacy Clause functions. As Hayburn's Case, Marbury, Gordon,
Klein, Crowell, Plaut, and Boerne reveal, the bigger threat is not that Congress
will withhold jurisdiction over importantfederal questions but that it will confer
jurisdiction and try to control its exercise. Martin, Cohens, Ableman, The Mayor,
and Reynoldsville reveal a similar temptation on the part of the states and
state courts to frustrate aspects of "[t]he judicial Power." Moreover,
through the influence of the states in Congress, 7 40 the latter threat may
intensify the former one. Posing this last danger is the gloss that three
circuit courts recently have placed on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), as
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
736. Id. at 1393-94.
737. Some of the ideas in this Part were initially developed by Professor Liebman in
briefs for the petitioner in Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd,
117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), relief granted on remand, 124 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 739 (1998) (discussed infra notes 822-848 and accompanying text).
738. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); see Liebman & Hertz, supra
note 389, § 2.4d, at 47-48 (discussing 1885 restoration of Court's appellate habeas
jurisdiction); supra note 361.
739. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 37, at 350-51 nn.15-16 (listing proposals).
740. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
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which obliges Article III courts (1) to consider the legality under federal
law of state decisions upholding custody but (2) to give effect to state
decisions found to conflict with federal law, unless the conflict with
supreme law is "more than clear" or is "grave." 74 1
Analyzing section 2254(d) (1) requires us first to resolve an issue left
open by Reynoldsville: whether the Court (in Marshall's terms) commits
constitutional treason when it (1) gives state officials qualified immunity
for acts violating federal law that was not "clearly established" when the
acts occurred, or (2) (under the Teague rule) denies state prisoners
habeas relief based on "new rules" of federal law that are in effect when
the habeas petition is adjudicated but were not in effect when the prisoners' convictions became final in state court. 742 Section 2254(d) (1) similarly compels a temporally focused choice of law forbidding relief based
on a federal court's reading of federal law when it rules and requiring it
instead to apply law from an earlier time. If "[t] he judicial Power" forbids
all constitutionally exclusive choices of law, then important lines of recent Court precedent are invalid. And if some such rules can coexist with
the Framers' and the Court's conception of that Power, it becomes important to know which rules are permissible and why.
A simple answer might be that legal blinders Congress imposes on the
courts present separation of powers problems that blinders the courts volunteer to wear do not-much as the President's, Congress's, or a state
court's "revision" or "overruling" of a federal district court's decision
presents problems that reversal or overruling by the same or a superior
federal court does not. 743 Although it is arguable that strategic exercises
of judicial restraint might sometimes enhance the prestige and thus the
checking capacity of the federal courts vis-4.-vis the other branches and
the states, we are unwilling so easily to abandon the Framers' and
Marshall's belief that the federal courts' prestige and authority depend
above all else on their unstinting exercise of supremacy-maintaining responsibility in every case within their jurisdiction, no matter how difficult.

741. See decisions cited supra note 33; infra note 822.
742. See supra notes 667, 688-707 and accompanying text.
743. See, e.g., Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995)
(distinguishing reversal by superior federal court from reversal by Congress); Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 525-26 (1859) (distinguishing reversal by superior federal

court from reversal by state courts); Amar, supra note 17, at 267 (suggesting that selfimposed limit on jurisdiction when Court denies certiorari is less serious than
congressional denial of jurisdiction); Friedman, supra note 25, at 11-27 (describing
qualified immunity and Teague as permissible self-imposed constraints). Compare Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991) (declining to adhere to stare decisis and overruling
prior constitutional holding), with City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997)

(Congress may not order or expect the Supreme Court to "treat its [constitutional]
precedents with [less than] the respect due them under settled principles, including stare

decisis").
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A. Qualified Immunity and Teague
Under the qualified immunity rule, "government officials performing discretionary functions[ ] generally are shielded from [damages] liability... insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." 74 Analogously, Teague "prevents a federal court from granting
habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a [new] rule announced
after his conviction and sentence became final." 745 A rule is "new" and
thus unavailable for application on habeas if, at the time the prisoner's
conviction became final, the rule was one about which "'reasonable ju746
rists [could] disagree.'"
Our analysis suggests three possible understandings of each doctrine. First, each might require the reviewing court to "defer" to the public official's or state court's "reasonable" interpretation of federal law.
Second, as Fallon and Meltzer's account of the doctrines suggests, each
may require the reviewing court to deny relief, despite concluding that a
constitutional violation occurred, because the official or court acted "reasonably" in believing that the behavior or decision at issue was legally
permissible. 74 7 Third, both doctrines may require the reviewing court to
apply the governing federal rule independently and to afford necessary
relief, while (a) imposing a choice of law in favor of the rule in effect
when the public official or state court acted, and (b) defining that rule as
the one that "all reasonable actors" would have understood to be in effect
at that time. The first two understandings treat qualified immunity and
Teague as addressing the merits, i.e., whether a violation occurred and, if
so, what remedy should be imposed. In doing so, the first understanding
threatens the "independent interpretation" ingredient of "[t] he judicial
Power"; the second understanding preserves independent interpretation
but threatens the "remedial effectualness" ingredient. The third understanding treats the "reasonableness" test as addressing not the merits but
the threshold question of what federal legal standard the reviewing court
will apply when it eventually reaches the merits. It thus preserves the
independence and effectualness ingredients but threatens the "whole
supreme law" principle.
An example illustrates the three approaches. Assume that A is falsely
convicted based on her own confession. Assume further that, after being
released upon conclusive proof of her innocence, A brings a federal sec744. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

745. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). The doctrine has exceptions for
new rules that (1) immunize behavior from criminal sanction or (2) create "watershed"
criminal procedure protections against convicting the innocent. See id. at 396.
746. Id. at 395 (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990)) (alteration in
original). A conviction becomes final upon completion of direct review in the state courts
and certiorari review in the Supreme Court. See id. at 390.
747. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 37, at 1818-24 (discussed infra notes 774-799
and accompanying text).
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don 1983 action for damages against the police officers who interrogated
her, claiming they violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
by using a series of psychological stratagems to make her confess "invol748
untarily," in contravention of the 1936 rule of Brown v. Mississippi,
which asks "whether under the totality of the circumstances the defendant's will was overborne." 749 The Court repeatedly has defined the test as
posing a mixed question of law and fact that Article III courts are dutybound to answer independently. 750 Assume, finally, that the defendant
police officers claim qualified immunity. Switching to a habeas scenario,
assume that, instead of being released, A is convicted at trial and her
conviction is affirmed by the state's high court on direct appeal over her
"involuntary confession" objection. Assume that A then seeks federal
habeas relief on the same ground, and the state invokes Teague.
Now assume that in each case the reviewing federal court finds the
"voluntariness" question (quoting Marshall in Cohens)75 1 "difficult[ ]" or
"doubtful" under the totality of circumstances but, applying its best judgment, would conclude that A's will was overborne by the interrogation.
Under the first (deference) approach above, the reviewing court would
defer to the police officers' or state court's reasonable judgment that the
officers committed no constitutional violation under the circumstances,
though the reviewing court's independentjudgment on that question was
to the contrary. Under the second (remedial limits) approach, the result
would be the same but the analysis would differ: The reviewing court
would reach its own independentjudgment that a violation occurred but
would withhold relief because the officers' or state court's judgment,
although in error, was not "unreasonably" so. Under the third (choice of
law) approach, the outcome as well as the analysis would differ. Because
the "voluntariness" test was well-established when the interrogation took
place (all reasonable police officers should have known of that standard
based on Brown and subsequent decisions), the court would "choose"
Brown's voluntariness test as the law to apply, independently conclude
752
that A's will was overborne, and grant relief.
1. Interpretive Independence and Remedial Effectualness. - In the qualified immunity context, after initially toying with the third (choice of law)
748. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
749. Veilleux v. Perschau, 101 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see, e.g.,
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
750. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 694 (1993).
751. See supra notes 664-667 and accompanying text.
752. The choice among these approaches matters. Compare Lindh v. Murphy, 96
F.3d 856, 876-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.) (applying second of three
approaches described in text and concluding that denial of cross-examination into
potential bias of prosecution witness, although unconstitutional in the opinion of "some
members" of the court, was not sufficiently grave or "unreasonable" to warrant habeas
relief), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997), with Lindh v. Murphy, 124 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir.
1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (on remand, after reversal, applying third of three approaches
described in text and granting relief), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 739 (1998).

854

COLUMBIA LAW REViEW

[Vol. 98:696

approach, the Court has opted for the second (remedial limits) approach. In the Teague context, the Court has rejected the second and
opted for the third approach. We first consider how this happened and
then why.
a. Qualified Immunity. - In applying qualified immunity, the Court
repeatedly has told federal courts to resolve as a threshold matterbefore reaching "the merits"-the question whether the constitutional
rule under which the plaintiff claims relief was "clearly established" when
the defendant official allegedly harmed her.7 5 3 Only if the rule was

clearly established may the reviewing court reach the merits. In Mitchell v.
Forsyth, in 1985, the Court further ruled that a defendant official may take
an immediate, interlocutory appeal when a trial court denies her motion
to dismiss a complaint that, she claims, relies on a rule that was not clearly
established when the violation allegedly occurred. 754 Such rulings are
immediately appealable, the Court concluded, because they fall within
the "'small class [of interlocutory orders] which finally determine claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action...
[and are] too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
' 755
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. '
Mitchell thus concluded "that a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct
from the merits of the plaintiffs claim that his rights have been violated"-it does not turn on "the correctness of the plaintiffs version of
the facts, nor even . . . [on] whether the plaintiffs allegations actually

state a claim... [but only on] whether the legal norms allegedly violated
by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged
75 6
actions."
Mitchell thus seemed to adopt the third approach to qualified immunity, requiring a choice of law in favor of "the legal norms... [that] were
clearly established at the time of the challenged actions." Eschewing the
first (deference) approach, reviewing courts were not to say, in effect: "In
our judgment, a violation of the governing constitutional norm has occurred. But, deferring to the defendant's 'reasonable' judgment, we will
not find a violation." Nor, pursuant to the second approach, were courts
to say: "The defendant's alleged conduct violates the governing federal
legal standard, but damages are unavailable, even so, because the question is so close under the circumstances that the violation is not 'unreasonable."' Instead, the reviewing court had only to say: "The constitutional norm that applies-the rule all 'reasonable' officials would have
known applied at the time the incident occurred-is X. Relief is denied
because the plaintiff does not claim the defendant violated X (or be753. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
754. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-29.
755. Id. at 524-25 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546

(1949)).
756. Id. at 527-28 (emphasis added).
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cause, when we 'look to' the merits under rule X, we see that defendant
did not violate the governing law) ."
In Anderson v. Creighton,7 57 in 1987, the Court took a different tack
(albeit without expressly overruling Mitchell). The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant officer lacked probable cause for mistakenly believing that
a bank robber was hiding in their home when the officer searched it.
Because the "probable cause" standard was well established, the lower
court and Supreme Court dissent deemed qualified immunity inapplicable and called for consideration of the merits. 758 The majority ruled,
however, that a police officer who had "reasonably but mistakenly conclude[d] that probable cause [was] present ... should not be held personally liable" for damages. 75 9 Adopting the second approach above
(making damages unavailable in close cases), the Court ruled that the
officer deserved immunity-though he could not reasonably have mistaken the governing standard when he acted-if he could show that "a
reasonable officer could have believed [the particular] . . . search to be
lawful, in light of [the] clearly established law and the information [he]
760
possessed."
b. Teague. - The Teague doctrine requires federal courts to treat
as a "threshold" question-prior to the merits-whether the legal rule
the habeas petitioner seeks to apply is "new" (i.e., was not in effect when
the petitioner's conviction became final) and thus is unavailable in
habeas cases. 76 ' In Wright v. IVest, in 1992, the Court addressed the question whether Teague requires either interpretive or remedial deference to
reasonable state court interpretations of the constitutional law governing
the suit (the first or second approach) or, rather-as the doctrine's
"threshold" status suggests-imposes a choice of preexisting law, while
obliging the reviewing court to apply that law independently and award
any relief the law warrants (the third approach).762 The answer Wright
gave left the Teague doctrine about where Mitchell had initially located the
qualified immunity doctrine, in the third, choice of law category.
The habeas petitioner in Wright claimed that Virginia had convicted
him unconstitutionally based on evidence insufficient to convince a rational juror of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 7 63-a standard the
Court had adopted 15 years earlier and identified as a "mixed question"
requiring independent federal court review. 764 The "sufficiency" issue in
757. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
758. See id. at 637-38; id. at 663-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
759. Id. at 641.
760. Id. (emphasis added). Confusion in the lower courts, see Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 37, at 1752-53 & n.111, suggests that Anderson's and Mitchel's analyses persist in
uneasy tension.
761. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1973 (1997); Goeke v. Branch,
514 U.S. 115, 117 (1995).
762. 505 U.S. 277, 284 (1992) (plurality opinion).
763. See id. at 283.
764. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979).
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Wright presented a close question under the circumstances-the court of
appeals having granted relief, the Supreme Court ultimately denying it.
Virginia argued that, under Teague, the Court had to defer to the state
court's reasonable answer to that close question, whether or not the
Court independently agreed with it. 7 65 The prisoner argued that Teague
merely defined the appropriate legal rule-the "rational juror" insufficiency test that was in effect when the case became final-which the
Court then was obliged to apply independently to the facts. 766
Presented with these arguments, three Justices interpreted Teague to
require the federal habeas court adjudicating the issue to "'defer"' to the
state court ruling on the question as long as reasonable minds could differ on whether the evidence in the case was sufficient to convince a rational juror beyond a reasonable doubt.76 7 FourJustices wrote orjoined
opinions concluding that Teague's "reasonableness" test comes into play
only when a court is trying to decide which rule to apply, obliging the
court thereafter to deploy the rule independently and grant the relief it
warrants no matter how close the case. 768 And the Court as a whole proceeded to adjudicate the "sufficiency" claim independently (and to deny
relief) .769 Since Wright, the Court repeatedly has granted habeas relief
based on its own independent resolution of "close" mixed questions, and
no Justice has recurred to the three Justices' contrary suggestion in
Wright.770

In her opinion in Wright, Teague's author,Justice O'Connor, rejected
the first understanding of Teague-requiring a federal court to defer to
reasonable, if (by the court's lights) erroneous, state court legal and
mixed conclusions. Evoking Marbuy, Justice O'Connor wrote:
[T] his does not mean that we have held in the past that federal
courts must presume the correctness of a state court's legal conclusions on habeas, or that a state court's incorrect legal determination has ever been allowed to stand because it was reasonable. We have always held that federal courts, even on habeas,
have an independent obligation to say what the law is.7 7 1
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Wright then rejected the second approach to Teague-imposing remedial limits t la Anderson in the qualified immunity arena-in favor of the third approach-imposing a choice
765. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 281-82, 294 (plurality opinion).
766. See id. at 294-95.
767. Id. at 291 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and Scalia,

J.).
768. See id. at 304-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun and Stevens,
JJ.); id. at 309 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
769. See id. at 295-97 (plurality opinion) (concluding, upon independently
considering the question, that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction-a
view adopted by all nine Justices).
770. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1995); Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 454 (1995); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 694 (1993).
771. Wight, 505 U.S. at 305 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of law Lla Mitchell. As explained by Justice Kennedy, Teague requires independent review and relief (if merited) when the prisoner relies on a
legal rule that was in effect at the time the state courts ruled and that was
intended from the start to apply to a wide range of situations, including
the one before the court-no matter how susceptible to reasonable disagreement that "mixed" question might be in the particular case:
Whether the prisoner [is Teague-barred] ... depends in large
part on the nature of the rule. If the rule in question is one
which of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific applications
without saying that those applications themselves create a new
rule. The [constitutional sufficiency of the evidence] rule... is
an example. By its very terms it provides a general standard
which calls for some examination of the facts ....

Where the

beginning point is a rule of this general application, a rule
designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so
novel that it forges a new rule .... 772
Justice Kennedy's approach divides rules relied on in habeas cases
into two types-general rules designed for a myriad of situations (e.g.,
the involuntary confession rule) and specific rules governing narrow categories of behavior. If long in effect, general rules make the habeas
choice of law easy. Not so specific rules, because the established ones
often do not cover the behavior actually before the court and only supply
a basis for extrapolating an appropriate rule by analogy. If the proper
analogy when the state court ruled was uncertain, as often will be the
case, the rule the state court chose is likely to seem "reasonable" and, if
so, under Justice Kennedy's analysis, will bind the federal court to the
same choice. Only occasionally will extrapolation from preexisting rules
reveal that the one the prisoner advances on habeas review was clearly the
correct one and that the different rule the state court chose was
"unreasonable."77 3
772. Id. at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra note 770 (citing recent decisions
utilizing Justice Kennedy's approach).
773. An example is Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Stringer v. Black, 503
U.S. 222 (1992). Before Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), the Court had left
open whether the Eighth Amendment requires resentencing when a court invalidates one
of several aggravating factors that a jury balanced against mitigating factors to reach a
death verdict. The Court previously had held that where the statute required the jury to
consider but not to "weigh" aggravators and mitigators, the invalidity of one of the
aggravators did not require resentencing; and the Mississippi Supreme Court had followed
the latter rule in the "weighing" context. See Stringer, 503 U.S. at 229-30. In Clemons,
however, the Court reversed the Mississippi court, ruling that, in "weighing" contexts,
invalidation of one of the aggravators does require resentencing. To decide whether
Clemons adopted a "new rule" that was Teague-barred in cases then pending on habeas, the
Court first considered whether the Clemons subrule had "emerge[d] . . . from any single
case." Id. at 232. Because no case had "dictated" the subrule, the Court considered the
impact of more general precedent, holding that the interplay of two lines of authority left
"no arguable basis to support the view ... that at the time petitioner's sentence became
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c. Why the Difference? - In our involuntary confession example, the
"reasonableness" of the officer's constitutional error immunizes him
from section 1983 damages, suggesting a "remedial limits" approach. But
the "reasonableness" of the state court decision finding no error does not
bar habeas relief under Teague, ruling out a "remedial limits," and adopting a "choice of law," approach. Thus, Fallon and Meltzer's account,
and
which assimilates both doctrines to a "remedial limits" approach 774
overlooks differences in the outcomes they generate, is incomplete.
Our analysis suggests two reasons why the Court has required Article
III courts in the qualified immunity, but not the Teague, context to deny
relief after reaching the merits and finding a violation of established federal law. First, in Hart's words, "[t] he denial of any remedy is one thing
.... But the denial of one remedy while another is left open ... can

rarely be of constitutional dimension." 775 Article III does not demand a
remedy for ever), effect of every violation of federal law but only a remedy
that preserves the law's supremacy by depriving contrary state action
(over which a court has jurisdiction) of official sanction. For that purpose, a declaration or injunction serves as well as damages-and qualified
immunity bars neither of the former. 776 Because qualified immunity
often leaves some relief available, it poses less of a threat to the remedial
effectualness ingredient of the judicial power than Teague, which almost
always bars the only available relief.7 77 This is not the whole answer, howfinal the Mississippi Supreme Court was permitted to apply a rule of automatic affirmance
...when one [of several aggravators] is invalid." Id. at 231. Accordingly, because, even
before C/emons, no "reasonable minds could differ" about its rule, the rule applied in
habeas. Id. Also holding unreasonable a state court's application of clearly established
Supreme Court precedents that were merely relevant to, but did not directly govern, the
issue at hand are, e.g., Tuggle v. Netherland, 516 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1995) (per curiam);
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-26 (1994) (per curiam).
774. Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 37, at 1813-24 (discussed supra notes 87, 697
and accompanying text; supra note 399; infra note 797).
775. Hart, supra note 5, at 1366.
776. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 2037 (1995); Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 37, at 1749 n.88, 1751 n.103, 1821. Because qualified immunity for state
officials is notjurisdictional, it potentially imposes qualitative constraints on the exercise of
jurisdiction that the Eleventh Amendment's outright withdrawal ofjurisdiction over suits
against states does not. Both types of immunity, however, limit available relief in a similarly
weak manner-forbidding one set of remedies (mainly damages) but allowing others
(mainly injunctions) that generally "permit the federal courts to ... hold state officials
responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States.' "Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (quoting Ex parte Young, 208 U.S. 123, 160
(1908)).
777. Because petitioners may only seek federal habeas relief after exhausting state
remedies through state decisions that thereafter are res judicata in subsequent state
actions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994), and because section 1983 relief in actions
challenging state procedures leading to conviction are barred unless the plaintiff first
overturns the conviction in state court or in federal habeas proceedings, see Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), a denial of habeas relief under Teague virtually
assures that no other relief is available. That state court remedies previously were available
to the prisoner might be dispositive of the due process question whether the prisoner had
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ever, because standing to secure, and the standards for, prospective relief
require a showing that unlawful acts are likely to occur and injure the
plaintiff in the future. These factors might possibly combine with qualiinjured by offified immunity to preclude relief for section 1983 plaintiffs
778
cial action in violation of then-existing federal law.
This leads to our second point. Recall that Madison's central goal at
the Convention was not to secure the supremacy of federal over state "authority," but-in the words of the Supremacy Clause that emerged from
the August revisions conforming it and the "arising under" clause-that
"[t]his Constitution and the laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme law of the Land; and the judges in the several States shall be
bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the constitutions or laws of
the several States to the contrary notwithstanding." 779 Repeatedly and
consistently in Madison's and his allies' writings, speeches, and design of
the national judiciary and national negative, and in Rutledge's and
Martin's Supremacy Clause substitutes for the negative, it was the "injustices" and "mutability of the laws of the States," and the capacity of the
"decisions" of "the Judges of the several States" to control them, on which
the Constitution focused. 780 It is that "state law" and those state "decisions" that may "not[ ]withstand" contrary federal "law."
Moreover, it was the role of state 'judgments" in making and controlling state "law" on which ChiefJustice Marshall premised judicial review
of the former in Cohens.78 1 Thus, after noting the federal judiciary's duty
to treat as "absolutely void" the "laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States," Marshall asked:
"Is it unreasonable that [the judiciary] should also be empowered to decide on the judgment of a State tribunal enforcing such unconstitutional
a fair opportunity to challenge his conviction, but is not dispositive of the Article III

question whether federal courts with jurisdiction can properly effectuate their conclusion
that state decisional law conflicts with supreme law.
778. The Court has-denied constitutional standing to section 1983 plaintiffs seeking
prospective relief who failed to show an alleged "threat of injury... [that was] both 'real

and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969)); see also
decisions cited infra note 788 (discussing similar limits on the availability of section 1983
injunctions). Notably, however, the Court has never directly held that Article III permits a
federal court to deny requested monetary and prospective relief to a plaintiff who has
constitutional standing to sue an official for actual injuries caused by the official's violation
of existing constitutional law-i.e., to a plaintiff capable of obliging a federal court to
"look" at that violation. Cf. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991) (per curiarn)
(denying damages on qualified immunity grounds to plaintiff who did not seek other
relief); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 n.6 (dismissing injunction action for lack of constitutional
standing after damages action was voluntarily severed for subsequent separate trial); Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 37, at 267-68 & nn.4 & 5 (suggesting that issue is open).
779. See supra notes 53-55, 238-239, 247-249 and accompanying text.
780. 10 Madison Papers, supra note 55, at 212 (emphasis added); see supra notes
53-62, 109-113, 142-147, 152-154, 159-163, 166-173, 312 and accompanying text.
781. See supra notes 489-498, 664-667 and accompanying text.
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law?" 782 He elsewhere answered that "[t]here is... nothing in ... our
constitution... which would justify the opinion, that the confidence reposed in the States was so implicit, as to leave in them and their tribunals
the power of resisting or defeating, in the form of law, the legitimate measures of the Union."783 The Court's numerous decisions enforcing a
"duty" of "independent" federal review of "mixed" legal and factual state
court determinations because of their capacity to make "law" rest on the
same principle, that state judicial decisions making unconstitutional law
7 84
are no less "void" than state statutes doing the same.
These considerations explain the Court's devotion to the independence and remedial effectualness principles in the Teague/habeas context. Habeas cases require federal judges to review the "law" made by
state "Judges . . .in their decisions." Such cases accordingly subject to
federal judicial scrutiny the constitutionally crucial behavior of the very
state actors to whom the Supremacy Clause entrusts the central structural
function of maintaining the fidelity of all state law and state action to
supreme law-the very behavior and actors that Article III gives the national judiciary the central structural function of superintending through
the jurisdiction that Congress finds it necessary and proper to confer.
Qualified immunity differs from Teague in this regard. "Law" as the
Framers understood it is not made at the end of a police officer's baton,
nor is the officer's stroke of the baton behavior to which the Constitution
entrusts a supremacy-maintaining function. Structural supremacy-based
concerns-concerns that override all others to which "[t]he judicial
Power" attends7 85-thus are not implicated if a federal court in a section
1983 action "looks" at the case, finds a violation of then-existing constitutional law, but denies damages on qualified immunity grounds and prospective relief on standing and equitable grounds. 78 6 Moreover, when an
officer's swing of the baton does make state law-when it constitutes "' [official] policy or custom' "787-then for that reason, existing doctrine does
permit injunctive relief 788 and, if the law, custom, or policy is that of a
782. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 414 (1821) (emphasis added).
783. Id. at 388 (emphasis added); see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 344 (1816).
784. See supra notes 639, 671 and accompanying text.

785. See supra notes 674-675 and accompanying text.
786. See supra note 778 and accompanying text.
787. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (quoting Monell v.
Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

788. Injunctions against state officials, which are not barred by qualified immunity,
see supra note 776 and accompanying text, are available upon proof that unconstitutional
harms are likely to injure the plaintiff in the future, i.e., inter alia, that the unconstitutional

acts are mandated by state law, constitute official policy, or are customary in the plaintiffs
situation. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106-08 & n.7 (1983); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 812, 814-15 (1974)
(enjoining "conduct [that] was... part of a single plan... [and] a pervasive pattern of
intimidation" by state officials); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Hague v.
CIO,307 U.S. 465, 505-06 (1939). So, although qualified immunity and a low probability
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789
municipality, even suspends immunity and allows an award of damages.
Thus, when state "law"-and particularly state law made by a "decision" of
one of "the Judges in every State"-is under review, neither qualified immunity nor Teague requires deference to a state actor's interpretation of
law or denial of effectual relief.
2. The Whole, Supreme Law. - But, having avoided the "interpretive
deference" and "remedial ineffectualness" frying pan in the manner just
described, does Teague nonetheless succumb to the "ignore supreme law"
fire? Does it require what Harbury and Klein forbid-that Article III
courts avert their eyes from their bestjudgment of the Constitution's current dictates? Granted there are strong policy reasons to protect the finality of state criminal judgments against the vagaries of unpredictably
developing constitutional law.790 But what of the Article IIIjudge's duty,
upon pain of "treason to the Constitution," to apply the whole supreme
law, no matter how "painful," "difficult," or "doubtful" doing so might be?
The answer to these questions comes directly from the Convention's
and Court's particular conception of Article IIIjudges' duty to decide the
"whole question" based on the "whole law" in exercising "[t]he judicial
Power." Professor Wechsler has distinguished three views of this duty in
the process of endorsing the third:
The duty, to be sure, is not that of [1] policing... legislatures or
executives, nor even... [2] of standing as an ever-open forum
for the ventilation of all grievances that draw upon the
Constitution for support. It is the duty [3] to decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordance with the law .... 791
As we repeatedly have shown,79 2 and as Teague confirms, Wechsler's preferred view of the duty to decide the "whole question" based on the
"whole law" is not the Framers' or the Court's preferred view. An Article
III judge's duty under the Supremacy Clause as adopted and interpreted
is not the deontological one to do the right thing under the judge's best

of future harm might possibly bar damages and an injunction, at least an injunction is
available when the challenged behavior amounts to "law."
789. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); id. at
1403 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing "a police officer's decision about how much
force to use when making a particular arrest and a police chief's decision about how much
force to use when making a particular kind of arrest"); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (a
municipality is liable for damages if it "unconsitutional[ly] implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or [official] decision," or a "governmental
'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's
official ... channels"). Even when qualified immunity applies, the closer the defendant
comes to being a policymaker, the weaker her protection. See Kit Kinports, Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 597, 598
(1989) (under sliding-scale of "unreasonableness" that all circuit courts use, the greater
the defendant's legal sophistication, the more likely it is that her deviations from wellestablished law as the court independently applies it are "unreasonable").
790. See, e.g., Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1995).
791. Wechsler, supra note 303, at 6.
792. See supra notes 364-369, 399, 632-653, 674-675 and accompanying text.
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current view of the law but, rather, the deterrent or structural duty to
ensure that state judges "'toe the constitutional mark'";793 to "serve[ ] as
a necessary additional incentive [additional to the Supremacy Clause itself] for [state] trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct
their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards";7 9 4 to engage in "independentjudicial review... to the end that
the Constitution as the supreme law of the land may be maintained."795 Accordingly, although the "whole supreme law" and other qualitative ingredients of" [t] he judicial Power" are the constitutionally mandated means to
Article III's overriding supremacy-maintaining end, once that end is
79 6
achieved, the means' constitutional protection lapses.
The Framers' and the Court's supremacy-focused conception of
"[t] he judicial Power" consequently is not offended when, for good policy
reasons, the Court insulates state judges from reversal and makes their
decisions final-no matter how differently federal law thereafter develops-as long as those judges held up their end of the constitutional bargain by faithfully applying supreme law at the time. "The judicial Power"
then consists of the independent resolution of the whole question based
on the whole supreme law at the time the state court ruled and an effectual ability to nullify state decisions that violated state judges' duty to
subordinate state law to federal law. Once the federal court satisfies itself
that state judges acted in accord with clearly established national law at
the time, the constitutional-structural mechanism for preserving the
supremacy of national law-i.e., the state judicial filter and the federal
judicial spot-check-has functioned adequately, even if (for good policy
reasons) the federal court's best current understanding of federal law
and the individual litigant's rights under that law have not been
enforced.
Fallon and Meltzer are thus correct that policy concerns properly
affect the decision whether to confer federal jurisdiction over suits to
remedy federal wrongs and, if so, whether to immunize official acts from
damages or assess them under then-existing or current law. But they
omit a crucial qualitative limit on remedial discretion that the supremacyfocused ingredients of "[t] he judicial Power" impose and that Congress
and the Court traditionally have observed: Once jurisdiction is conferred, federal courts must possess and exercise an effectual remedial
power to nullify state law contrary to federal law and state decisions con793. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1989) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638, 653 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)).
794. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
795. St.Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1936) (emphasis
added); see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (The judicial power
"is a structuralsafeguard," not "a remedy to be applied.., when specific harm ...can be
identified.... [I] t is a prophylactic device ... ").
796. See supra text following note 675.
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trary to the obligation of "the Judges in every State" to maintain federal
797
legal supremacy.
There is another reason why habeas review under Teague, in the process of holding state judges to their constitutional obligation to effectuate
the whole supreme law when they rule, cannot be said to divert federal
judges from their structural obligation to effectuate that law. Recall (1)
the core Madisonian aspiration of a large number of cases in which
Congress provides for federal judicial spot-checking of state decisions,
and (2) the crucial Madisonian decision to empower Congress to "ordain
and establish" lower federal courts-even at a cost of surrendering
mandatory Supreme Court review-in order to expand the federal
judiciary's appellate capacity beyond what the Court could manage on its
own. 798 As we discuss below, habeas review under Teague follows precisely
this Madisonian plan. It shifts the Court's appellate responsibilities to the
lower federal judiciary (1) in quantities of state cases far broader than the
Court could manage by itself and (2) in types of state cases in which there
is a particularly high risk that state court enforcement of national rights
will succumb to "the bias of local views and prejudices and ... the interference of local [laws] .-799 Understanding federal habeas judges as repositories and extensions of the Court's judicial power on direct review
helps explain why it is not constitutionally problematic for Teague to hold
those judges to the law in existence when the direct review for which
habeas substitutes would have occurred. Rather than limiting the federal
courts' exercise of "[t]he judicial Power" on review of state decisions,
habeas (quantitatively) expands the occasions for the equivalent of the
Court's own review of those decisions, while-even under Teague--(qualitatively) replicating the scope of that review.
797. Fallon and Meltzer do discern a limit on remedial discretion-that Congress and
the Court must leave litigants with enough opportunities for judicial relief from officials'
violations of federal law to keep government within legal bounds. See Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 37, at 1736. There are three difficulties with this approach: (1) It provides no
measure of how much opportunity to enforce particular federal laws is "enough," nor do
the authors cite any decisions purporting to undertake such an analysis. (2) The approach
substitutes this unadministrable test for, and risks neutralizing, the Framers' own measure
of how much enforcement is "enough"-a measure to which they devoted their full
attention at the Convention toward the same supremacy-maintaining goal as Fallon and
Meltzer identify-i.e., that "enough" enforcement occurs when Article III courts effectuate
federal legal supremacy in every case over which Congress has found it necessary and
proper to confer federal jurisdiction. Finally, Fallon and Meltzer cannot explain the
absence of an authoritative statutory or judicial precedent for the view-tolerated by their
analysis but not (as we read the cases) by, e.g., Marbuiy, Martin, Cohens, Gordon, Ableman,
Klein, Crowell, Reynoldsville, and the Mixed Question Cases-that a federal court with
jurisdiction to review a state law or decision that harmed a party in violation of then
existing federal law may be denied the remedial power to nullify, and may even be forced
to give full legal effect to, the illegal law or decision.
798. See supra note 95, 125-133, 162-163, 226 and accompanying text.
799. The Federalist No. 22, supra note 305, at 182; see infra notes 886-895 and
accompanying text.
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We are finally ready to answer the question we left open when we
discussed Reynoldsville, namely, why the Ohio courts could not deny remedial effect to the Court's prior constitutional invalidation of an Ohio statute of limitations that was more onerous for out-of-state than for in-state
tort defendants. 80 0 Because the plaintiff and the Ohio Legislature had
the same "retroactivity" concerns as defendants and state courts in the
qualified immunity and Teague contexts, the answer is not (as the
Reynoldsville majority suggested) the absence of good policy reasons to
exercise remedial discretion. Nor does Justice Scalia's answer suffice. He
correctly pointed out that federal courts must be able to effectuate their
conclusion that state law is unconstitutional by nullifying it, though they
need not always neutralize state action short of law in the same way. But
his analysis does not explain why Teague gives state decisional "law" more
favorable treatment than ReynoldsvilLe gave state statutory law, i.e., why
Teague scrutinizes state decisions under federal law in effect when the
decision was made, while Reynoldsville, on Scalia's theory, scrutinized the
state statute under federal law developed after the statute was enacted.
The answer to the Reynoldsville puzzle instead seems to be that the
offending "law" there was not only the Ohio statute (which might arguably escape a retroactive remedy because it was adopted before the constitutional doctrine that invalidated it) but also the Ohio Supreme Court
decision, which in reviewing that enactment failed to give effect to
supreme law that had become well-established in the meantime. Thus,
through the intervening Bendix case, the Court not only had invalidated
Ohio's statute but also had prescribed the appropriate response-nonenforcement of the special statute of limitations for out-of-state defendants8 0 1-which the Ohio high court had then undertaken to revise.
What was intolerable under the Supremacy Clause, that is, was the Ohio
court's default of its central structural duty to give effect to then-existing
supreme law and deny effect to inconsistent state law.
B. Section 2254(d)(1)
1. Two Statutory Meanings. - Since 1867, habeas corpus has been
statutorily available in "all cases where [a state prisoner was] restrained of
his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States." 80 2 The existing statute provides that "a district court
800. See supra notes 687-707 and accompanying text.
801. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 750-52 (1995) (discussing
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988)).
802. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-87 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c) (3), 2254(a) (1994)); see, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993); In
re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 631 (1890); Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26
(1868) (1867 Act provides a remedy "for every possible case of privation of liberty contrary
to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws"; its scope is coextensive with "arising under"
jurisdiction and thus "is impossible to widen"). Mr. Scheidegger, whose Legal Foundation
seeks the repeal of the modem habeas writ, uses the opportunity provided by his response
to this Article to reprint some of the Foundation's inaccurate broadsides on the subject.
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shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
[prisoner]" alleging that he is in custody due to a violation of federal
law.80 3 Since 1989, the principal limit on habeas adjudication has been
the Teague rule requiring federal courts to apply the law in effect when
the prisoner's conviction became final. As is described above, Teague allows access to previously established "rule[s] of... general application
...designed for... a myriad of factual contexts," but makes problematic
reliance on narrower rules, not previously applied to the acts at issue and
8 04
advanced by analogy to established rules governing different behavior.
Between 1807 and 1879, the Court treated habeas jurisdiction as
"clearly appellate" when the custody under review was court ordered.8 0 5
The Court had to do so to sustain its jurisdiction under the 1789 Actstill retained today-to entertain so-called "original" habeas writs, which
are not encompassed by Article III, Section 2's delineation of the Court's
original jurisdiction and thus are unconstitutional under Marbury unless
they qualify (despite their name) as appellate. In ChiefJustice Marshall's
words four years after Marbuy, "so far as that case has distinguished between original and appellate jurisdiction, th[e habeas jurisdiction] which
the court is now asked to exercise is clearly appellate. It is the revision of
a decision of an inferior court, by which a citizen has been committed to
jail."8 30 6 During this century, the Court has cited an 1883 habeas decision-which, importantly, involved executive, not judicial, detention so
that the "appellate" description did not apply-for the proposition that
80 7
habeas jurisdiction is "a new suit brought ...to enforce a civil right."
The view that "[h] abeas corpus is not an appellate proceeding, but rather
See Scheidegger, supra note 75, at Part IV. Where inaccuracies actually bear on this
Article, we point them out. See supra notes 389, 639, 653, 672. Consider also Mr.
Scheidegger's discussion of the statistic that "40% of state death row inmates are granted
federal habeas relief," a "figure [he claims] has dropped off dramatically with time," to
"15%," or even "8%," as of "the mid-1990s." Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 943 & n.390.
The cases to which Mr. Scheidegger refers are in the federal reporters and can be either
counted in toto or, as in Mr. Scheidegger's and the other study he cites, sampled for
selected courts and years. One of the authors of this Article and colleagues are conducting
a comprehensive study of all capital habeas cases that were finally decided in this country
between the reinstitution of the death penalty after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), and the first Monday in October 1995 (the day each year when the largest number
of habeas cases become final with the Court's denial of certiorari petitions filed in the
summer). In that period, there were 603 such cases. In 232, or 38.5%, of them, relief was
granted. The corresponding figures for the last year of the study, 1995, are that relief was
granted in 9 of 21, or 42.9%, of the cases.
803. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994); see id. § 2243.
804. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); see notes 761-773 and accompanying text.
805. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 374 (1880); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 85, 97 (1869); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 100-01 (1807).
806. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 100-01.
807. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (reviewing lower federal
court's denial of writ to review detention by sheriff, absent court order).
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an original civil action in a federal court,"80 8 is now the black-letter of the
matter-on the "technical[ ]" ground that "the federal court is not formally reviewing a [state] judgment, but is determining whether the prisoner is 'in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.'"809
As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, section 2254(d) (1) of the Judicial Code provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States
810

Section 2254(d) (1)'s kinship with Teague (which the section seems to subsume and supplant) is obvious. 8 1 ' As did Teague, section 2254(d) (1) requires federal habeas courts to apply the federal law in effect during direct review and distinguishes two types of claims. When a claim the state
court adjudicated was governed by "clearly established Federal law" to
which the state decision can meaningfully be described as "contrary"i.e., law designed specifically for the situation at issue or for many situations including the one at issue-the federal habeas court must ascertain
whether the state court "decision . . was contrary to . . . [that] clearly
established Federal law." "Contrary to law" review is a statutory term of
art for one court's independent review of another court's legal and
8 12
mixed rulings under governing law.
When there was no clearly established law to which the state court
decision of the claim could meaningfully have been "contrary"-because
the rule governing the situation at issue was not established and had to be
extrapolated by applying clearly established law governing different situa808. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 14 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
809. Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1522 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(1994)). But see Felker v. Turpin, 116 5. Ct. 2333, 2338-39 (1996) (reaffirming Court's
jurisdiction to grant so-called "original," but jurisdictionally appellate,habeas writs); O'Neal
v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440, 442 (1995) (federal court's function in habeas is to "review
errors in state criminal trials"); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 579 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("federal [habeas] court is asked to review not only a state trial court's
judgment, but almost invariably the judgment of the highest court of the State as well").
810. 28 U.S.CA. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 1998).
811. See, e.g., Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. 8upp. 468, 475-76 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ("This new
standard is a codification and.., modification of the... doctrine in Teague v. Lane.... .").
812. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A) (1994) (providing district court "contrary to law"
review of certain magisterial decisions); Fed. R Civ. P. 72(a) (similar). On the "plenary"
nature of "contrary to law" review of legal and mixed questions, see, e.g., Saltereli v. Bob
Baker Group Medical Trust, 35 F.3d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1994); Alldread v. City of Grenada,
988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993); Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.
1992).
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tions-the federal court must ascertain whether the state "decision ...

involved an unreasonable application of [the] clearly established Federal
law." As used as ajudicial term of art in Teague and like cases, a "reasonable" or "unreasonable application" connotes a legal rule that another
tribunal properly or improperly extrapolated from whatever noncontrolling law was available. 813 If the extrapolated rule "involved an unreasonable application of[ ] clearly established Federal law," the federal court
applies current federal law. Othenvise, it applies the rule the state court
fashioned. In either event, the federal court exercises plenary review of
legal and mixed rulings under the governing law and grants the relief
814
that law requires.
Despite this kinship, there are four ways in which section 2254(d) (1)
accords more respect to state court finality than did Teague. First, under
the statute, only Supreme Court precedent may clearly establish federal
law; Teague let circuit precedent do so as well. 815 Second, under the stat-

ute, law must be clearly established by the date of the state decision;
under Teague it could become established thereafter, while certiorari was
pending. 816 Third, the statute recognizes no exceptional situations in
813. See, e.g., Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 469 n.1 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (Teague validates "reasonable applications of then-existing law"); Gilmore v.
Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 351 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Teague disapproves rules
fashioned through a "begrudging or unreasonableapplication of [analogous] principles")
(emphasis added); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18
(1992) (validating "objectively reasonableapplicationof relevant precedents"); Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Teague doctrine analyzes whether
state court's "deviation" from analogous but "factual[ly] distinct[ ]" precedent is or "is not
reasonable"); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) (Teague rule "validates
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents").
814. Mr. Scheidegger's effort to use legislative history to support a contrary
interpretation of section 2254(d) (1) illustrates the hazards of such history. His main way
of explaining the provision is to quote its opponents' demonizing it. See Scheidegger,
supra note 75, at 945, 946, 948, 951-52. And his selective quotation of the provision's
proponents conveys the opposite of what they said. See id. at 945. For example, consistent
with our analysis, Orrin Hatch, the bill's floor leader in the Senate, said that section
2254(d) (1) "essentially gives the Federal court the authority to review, de novo, whether the
State court decided the claim in contravention of Federal law"; "itjust means that we defer
to the state courts if they have properly appliedFederal law." 142 Cong. Rec. S3446-47 (daily
ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (emphasis added). After Senator Biden made one of the attacks on the
provision that Scheidegger cites as authoritative, see Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 946,
951-52, Hatch replied: "[Senator Biden] says [section 2254(d) (1)] requires Federal courts
to defer to State courts in almost all cases, even if the State is wrong about the U.S.
Constitution. That is absolutely false." 141 Cong. Rec. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995)
(emphasis added); see also 142 Cong. Rec. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (similar
statement of House floor leader Henry Hyde).
815. Compare Sweeneyv. Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 1997) ("we are no longer
permitted to apply our own jurisprudence, but must look exclusively to Supreme Court
caselaw"), with, e.g., Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1995) (pre-Act
Teague case treating circuit precedent as clearly establishing a rule the Supreme Court had
not endorsed).
816. Compare Blankenship v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1997)
(under section 2254(d), "review is limited to whether the law was 'clearly established' at
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which postfinality law applies; Teague, in contrast, established two
exceptions. 8 17 Finally, the statute makes the state "decision" the focal
point of review and dispositive of the case unless found to violate federal
law, thus restoring the writ's nineteenth century status as merely "appellate" because "it revises and corrects the proceedings in a [judicial] cause
already instituted"; the prior regime treated habeas (at least technically)
as an independent civil suit requiring "full reconsideration of... constitutional claims" from scratch and relegating state high court decisions to
the lowly status of mere relevant authority from "another jurisdiction." 8 18
Reading section 2254(d) (1) (as a number of lower courts have
done) 81 9 to codify and strengthen Teague avoids Article III problems.
True, the habeas statute obliges "a district court ... [to] entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in [state]
custody... on the ground that he is in custody in violation of [federal
law]," then binds the court to a choice of the federal law in effect when
the state court ruled.8 20 But this choice of preexisting law is no different
from Teague's, which, as we noted, respects Article III's supremacyfocused "whole law" principle.8 21 Because the federal court independently applies the whole supreme law in effect when the state court
ruled-allowing it to assess whether the state judges faithfully discharged
their Supremacy Clause obligation-while retaining an effectual ability
through the writ to nullify state decisions that failed to discharge that obligation, the federal court can discharge its supremacy-bounded Article III
function and thereby exercise "[t]he judicial Power."
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have given section
2254(d) (1) another reading-not as strengthening Teague's temporal
choice of law but, instead, as barring independent federal interpretation
of federal law or relief from state judgments violating that law.8 2 2 In the
the time the [state high court] entered its judgment"), with O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S.
Ct. 1969, 1973 (1997) (case became final for Teague purposes when Supreme Court denied

certiorari).
817. See supra note 745.
818. Compare Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807), and Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477
(1976), and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (all quoted in text). See generally
supra notes 802-809 and accompanying text.
819. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Dubois, No. 97-1979, 1998 WL 257206, at *4-*9 (1st Cir.
May 26, 1998); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1102-05 (3d Cir. 1996); Baylor v.
Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996); Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 89, 92 (3d Cir.
1996); Ayala v. Speckard, 89 F.3d 91, 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1996); Nevers v. Killinger, 990 F. Supp.
844, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468,475 (S.D. Ohio 1996); see also
Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 435 -37
(1996) (similar interpretation); cf. Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir. 1997)
(noting this reading without adopting or rejecting it).
820. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
821. See supra notes 761-773, 790-799 and accompanying text.
822. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 877 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (discussed supra note 752) (followed in Neelley v. Nagle,
138 F.3d 917, 923-25 (11th Cir. 1998); Drinkard v.Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767-68 (5th Cir.
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Seventh Circuit's formulation, "[t]he first phrase of § 2254(d) (1) ...authorizing a federal court to issue the writ when the state court's decision
is 'contrary to... clearly established Federal law. . .' preserves.., federal
courts' independent interpretive power" only in the review of "pure" legal
questions, but does not "authorize issuance of a writ whenever a [state]
court err[ed]" in deciding a mixed question under clearly established
law.8 23 Rather, "when the dispute lies not in the meaning of the
Constitution, but in its application to a particular set of facts-when it is
...a 'mixed question of law and fact'-sec. 2254(d) (1) restricts... relief
to cases in which the state's decision reflects 'an unreasonable applica824
tion of' the law."
On this reading, the statute calls for "[d] e novo ... review for core
legal issues, such as whether the Confrontation Clause applies [to a type
of proceeding], and deferential review for operational decisions [such as
whether a trial court violated the Clause by barring a particular line of
cross-examination]."825 A state court's "fact-specific answer [to a mixed
question] cannot be called 'unreasonable' [simply because] it is
wrong." 2 6 Rather,"'unreasonable[ ]' . . . is stronger than 'erroneous'
and maybe stronger than 'clearly erroneous,' "827 and requires "grave" error.8 28 Apparently for the first time in American history, therefore, federal judges (in these circuits) are reviewing but letting stand state court
decisions that, in Article III courts' independent judgment, are contrary
to clearly established federal law as of the time the state (and federal)
8 29
courts ruled.
1996), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Carter, 117 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 1997));
see also Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated)
User's Manual, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 103, 106-17 (1998) (arguing that section 2254(d) (1)
requires federal habeas courts to accept "reasonable" state court resolutions of mixed
questions, but advocating a less deferential standard of reasonableness than did the
Seventh Circuit in Lindh); Sharad Sushil Khandelwal, Note, The Path to Habeas Corpus
Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), 96 Mich. L. Rev. 434, 446-47 (1997)
(endorsing Lindh interpretation); Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for
Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1868, 1879-81 (1997)
(endorsing Lindh interpretation); cf. Green v. French, No. 97-25, 1998 WL 237506, at
*2-*7 (4th Cir. May 18, 1998) (rejecting some, and adopting other, aspects of the Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' interpretation). Dissenting judges in the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits favored an interpretation of section 2254(d)(1) similar to the one
advanced in this Article. See Drinkard,97 F.3d at 778-79 (Garza, J., dissenting); Lindh, 96
F.3d at 888-89 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (raising constitutional objection to majority's
interpretation).
823. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 868-70.
824. Id. at 870.
825. Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
826. Id. at 876-77.
827. Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1997).
828. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 870.
829. See supra notes 639, 671, 771 and accompanying text (longstanding rule of
independent Article III court determination of mixed questions in habeas and other
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The three circuits' reading of section 2254(d) (1) is troublesome for
several reasons. First, the statute asks whether the state "decision" was contrary to law. Ajudicial "decision" is a "determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and ... law" 83 0-in lay terms, a "final and definite
result of examining a question; a conclusion" or "resolution."8 3 1 Thus, as
the Convention recognized in rejecting the Pinckney and New Jersey
Plans, and as the Court held long ago in Martin and Osborn, a legal "decision" is not the articulation of a legal rule without more but the application of a rule to the facts of a case to reach a conclusion.8 3 2 As a matter
of plain construction, therefore, a "decision [is] ... contrary to ... law"
whenever the conclusion it reached upon applying the law to the facts is
wrong. The statutory text thus warrants relief if there is "clearly established... law" to which a "decision" might potentially be "contrary" (i.e.,
if there is law designed for just that kind of case), and if the "decision"the application of the law to the facts to reach a resolution-is contrary
8 33
to (i.e., wrong under) that law.
Second, the statute requires relief if the state court decision was contrary to clearly established federal "law." As exemplified by Martin,
Crowell, and scores of other decisions, "mixed question [s] of law and fact"
have long been "ranked as issues of law"834-"what purport[ ] to be...
finding[s] upon questions of fact [but are] so involved with and dependent upon such questions of law as to be in substance and effect ... decision[s] of the latter."8 35 The Seventh Circuit's premise that "the meaning of
the Constitution" can never emerge from the Constitution's "application
to a particular set of facts" thus is plainly wrong.8 36 Indeed, if a question
is "mixed," then by definition "the relevant legal principle can be given
meaning only through its application to the particular circumstances of a
837
case."
contexts); infra notes 867-885 and accompanying text (absence of precedent for the three
circuits' approach).
830. Black's Law Dictionary 407 (6th ed. 1990); see id. at 842 (equating "decision"
and "judgment" and defining latter as a "[c]onclusion of law upon facts").
831. 4 Oxford English Dictionary 332 (2d ed. 1989); see Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 585 (1986).
832. See supra notes 80, 137, 139, 201, 222, 250-252, 467-474 and accompanying

text.
833. See supra notes 812, 823 and accompanying text (as the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged in Lindh and as statutory antecedents establish, "contrary to law" connotes
plenary review).
834. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1995) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (habeas case).

835. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. C.H. Albers Comm'n Co., 223 U.S. 573, 591 (1912)
(emphasis added); see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (applying same
definition in habeas case); decisions cited supra note 639.
836. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997); see Note, supra note 822, at 1880.
837. Miller v. Fenton" 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (emphasis added) (habeas case); see
Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
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Third, the Seventh Circuit misreads the phrase "an unreasonable application of[ ] clearly established . . .law" as if it said something else,
namely, "an unreasonable application to the facts of clearly established
law." The phrase "application to thefacts"-with the italicized words obsessively included-is the one the legal culture uses to refer to mixed
questions.8 3 8 But the phrase Congress actually used-omitting the italicized words and including the "clearly established" qualification-has a
different source, namely, Teague and related cases, which use "unreasonable application of law" to connote a rule improperly extrapolated from
peripherally relevant precedent in the absence of clearly controlling
8 39
law.
Fourth, there is an especially strong reason why section 2254(d) (1)'s
actual distinction-between "decisions contrary to clearly established federal law" and "decisions involving unreasonable applications of that
law"-cannot be read as distinguishing, instead, between "improper interpretations of clearly established federal law" and "unreasonable applications to the facts of that law": In the course of considering section
2254(d) (1), Congress expressly rejected the latter distinction in favor of
the former.
As originally adopted by the House, section 2254(d) forbade habeas
relief unless the state decision was based on an improper "interpretationof
clearly established Federal law as articulated... [by] the Supreme Court"
or "was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable application to the facts of
[that] law." 8 40 In the provision as thereafter carefully revised and introduced in the Senate, however, in the form in which it became law, the
House's distinction between invalid "interpretations" and unreasonable
"applications to the facts" was replaced by a distinction between "decision[s] ...contrary to ...clearly established federal law" and "unreasonathe United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508 (1984); supra notes 636-639, 671 and
accompanying text.
838. It is an "appllcation-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort of question . . . [that is]
commonly called a 'mixed question of law and fact.'" United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 512 (1995) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1664 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) ("application of an objective legal standard to the facts . . .is properly
characterized as a mixed question" (emphasis added)); Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111-12;
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
839. See supra note 812 and accompanying text.
840. H.R. 729, 104th Cong. (1995); see 141 Cong. Rec. H1424-28, H1433-34 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (emphasis added). Under the House proposal, a state court adjudication
permitted relief only if it:

(1) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable
interpretation of clearly established Federal law as articulated in the
decisions of the Supreme Court ...; [or]

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or unreasonable
application to the facts of clearly established Federal law as articulated in
the decisions of the Supreme Court ....

Id. at H1424.
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ble application [s]" of that law.84 1 The three circuits thus read section
2254(d) (1) not only as if its actual "decision contrary to law" and "unreasonable application" terms of art were not present but also as if it included "interpretation" and "application to the facts" terms of art that
42
Congress deleted.3
Fifth, the Seventh Circuit's reading apparently makes the "decision
contrary to law" clause superfluous. Under that reading, the contrary to
law clause applies when the state "opinion . .. [in]correctly states" the
governing rule.8 48 But can stating the wrong rule, by itself, "authoriz[e]"
relief,8 44 though the state "decision," i.e., the outcome upon applying law
to fact, "was [not] contrary to law"? If so, the statute has "advising"
problems; it makes federal courts do what the "adequate state ground"
doctrine (for one) forbids-review things state judges said in their opinions that make no difference to what they did in their decisions8 45 Nor
could a habeas court remand to the state court to reconsider under the
correct standard, as might occur on direct appeal, because such remands
are forbidden in the habeas context. 84 6 Nor, apparently, could relief be
granted only when (1) the state court decision articulates an incorrect
rule and (2) its application of law to fact is erroneous in the federal
court's judgment. For that would undermine the Seventh Circuit's view
that misapplications of law to fact do not fall within the "decisions contrary to law" clause and only fall within the "unreasonable application"
clause when the error is "more than clear" or "grave." To avoid these
problems, relief would have to be reserved for state decisions that involve
(1) an interpretation that was contrary to established law and reached a
conclusion that, under the right rule, was an unreasonable application of
the law to the facts, or (2) an unreasonable application of the law to the
facts. But "relief only if X and Y, or if Y' means "relief only if Y'-i.e.,
only if the "unreasonable application" clause is satisfied-thus rendering
the "decision contrary to law" clause a cypher.
Finally, as Chief Justice Hughes said in Crowell, "[w] hen the validity
of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt
841. S.735, 104th Cong. § 704 (1995); see 142 Cong. Rec. H3599 (daily ed. Apr. 18,
1996) (House's approval of the Senate habeas title of the Antiterrorism bill without
alteration); 141 Cong. Rec. S7803 (daily ed.June 7, 1995) (Sen. Specter discussing Senate's
careful redrafting of House habeas bill); 141 Cong. Rec. S5842 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995)
(introduction of S.735).
842. Cf. Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 1300 (1996) (the Court will not read a
habeas statute to impose a requirement that Congress "rected, by removing [it] from...
[an earlier draft]").
843. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 877 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd, 117 S.Ct.
2059 (1997).
844. See id. at 868-69.
845. Cf. Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (ThomasJ, dissenting) ("'Ourjob
...is to review judgments, not to edit opinions ....'") (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Schutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part));
supra notes 390-402 and accompanying text.
846. See Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 489-90 (1975) (per curiam).
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of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that [courts] will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided."8 47 As we discuss below, the Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' reading of section 2254(d) (1) raises at
least a serious doubt about the provision's constitutionality. Accordingly,
because the different reading we give section 2254(d) (1) above is at least
"fairly possible," that reading is an imperative antidote to the constitu8 48
tional doubts raised by the three circuits' interpretation.
2. One ConstitutionalMeaning. - Read as we propose above, section
2254(d) (1) presents the same Article III issues as Teague, which are not
fatal to a supremacy-bounded notion of "[t]he judicial Power."8 49 The
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' alternative reading, however, poses
more serious-we think fatal-Article III problems. We first show why
the three circuits' reading deprives federal courts of "[t]he judicial
Power." We then explain why the Seventh Circuit's (which is the only
sustained) constitutional defense of that interpretation fails.
After first directing federal habeas judges and justices to "look at"
state court decisions upholding incarceration to see whether they "violat[e] the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," and
whether they are "contrary to ...Federal law,"8 5 0 the three circuits' interpretation requires those Article IIIjudges to do one of the following: (1)
"defer" to state court interpretations of supreme law that in the Article III
judges' independent estimation offend that law (unless the offense is
"grave"); (2) in deciding which rule to apply, choose the statute (insofar
as it directs the federal court to apply the state court's "reasonable" reading of supreme law) over the Constitution; 851 or (3) interpret federal law
independently and acknowledge violations of it, but then deny all reliefi.e., (a) withhold effect from a federal decision finding that supreme law
was violated, (b) give effect to a state decision contrary to that law (by
847. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84,92 (1985); United States v. Delavrare & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909) ("where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our
duty is to adopt the latter").
848. See supra notes 810-821 and accompanying text. In his response, Mr.
Scheidegger asserts, but he fails to explain why, it would be a "shell game" for the Courthaving concluded in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), see supra notes 762-773 and
accompanying text, that it could not "amend" the existing habeas statute's plenary-review
standard with a judge-made "deference" rule-to conclude that the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits should not have "amended" the recently enacted section 2254(d) (1) with
the same (constitutionally problematic) deference gloss. See Scheidegger,
at 889-91.
849. See supra notes 364-369, 399, 632-640, 674-675, 790-799,
accompanying text.
850. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1) (West
851. That is, to choose the statute over the Constitution as the
independently interprets it at all relevant times. See supra notes

accompanying text.

supra note 75,
819-821 and
Supp. 1998).
federal court
790-799 and
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treating it as the reason to deny relief from unconstitutional custody),
and, as such, (c) let state decisional law "withstand" contrary federal law.
As we have shown, however, Congress may not give Article III courts these
commands because they all oblige the exercise of less than "[t]he judicial
Power."
Approach (1)-defer to state court constructions of federal law that
are not gravely wrong-offends Article III's independent interpretation
rule and thus the Framers' sedulous effort to shield Article III judges
from the influence of "will" rather than "reason" and from revision by
anyone save superior Article III judges.8 52 It conflicts with Marbury's refusal to defer to Congress's construction of Article III; Marlin's and
Cohens' rejection of the Virginia high court's demand for deference to its
reasonable applications of federal treaties and acts; Klein's invalidation of
the directive in the 1870 Act that the Court assume the correctness of
Congress's reading of Article II; Crowell's rebuff of a statutory command
to accept agency findings of constitutional fact absent clear error; the
Mixed Question Cases forbidding federal courts to treat mixed questions
as matters of fact requiring deference to state court findings absent clear
error; and a strong American legal consensus that deference on legal
85 3
questions is intolerable.
Furthermore, approach (1) is conceptually no different from letting
Congress, the President, or state supreme courts hear "appeals" of Article
III court decisions and reverse them when, say, reasonable minds can,
and the reviewing agency does, disagree. Approach (1) thus violates antirevising cases from Haybum's forward; Martin's and Ableman's invalidation of state court reversals of the Court's interpretation of two treaties,
and of a federal district court's ruling that the Fugitive Slave Act was constitutional; Plaut's conclusion that Article III court decisions are immune
from revision save by superior Article III courts; Boerne's invalidation of
RFRA's effort to overrule Smith; and Reynoldsville's rejection of the Ohio
854
Supreme Court's effort to modify Bendix.
Approach (2)-requiring federal courts to choose the statute over
the Constitution (insofar as the statute directs them to adopt the state
court's reasonable interpretation of federal law)-violates Article III's
and the Supremacy Clause's "whole supreme law" principle, as most classically exemplified by Marbury's refusal to choose the 1789 Act over the
Constitution when the two conflicted. In diverting federal courts' attention from supreme law, or from the aspect of the question presented to
which that law applies, this approach also conflicts with Martin's refusal
to ignore federal treaties because they were not visible on the face of the
state decision; Osborn's insistence that the Court decide not only relevant
interpretive issues but also the effect of the appropriate interpretation on
852. See supra notes 330-342, 403-458, 467-536 and accompanying text.
853. See supra notes 537-640, 654-673 and accompanying text.
854. See supra notes 403-458, 475-536, 678-718 and accompanying text.
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the facts and the outcome of the case; Klein's invalidation of statutory
requirements to ignore evidence of a presidential pardon raising a constitutional question or, if the Court considered the evidence, to relinquish
jurisdiction at the point where it otherwise would be obliged to privilege
the Article II pardon power over the statute's direction to deny pardons
any effect; Yakus's refusal to read the statute to keep it from reviewing the
statute's (as opposed to the previously reviewable regulations') constitutionality; and the core principle of Hart's Dialogue that Congress may
withhold jurisdiction from federal courts but may not grant it and forbid
them to subject the underlying statute or official action to scrutiny based
8 55
on the whole, supreme law.
Approach (3)-letting federal courts independently review state decisions under federal law but making them deny relief from any constitutional error that cannot be called "unreasonable"-offends Article III's
"effectualness" requirement. That requirement-and the defect of a rule
directing Article III courts with jurisdiction to let violations of supreme
law lie-are most powerfully revealed by the Framers' rejection of proposals (a) to limit "arising under" jurisdiction to interpreting the law not
deciding cases, (b) to require judicial advising of political actors, and (c)
8 56
to let Congress control the "manner" of federal adjudication.
Approach (3) also conflicts with Marbury's express refusal to give effect to the mandamus statute after finding it unconstitutional; Martin's
denial that considerations of federalism permit state courts to decide
whether the Court's rulings are valid and enforceable; Cohens' rejectionas "constitutional treason"-of a request to forgo exercising the jurisdiction Congress accorded Article ImI courts to review and, if necessary, reverse state decisions raising "difficult[ I" or "doubtful" issues of federal
law; the refusal of Osborn, Crowell, and the Mixed Question Cases to limit
the federal courts' role to providing abstract interpretations of federal
law, and insistence that those courts give federal law effect under the circumstances by applying it to the facts; the "defunct territorial court"
cases' denial ofjurisdiction when the Court had no way to effectuate its
judgment; Gordon's and the declaratory judgment decisions' denial of
Article III status to any court lacking the power to bind the parties by its
judgment either directly or by binding another court with power over the
parties; Ableman's denial of a state court claim of authority to neutralize a
lower federal court's judgment of conviction by second-guessing the federal court's judgment that the conviction was constitutional and by releasing the convict; Klein's voiding of a statutory command to exercise jurisdiction over compensation cases but to treat the resolution of a
constitutional question against the Government as triggering a midstream interposition of sovereign immunity or cut-off of the jurisdiction
to grant relief; Plaut's ban on statutory denials of res judicata effect to
855. See supra notes 467-474, 563-599, 641-653, 731-735 and accompanying text.
856. See supra notes 65, 80, 84-85, 104-108, 137, 139, 201, 222, 250-252, 259,
268-271 and accompanying text.
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Article III courtjudgments; Boerne's rejection of a statutory denial of stare
decisis effect to the Smith decision or creation of a right to relief in every
case in which Smith's overruling of Sherbert forbade relief; Reynoldsville's
denial of state court "remedial discretion" to apply a statute of limitations
to pending cases after the Supreme Court struck down the statute in another case; and Hart's point that Congress may with impunity deny jurisdiction or invoke sovereign immunity at the threshold, or even grant jurisdiction and make a choice among remedies, but may not grant
jurisdiction and waive sovereign immunity, yet withhold all relief.8 57 Nor
does the qualified immunity doctrine provide a precedent for denying
any effectual relief when, as here, what is under review is not intermittent
official misconduct, but the making of state "law" through the unconstitutional "decision" of one of the 'Judges in every State" to whom was entrusted the structurally central role of keeping state law in conformity
8 58
with "the supreme Law of the Land."
Approach (3) does fourfold damage to the Constitution's core structure. It lets Congress withhold "an essential part of ...the exercis[e of]
judicial power"-the capacity to effectuate judgments-leaving judicial
decisions "inoperative and nugatory, . . .a dead letter ... without any
operation upon the rights of the parties ....
Such is not the judicial
power."8 59 It tolerates an adjudicated malfunction of a crucial structural
mechanism for maintaining federal supremacy, namely, the service of
"the Judges in every State" as ever-ready filters of state law and state action
in violation of federal law. It lets stand-indeed, it gives decisive effect tostate decisional law that is (and, when made, was) contrary to national
law, reversing the Supremacy Clause command to forbid state law to
"withstand" contrary national law. And it stymies the other crucial structural mechanism for maintaining the supremacy of federal law. For it
thwarts the exercise by Article III courts of an "arising under"jurisdiction
that the Framers expressly made "conformable" to the Supremacy Clause
so as to provide a means, whenever Congress found it expedient to confer
jurisdiction, of (1) spot-checking state judging for conformity to the
judges' Supremacy Clause duty and state decisions for conformity to
supreme law, and (2) voiding judging and judgments found wanting.
What then can be said in favor of reading section 2254(d) (1) to require Article III courts to adjudicate the constitutionality of incarceration
and consistency of state decisions with federal law but then to (1) defer to
the state court's interpretation of federal law, (2) give priority to the statute's (i.e., the state court's) decision rule over the one mandated by
supreme law, or (3) deny relief and give effect to state decisions in conflict with that law? The Seventh Circuit offered three explanations. First,
857. See supra notes 401, 407-458, 472-474, 502-536, 549-599, 604-640, 654-667,
671, 678-707, 727-735 and accompanying text.
858. See supra notes 753-760, 774-800 and accompanying text.
859. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (decided 1864, reported 1885)
(emphasis added).
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877

when a dispute is over the Constitution's "application to a particular set
of facts-when it is, in the standard phrase, a 'mixed question of law and
fact'"-the rule that "Congress lacks power to. . . require federal judges
to 'defer' to the interpretations reached by state courts" is suspended because "the dispute lies not in the meaning of the Constitution."8 60 But as
the Framers recognized in rejecting the Pinckney and NewJersey Plans'
limitation of federal question jurisdiction to abstract interpretations of
federal law, and as the Court affinned in Martin, Osbom, Crowell, and the
Mixed Question Cases, it is the "solemn duty" of Article III courts to answer mixed questions independently8 61 precisely because the answers define the meaning of the Constitution-because "the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only through its application to the particular
circumstances of a case."8 62
The Seventh Circuit also reasoned that, as long as "[filederal courts
are free to express an independent opinion on all legal issues in the
case," Congress, in "[riegulatingrelief," can make federal judges deny all
relief and leave in effect state decisions that in an Article III judge's "independent opinion" conflict with supreme law. 863 But Marbury, Martin,
Cohens, Gordon, and Klein all forbid Congress, or even constitutionally
grounded separation of powers and federalism policies, to force (or permit) Article III courts to surrender jurisdiction at the moment at which
their independent interpretation of supreme law calls for relief sufficient
to nullify law in conflict with the supreme law.8 64 That the law in conflict
here is state decisional law made by state judges in default of their crucial
structural function under the Supremacy Clause aggravates the problem.
For it confounds the core constitutional mechanism that the Framers
865
struggled so hard to design to keep state law in line with federal law.
Nor is the problem solved by letting Article III courts "express an independent opinion on all legal issues in the case." The insult of being
relegated to advising cannot repair the injury of statutorily mandated in866
effectualness in the face of state decisions in conflict with federal law.
860. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870, 872 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (emphasis
added), rev'd, 117 S. Ct 2059 (1997).
861. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939).
862. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (emphasis added); see supra notes 80,
137-139, 201, 222, 250-252, 467-474, 604-653, 671, 834-837 and accompanying text.
863. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 869, 872 (emphasis added).
864. See supra notes 408-424, 537-599, 654-673 and accompanying text.
865. See supra notes 53-55, 80, 137, 139, 201, 222, 238-239, 247-252, 348-349 and
accompanying text.
866. Our conclusion would be different if the federal court's "independent opinion"
thereafter had a binding effect in some still available state or federal (e.g., section 1983)
action between the same parties in which an effective remedy could be imposed. See supra
notes 641-653, 775-777 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit, however, did not
contemplate a resjudicata effect for the "opinion[s]" invited by its interpretation of section
2254(d) (1). Nor may the constitutional problems with the three circuits' interpretation of
section 2254(d) (1) be avoided by reading it to require federal judges to look at whether
the state decision's deviation from supreme law is "reasonable" while forbearing (advisorily)
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that its interpretation of section 2254(d) (1) places no greater constraint on federal judges than
other, accepted doctrines. 867 Unlike the Seventh Circuit's interpretation
of that provision, however, none of the doctrines the court mentioned
impugns federal judges' power and duty "not merely to rule on cases, but
to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III
hierarchy-[nor the] understanding ...that... 'a 'Judicial Power" is one
to render dispasitivejudgments." 8 6 8 Indeed, some of the doctrines the
Seventh Circuit cites positively assure that federal judges render "dispositive" judgments, not ineffectual advice-including the adequate state
grounds and harmless error rules and the resjudicata effect of prior federal decisions.8 19
As we also already have shown, two other doctrines the Seventh
Circuit cites-the Full Faith and Credit and Anti-Injunction Acts-do not
exercise a qualitative congressional power to determine the manner in
which the judicial power is exercised when federal courts have jurisdiction to review state court decisions. Rather, they preserve Congress's
quantitativepower to decide whether, when, and on what courts to confer
8 70
federal jurisdiction to review state judgments.
Two additional cited doctrines-Chevron and political questionsconform to the judicial power in ways the Seventh Circuit's reading of
section 2254(d) (1) does not. As Professor Monaghan has shown, Chevron
to look at whether the state decision in fact deviates from supreme law. First and foremost,
the statute itself tells the federal court that it must "look at" the constitutional questioni.e., that it "shall entertain" any claim that the prisoner "is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" and shall determine whether, in
upholding the federal legality of that custody, the state "decision ... was contrary to...
Federal law...." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1) (West Supp. 1998)
(emphasis added). Second, a court can hardly calibrate the "reasonableness" of a
decision's deviation from federal law without confronting either the deviation itself or, at
least, the category or level of deviation into which the case fits. Third, even if a court
somehow could decide whether an "assumed" violation was "reasonable" without placing
the actual violation before its eyes, that assumption still would trigger the crucial Article III
duties. Unlike denials of relief in the adequate and independent state grounds and
harmless error situations, moreover, in which Article III duties are satisfied by a conclusion
that proceedingfurther, and imposing a remedy without effect on the outcome, would involve
the federal court in rendering an advisory opinion, see supra note 399 and accompanying
text, in the habeas situation, in which the court confronts (or assumes) a dispositive
violation, it is the refusalto go further and to impose relief needed to effectuate federal law
and to neutralize the effect of conflicting state law that makes its decision impermissibly
advisory and ineffectual. Finally, this proposal would require exactly what Marbury and
Klein forbid, namely, that an Article III court on which Congress has conferred jurisdiction
over an issue at the heart of which lies a constitutional question be required to skirt, or
refuse to "look at," the constitutional question. See supra notes 545-599 and
accompanying text.
867. See Lindh, 96 F.3d at 871-73.
868. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (quoting
Easterbrook, supra note 407, at 926 (emphasis added)).
869. See supra notes 399, 419, 451-458, 648-653, 866 and accompanying text.
870. See supra notes 376-389 and accompanying text.
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identifies situations in which, by leaving terms in an agency's organic statute undefined, Congress delegates to the agency the task of defining the
terms through supplementary positive law that has the same force as the
organic statute. 8 71 The federal court thus does not give effect to agency
definitions of statutory terms that it believes are wrong but, instead, independently decides whether the agency has acted within a statutorily delegated power to make supplementary law and, if so, complies with the statutory command to treat the law Congress's delegate has made as it treats
the law Congress itself makes.8 72 Professor Wechsler has applied the
same analysis to the "political question" doctrine, except that there, the
Article III court independently interprets the Constitution itself to see if it
has given Congress the duty to define an ambiguous constitutional provision and, if so, independently applies Congress's definition as the constitutional law of the matter. 873 Unless the Constitution somehow can be
read to give, or to let Congress give, state courts final authority to define
the Constitution in cases over which Congress has given the federal
courts jurisdiction to review state decisions-unless, that is, Article III,
Martin, Cohens, and Ableman are read out of supreme law-Chevron and
political questions do not illustrate the constitutionality of the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of section 2254(d) (1).
Nor, as we have shown, do qualified immunity and Teague-or, for
that matter, a plausible reading of section 2254(d) (1) short of the
Seventh Circuit's-violate Article III's supremacy-bounded "whole law"
principle. 8 74 Rather than denying all relief from state law in conflict with
supreme law at all relevant times, all three doctrines merely make a
choice among remedies (qualified immunity), apply to state action short
of the making of law (same), or keep state judging and decisions in line
with supreme law when the state judge acted, rather than at a later time,
in fulfillment of the federal courts' overriding supremacy-maintaining
function (Teague and, when properly interpreted, 2254(d) (1)).
Nor is Stone v. Powel18 75 (also cited by the Seventh Circuit) analogous. Stone bars federal habeas relief on most Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims premised on Mapp v. Ohio.876 As the Court repeatedly

has explained, however, in refusing to extend Stone to any other federal
claim, 877 the critical (and also sui generis and controversial) feature of the
"right" the Court announced in Mapp and withdrew from habeas enforcement in Stone is that it is "'not a personal constitutional right'" but a
871. See Monaghan, supra note 555, at 27-31; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
872. See Monaghan, supra note 555, at 27-31.
873. See Wechsler, supra note 303, at 7-8; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).

874. See supra notes 753-821 and accompanying text.
875. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
876. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
877. See, e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("We have
'repeatedly declined to extend the rule in Stone beyond its original bounds.'" (citations

omitted)).
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"judicially created' structural remedy 'designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights [of the public generally] . . . through its deterrent effect." 8 78 The Mapp remedy (and right) thus does not belong to the defendant but to the "public" for whom the defendant merely serves as
proxy. Stone then withholds the Mapp remedy on habeas because of its
"minimal [deterrent] utility" on behalf of the public when applied years
879
after the police officer acted.
Because, at any given time, the "public" owning the Mapp right has
available to it alternative remedies (also operative through proxies),
mainly the rule's ongoing enforcement at criminal trials and on direct
review, the Stone doctrine qualifies as merely a choice among remedieswhich, as we have seen, is of no Article III interest as long as some remedy
remains. 88 0 Indeed, the Stone rule is expressly predicated on ongoing access to alternative remedies by the public holder of the Mapp right, because the rule only bars habeas consideration when the relevant state's
criminal procedure provides a generally available "opportunity for full
and fair litigation" of Mapp claims at "trial and on direct review."8 8'
When, on the other hand, the public right holder's principal remedial
alternative is not available on an ongoing basis, Stone lets the public use
habeas petitioners as proxies to give it access to an ongoing habeas remedy. The message Stone sends Article IIIjudges thus is not: "'Look at' the
prisoner's custody. But when you find that it violates her constitutional
rights, and notwithstanding that she has no other remedy available, deny
relief and leave the violation in effect." Rather, the message is: "If the
'public' owner of the right has an alternative ongoing process through
which it can secure an effective remedy, it must choose that process and is
not then before you in the guise of the 'rightless' habeas petitioner."
The Court supported this interpretation when it refused to extend
Stone to bar habeas enforcement of the Miranda rule, even though that
878. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1986) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at
486 (citation omitted)).
879. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95 n.37; see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 379. We do not
defend Mapp or its limitation in Stone, cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-10 (1975) (discussing the uncertain constitutional
status of Mapp), but merely take at face value the Court's persistent description of both as
crucially dependent on the nonpersonal status of the underlying right. Because of the
indispensability of that description to Stone's adoption in the first place, and to the Court's
sedulous refusal to extend the doctrine to other federal, even "prophylactic," rights, see
supra notes 877-878 and accompanying text, it seems likely that but for the Court's
capacity to rely on the description, it would abandon Stone and probably Mapp.
880. See supra notes 775-777 and accompanying text. To like effect are the
exhaustion of state remedies limitation on habeas relief and other abstention doctrines
that forbid federal remedies when, but only when, state remedies actually remain available.
See Liebman & Hertz, supra note 389, at 427 n.18, 653-54; cf. supra note 777 and
accompanying text (after exhaustion occurs and state court relief is denied, habeas relief
generally is the petitioner's only remaining state or federal remedy).
881. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95 & n.37; see id. at 480, 489.
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rule also creates only "prophylactic" or "federal common law" rights.8 82
Miranda and Mapp rights differ, the Court held, because the former are
"personal" to the defendant-giving her a right to keep potentially unreliable evidence from being used against her at "trial"-while the latter
rights belong to the public.8 8 3 This personal-public distinction is the one
Article III would suggest. Because it is the defendant's own federal rights
that are violated when a statement she made in violation of Miranda is
prejudicially introduced against her at trial, denying her a remedy for the
violation of her right in a case as to which the Article III court has jurisdiction would pose an Article III problem that is absent in the Stone context. For then the message to the Article IIIjudge would be: "Adjudicate
the legality of the prisoner's custody. But in deciding whether it is illegal
under the federal Miranda rule, defer to the state court's interpretation
of that rule, or choose that court's rule over the federal rule, or, after
concluding that the custody is illegal under federal law, deny all relief."
So far as we can tell, in the Court's 209-year history, it has never
upheld a statute or adopted a doctrine with the drastic effect of the Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' interpretation of section 2254(d) (1).
There is no precedent for obliging Article III courts to decide whether
state judicial decisions approving state action are contrary to established
federal law, but for then obliging those courts to follow any of the three
courses those circuits' interpretation prescribes: (1) deference to a state
court's normative federal legal judgments; (2) subordination of the commands of the Constitution as the federal court interprets it at all relevant
times to a federal statutory directive to accept the state court's normative
legal judgments; or (3) denial of any and all relief upon independently
concluding that state action and, what is worse from a constitutionalstructural perspective, a state decision upholding that action prejudicially
violated the supreme law of the land at all those times.8 8 4 "Th[is] prolonged [history] would be amazing if such [statutes or doctrines] were
88 5
not understood to be constitutionally proscribed."
882. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993).
883. See id.
884. Nor is any precedent provided by the "law of the case" doctrine, which bars the
reopening of claims previously adjudicated in the same case by the same federal court after
that court's decision has been reviewed and decided one way or the other on appeal.
Compare Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 914-915, 953; (analogizing the three circuits'
interpretation to the law of the case doctrine and the analogous rule barring federalprisoner motions for relief from criminal judgments previously upheld against the same
attack on appeal), with id. at 915-16 & n.171 (conceding that the law of the case doctrine
has never been applied to bind federal courts to state court decisions). As Yakus reveals,
once an Article ILU court has finally resolved a litigant's claim, the federal "judicial Power"
has been exercised fully, and no other federal court-whether coordinate (as in Yakus) or,
especially, the same or an inferior federal court (as in the law of the case context)-has
any Article III or supremacy-based obligation to exercise that "Power" anew. See supra
notes 641-653 and accompanying text.
885. Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995); see Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct 2365, 2374-76 (1997).
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Another possible reason for a diminished judicial power in habeas
cases is their "original" nature. Our conception of the judicial power to
"spot-check" state decisions is mainly a conception of the appellatejudicial
power. Arguably, that conception does not apply to habeas cases, which
(in the currently accepted view) are "original."8s 6 This justification fails.
Most importantly, Article III's references to "lIt] he judicial Power" cover
all, not simply appellate, judicial decisionmaking. And the Court often
has protected the judicial power in cases involving statutory or state
judicial interference with Article III courts' exercise of originaljurisdiction, including Hayburn's Case (circuit court adjudication of widows' and
orphans' petitions), Marbuy and Osborn (the breadth of the Court's and
lower courts' original jurisdiction), Gordon and Klein (political branch interference in Court of Claims cases), Ableman (state court interference
with a federal district court judgment), Crowell and Yakus (lower federal
court challenges to agency behavior), and Plautand Boerne (statutory limits on the res judicata and stare decisis effect of Court decisions). Nor,
surely, is the judicial power diminished because the subject of original
Article III court review is a state court "decision," 88 7 thus invoking the
court's overriding structural duty to supervise "the Judges in every State."
Moreover, habeas cases easily satisfy Marbuty's classic definition of
appellate actions for Article III purposes, because they "revise [ ] and correct[ ] the proceedings in a [judicial] cause already instituted."8 8 8 Any
doubts on this score are removed by section 2254(d) (1), which now expressly requires federal habeas courts to make a manifestly appellate determination-whether the state court "decision was contrary to ... clearly
established [Supreme Court] law."88 9 Nor is there any constitutional objection to using lower federal courts to hear appeals from state courts, as
is clear from the Convention, The Federalist,Martin, Cohens, the precise
holding of The Mayor, and most especially, the plain text of Article III,
which vests the whole 'Judicial Power" in any inferior court Congress creates, extends that "Power" to all "cases arising under" federal law that
Congress assigns to inferior courts, and empowers Congress to declare
"Exceptions" to all of the Supreme Court's appellate power including by
890
shifting it to lower federal courts.
Finally, the least controversial understanding of an inferior federal
court's appellate review of state decisions is as a surrogate for Supreme
Court direct review 89 1-a view of habeas that section 2254(d) (1) suggests
886. See supra notes 807-809 and accompanying text.
887. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1) (West Supp. 1998).
888. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803); supra note 806 and
accompanying text.
889. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (1) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
890. U.S. Consr. art. III, § 1; id. § 2, cl. 1; id. § 2, cl. 2; see supra notes 128-133,
215-226, 247-252, 258-284, 298-327, 380, 662-663 and accompanying text.
891. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 514-16 (1963); Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two
Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 253-54 (1988); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time
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(as did Teague) by requiring habeas courts to apply a rough approximation of the law the Supreme Court assumedly would have applied in the
case on direct appeal certiorari, namely, "clearly established Federal law,
8 92
as determined by the Supreme Court" as of the end of direct appeal.
Indeed, if habeas qualified as an original, not appellate, action vis-a-vis
state trials and appeals, then there would be no good reason why the
following three inherent attributes of original actions, which are abandoned in our jurisprudence only in regard to appellate actions, do not
apply to habeas cases: (1) a prior final judgment's resjudicata effect in a
subsequent original, but not appellate, action;8 93 (2) Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity from suit against the state or its employees in their official capacity, which applies to all original actions in federal court but not to federal appeals of state cases in which the state is a
party;8 94 and (3) the capacity before judgment to "remove" state civil
suits-which include most state postconviction actions-to available, origChart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 106-07 (1959); Patrick E. Higginbotham,
Reflections on Reform of § 2254 Habeas Petitions, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 1005, 1008-10

(1990); supra notes 798-799 and accompanying text.
892. 28 U.S.C.A, § 2254(d) (1) (West Supp. 1998). Lower federal courts more
appropriately serve as surrogate Supreme Courts for supremacy-maintaining than for lawdevelopment purposes. See PaulJ. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts,
53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1953). It thus is not unreasonable to limit habeas review to
federal law that the Supreme Court already had clearly established as of the time it would
have conducted the direct review for which habeas substitutes and to define that law as the
rule reasonable jurists would have known was in effect at the time. Although harsh, this
approach removes any risk that inferior federal judges will usurp the Supreme Court's lawdevelopment function in the process of speculating on the rule they would have applied
had they been on the Court at the time.
893. See IB James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §§ 0.409[1.-1],
0.410[1], 0.441 [21 (2d ed. 1993) (presumptive resjudicata effect of state courtjudgments
in federal original, but not appellate, proceedings); supra notes 380, 388 (absence of res
judicata effect of state court judgments in federal habeas proceedings).
894. Even under the regime of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), habeas actions to
compel the warden to ignore state court judgments of conviction and confinement and to
release a prisoner from the state's custody unless "the State" retries might be thought to
qualify as suits against the state, not any individual in his or her personal capacity. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1183 (1996) (SouterJ., dissenting); Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity bars suits against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial party in
interest"). Although the Eleventh Amendment exception for suits brought to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment rights might cover habeas actions arising under the Constitution,
cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), the requirement of a clear intent to
invoke Congress's powers under Section 5 of that Amendment might be problematic,
because the habeas statute antedates the Amendment, cf. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223,
228 (1989) (Congress's abrogation of states' sovereign immunity must be "unmistakably
clear in... the statute" (citation omitted)). And this theory would not cover treaty and
some statutory claims. Viewing habeas as an appeal avoids sovereign immunity because
federal appeals of state decisions in which a state is a party have long been exempted from
the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 409-12
(1821); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale LJ. 1, 13-29 (1988).
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inal federal forums, in contrast to the strict exhaustion and finality requirements that bar removal of appeals from state to federal courts?8 95
CONCLUSION: THE LESSER IN PLACE OF THE GREATER
In cases over which Congress confers jurisdiction, the Constitution
vests Article IlIjudges with-i.e., it requires them to exercise and forbids
Congress to withdraw-five crucial qualities constituting "[t] he judicial
Power": (1) independent decision of (2) every-and the entire-question affecting the normative scope of supreme law (3) based on the whole
supreme law; (4) finality of decision, subject only to reversal by a superior
court in the Article III hierarchy; and (5) a capacity to effectuate the
court's judgment in the case and in precedentially controlled cases.
Each of these qualities is a constitutionally protected means to
Article III's overriding structural objective of maintaining the supremacy
of federal law and neutralizing the effect of contrary law. And each has
particular force when the subject of federal judicial scrutiny is state statutory or decisional law. In a series of compromises negotiated with excruciating care over the course of the Convention, the Framers designed the
Judiciary and Supremacy provisions as the central means of subordinating the states-and especially their law, with its tendency towards "mutability" and "injustice" 89 6-to national law. The Convention's novel means
of achieving this end was to bifurcate the supremacy-maintaining function between the national judiciary and the nationally co-opted 'judges in
every State"-while letting Congress decide whether and when federal
and state courts would exercise exclusive or shared authority.
By constitutional presumption state judges would do the vast quantity
of the work, serving as ever-ready filters for state action and especially
state law in violation of the "Constitution, and the Laws . . . and all
Treaties ... of the United States." To the federal courts would fall the
task of deploying the constitutionally assured qualities of independent
judgment, decision of the whole question, commitment to national law,
finality, and effectual remedial "Power" in order to (1) spot-check the
state courts' filtering process in cases in which Congress found it necessary or proper to confer jurisdiction and, thus, (2) keep national law
supreme and deprive contrary state law of effect. Checking the federal
judiciary would be the constraints of "[t] he judicial Power" itself (reason
not will; cases and controversies only; resolution of the whole case or
question, no matter how "painful," "difficult[ ]," or "doubtful") and
Congress's power to withdraw federal jurisdiction. Constraining
Congress would be the competing pushes and pulls of its own (often na895. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) (permitting removal of most state civil actions
to federal court with jurisdiction over the matter), with id. § 1257(a) (Supreme Court may
only hear appeals from final judgment[ ] ... rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had"), and id. § 2254(b) (habeas court may only hear claims
that have been exhausted in highest available state court).
896. See supra notes 53-55, 780 and accompanying text.
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tionalizing) ambitions, the states' (typically federalizing) political influence, and the starkness of the all-or-nothing choice the Constitution gave
Congress to confer federal jurisdiction without strings or to withhold jurisdiction and take its chances on state court adjudication.
Because an Article III court's overriding duty to maintain the
supremacy of federal law over state law defines and delimits the judicial
power, the qualitative ingredients of that power are especially potent
when the court is not only discharging its own structural Supremacy
Clause function with regard to state law but also reviewing the exercise by
"the Judges in every State" of theirs. And those ingredients lose constitutional protection when the supremacy of national law over state law is not
implicated (as when a purely factual or state law question is at issue).897
When national legal supremacy and state sovereignty concerns are both
strong-as in section 1983 and habeas cases-the Court has been particularly attentive to the law-focused and supremacy-bounded nature of the
judicial power. Thus, via the careful rationing of qualified immunity limitations on damages and of standing and equitable limitations on prospective relief, the Court has insisted that state law and its "custom" and "policy"
analogues never withstand their inconsistency with federal law, while
sometimes letting isolated official violations that make no state law and
fulfill no structural, supremacy-assuring function escape federal judicial
remedy.898 Via the Teague doctrine, the Court has ruled that, as long as a
federal court is able and obliged to exercise the full supremacymaintaining 'judicial Power" in deciding that state judges fulfilled their
supremacy-assuring function when they ruled, Article III's overriding
structural objective has been achieved, and the federal court is not required in addition to apply supreme law as it developed in the months or
8 99
years since the state court ruled.
As we have shown, habeas section 2254(d) (1) as amended by the
1996 Antiterrorism Act plausibly may be interpreted to preserve the constitutional design in the same manner as Teague. In contrast, the Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits' alternative interpretation sunders that
design. For it not only limits the federal court to the supreme law as of
the time the state judges ruled but also makes the Article III court (1)
defer to state judges' interpretation of that law, (2) give the statute's
"adopt the state court's reasonable interpretation" edict priority over the
Constitution, or (3) forbear exercising a remedial power to effectuate
supreme law when, in the Article III court's independent estimation, the
state court failed to do so and in the process made contrary state law.
But what of the argument that the "greater" power to withdraw jurisdiction encompasses the "lesser" power to regulate any jurisdiction that is
conferred? 90 0 Assuming that Congress has every Article III right (putting
897.
898.
899.
900.

See supra notes 632-640, 671-675 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 753-760, 774-789 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 761-773, 790-799 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850).
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aside any Suspension Clause constraints) to withdraw all habeas jurisdiction over state convictions-a proposal Congress considered but rejected
in the process of adopting section 2254(d) (1) 9 0 1-can it not also grant
federal jurisdiction but withhold the power to decide the case independently, or attentively to the Constitution, or effectually, unless the state
court deviation from supreme law is "grave"? The Court's answer to repeated questions of this sort has consistently been "No"-in Hayburn's
Case, Gordon, and Plaut (barring Congress from granting jurisdiction
while conditioning the court's power to effectuate its judgments on some
approving, or on the absence of some disapproving, executive or legislative action); in Ableman, Martin, and Cohens (by implication, at least, forbidding Congress to grant federal jurisdiction but subject Article III court
decisions to state court review); in Marbuy, Klein, and Yakus (forbidding
Congress to grant jurisdiction but tell the court to ignore the bearing of
the Constitution or give the Constitution Congress's interpretation or
surrender jurisdiction whenever the court's interpretation of the
Constitution differs from Congress's); in Martin, Crowell, and the Mixed
Question Cases (forbidding Congress to grant jurisdiction but limit the
court's power to reverse the constitutional-normative judgments a state
court or federal administrator made in applying supreme law to the
facts); and in Boerne and Reynoldsville (forbidding Congress after granting
the Supreme Court jurisdiction, and forbidding state courts, to deprive
the Court's judgments of stare decisis effect).
There is a good reason why the Court has given this answer: The
precise goal of the Framers' hard-fought compromises culminating in
Article III and the Supremacy Clause was to cede to Congress the
"greater" power while forbidding it to exercise the "lesser"-i.e., in good
checks and balances fashion, to grant and limit Congress's power to grant
and limit the federal courts' power. As much as Madison and the other
nationalists preferred (and repeatedly proposed) a congressionalveto on
state law contrary to federal law and, that failing, a federaljudicialveto on
contrary state law by way of exclusive federal jurisdiction in federal question cases, the Convention would accept neither. But as much as the confederationists preferred (and repeatedly proposed) to limit drastically the
size of the federal judiciary and, that failing, to give Congress plenary
control over the quality as well as the quantity (if any) of federal jurisdiction over federal questions, the Convention would accept neither.
Instead, the Convention gave Congress nearly plenary control of the
quantity of federal jurisdiction over federal questions, while requiring
Congress-whenever it could not serve its purposes without the help of
the federal courts-to let those courts independently determine the bearing of the whole supreme law on the case and effectuate their judgment.
As the Framers designed Article III and the Supremacy Clause, and as the
Court consistently has interpreted them, Congress was free to say how
901. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7829, S7849 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
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much or how little federal question jurisdiction the Article III courts
would exercise, and free (its own ambitions permitting) to leave most of
that jurisdiction to state courts partially co-opted by the Supremacy
Clause. But, if Congress found it necessary or proper to establish lower
federal courts and give them and the Supreme Court jurisdiction over
federal questions, it was not free to specify the manner in which the federal courts would exercise that jurisdiction or the level of fortitude they
would exhibit in maintaining the supremacy of national law and in nulli90 2
fying contrary law made by Congress or the states and their courts.

902. Mr. Scheidegger agrees that a lesser power offensive to core constitutional
policies cannot be saved by a greater power's permissibility, but he proposes an exception:
Congress, he claims, may compel Article III judges to exercise less than the full "judicial
Power" in cases within their jurisdiction as long as the only effect of doing so is to limit
"mere" federal court "relitigation" of matters previously addressed in the state courts. See
Scheidegger, supra note 75, at 917, 921, 953-57. The flaw in this argument is that the
essence of the Convention's, the Constitution's,and the Court's solution to the centralproblem of state
legal fidelity to federal law is "relitigation'--i.e.,Article III courts' deployment of "[t]he
judicial Power" in its entirety in reviewing state decisions to assure that state law does not
withstand its inconsistency with federal law. True, Congress may altogether forbid
"relitigation"-if it can do so without unduly trimming its own ambitions. Federal courts
have no roving commission to treat as "void any prior judgment on a federal question of
any... state court, simply because the Article III court disagrees with it." Cf. id. at 892.
But once Congress does authorize federal "relitigation" of matters previously adjudicated
in state court-as it did in, e.g., Martin, Cohens, and The Mayor, over vehement objections
that federal adjudicative redundancy was unconstitutionally insulting to the states and their
courts, see, e.g., supra notes 380, 478, 481 and accompanying text, and as it has done in
section 2254(d) (1), see supra notes 888-890 and accompanying text-then the whole
constitutionalpoint is that thefederal court must exercise the entire supremac-maintaining7udicial
Power," at risk of "treason to the Constitution."

